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Summary 
This thesis examines the experiencesof Sudan and Tanzania in attempting 
to control their respective insurance industries to serve their economic 
development. The socio-political chemistry in each country has produced a 
certain policy towards the insurance institution. The Sudan opted to control 
its industry through a regulation code; Tanzania adopted nationalization as 
an ultimate form of control. The thesis examines the respective roles of the 
two regulation models in the development process, and argues that, on balance, 
a direct model of insurance control such as in Tanzania is more appropriate to 
the needs of underdeveloped countries than a regulatory model of the Sudanese 
type. This conclusion derives from insurance theory itself, and from the need 
to avoid the problems which afflict the regulatory model such as the technical 
difficulties which regulation involves, the weakness of the regulation agency 
vis-a-vis the industry, the influence of the latter upon the agency, the 
difficulty of monitoring solvency, and of enforcing investment regulations. 
In theory, the state is also more capable of protecting the public which seeks 
insurance cover from its own institution than when cover is purchased from 
private insurers. 
Most information relates to the period 1970-1977, and the thesis is 
largely based on fieldwork research in the Sudan and Tanzania and on secondary 
resources. Although the methods of control examined are largely legal methods 
an attempt is made to transcend law for a better understanding of the problems 
which afflict the institution. A legal doctrinal study preoccupied with the 
analysis of rules and procedures is unlikely to provide an insight into how 
the institution operates. Even less is it likely to be of value when legal 
rules are not truly reflective of practice. It is for this reason that the 
institution is studied in the wider political economy of the two countries. 
CHAPTER ONE : INSURANCE, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
'We need constantly to remind ourselves that since this country 
[Britain] has never been well endowed with natural resources 
and is now no longer the manufacturer for the rest of the world,... 
it is increasingly dependent upon the sale of its export ser- 
vices, such as banking and insurance. ' 
Per Edger Bowing, The Chairman of B. I. A., 
Journal of the Insurance Institute of London: V01.60, 
October, 1971 
I. Introduction: 
The theories of modernization) which envisaged development as an 
evolutionary movement from an original state of 'underdevelopment' to an 
idealized version of western capitalist countries2, shared the notion which 
conceived of underdevelopment as being a natural phenomenon, original and 
self-inflicted. 
3 However, toward the end of the. first Development Decade 
1. see e. g. D. E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1965-y; S. P. Huntingdon, Political Order in Chan in 
Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); M. Weiner ed. , 
Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth (New York: Basic Books, 1966). 
2. As Lloyd argues, modernization theories 'confidently assumed that the 
rest of the world will noton=ly become like the United States but that it 
wishes to do so'. see, P. C. Lloyd, Classes, Crises and Coups: Themes 
in the Sociology of Developing Countries, (London: Paladin, 1973). p. 69. 
3. See e. g., S. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: Annon - Communist 
Manifesto, (London: Cambridge University Press, 19 0; R. Nurkse, The 
Problems of Capital Formation in the Underdeveloped Countries. (Oxford: 
Oxfor University Press, 1953_; P. PJ. Rosenstein-Rodan, Capital Formation 
and Economic Development, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964); but see, 
Pau A. Baran and E. J. Hobsbawn, The Stages of Economic Growth: A 
review, in Charles K. Wilber (ed. ), The Political Economy of Development 
and Underdevelopment, (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 
-4-5--73. 
(1960-70), in which economic thinking was dominated by modernization ideas, 
the conditions of underdeveloped countries deteriorated further, and the 
theories of modernization were relegated more and more to the limbo of 
academic history. 
' 
Ideas rival to 'modernization' soon dominated the main- 
stream academe on 'underdevelopment'. But, as will follow shortly, these 
ideas were not 'a sort of mental thunderclap that occurred at a given time 
and place'2 i. e. in the aftermath of the downfall of modernization theories, 
and taken together the ideas do not 'constitute a unified body of theory 
. 
that is entirely coherent, internally consistent, and relatively unchanging'3 
In political economy circles, however, and perhaps for convenience alone, 
these ideas form 'the theory of underdevelopment'. 
4 Virtually all writers 
who contributed to the theory of underdevelopment rejected the ideological 
1. The Cocoyac Declaration, for example, stipulated that '[w]e reject 
the unilinear views which see development essentially and inevitably 
on the effort to imitate the historical model of countries that for 
various reasons happened to be rich today. For this reason we reject 
the concept of 'gaps' in development. The goal is not to 'catch up' 
but to ensure the quality of life for all with a productive base 
compatible with the needs of future generations. ' Quoted by Jos¬ 
Ripoll, 'Some Thoughts on Insurance and Development', Best's Review, 
February, 1976, p. 49. 
2. F. H. Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in The United States", 
12 Latin American Research Review 7, p. 8. quoted by Francis G. Synder. 
"Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory", Law and Society 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, Spring 1980, p. 724. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The major writers on the political economy of underdevelopment include: 
Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, (_New York: Penguin Books 
[reprinted 1973]j-: -, Andre G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, (New 
York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Latin America n erdevelo - 
ment or Revolution, (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1970); 
Arghiri Emmanne , Une ual 
Exchange, (London: Monthly Review Press, 1972); 
Samir Amin, Accumu ation on a World Scale. (New York and London: Monthly 
Review Press, 1974); Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A 
Marxist Analysis, (London: Macmillan, 1979); Colin Leys, Underdevelopment 
in Kenya: the Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, (London: Heinemann, 
197 5 etc... 
misconception once propagated by modernization theorists on the causes 
and nature of underdevelopment. To these writers development and under- 
development were partial, interdependent eventualities that were not just 
contemporaneous. but inter-connected. The development of Western Europe, 
in particular, depended upon, and caused the underdevelopment of Africa. 
1 
The theory of underdevelopment begins with the works of Marx and Lenin, 
although voluminous contributions to its main body were made after the 
Second World War. Marx analysed the effects of British capitalist expansion 
2 
and Lenin examined the development of capitalism in Russia3 up to 1899, and 
formulated a general theory of imperialism. 
4 Two distinct, albeit inter- 
related, aspects of Marx's treatment of the phenomenon of underdevelopment 
are most relevant to the study of the role of colonial insurance institutions 
in the now underdeveloped countries with which this chapter is concerned. 
Firstly, Marx saw the invasion and plundering of 'undeveloped' regions by 
British capitalism as part and parcel of the pröcess of 'primitive accumulation 
of capital'. This accumulation was necessary to lay the foundation for the 
transition from mercantile capitalism to industrial capitalism. Secondly, 
he saw the destruction of stagnant or non-evolutionary social formations as a 
1. See e. g., Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (London: 
Bogle- L'Ouverture Publications, [2nd. ed. 1978]). 
2. For example in India, see K. Marx, "British Rule in India", in K. Marx 
and F. Engles: Selected Works, (Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing 
House: 1962), Vo . I. 
3. V. I. Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, (Moscow : Progress 
Publisheres, 1964 . 
4. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism, (Moscow 
Progress Publishers, tlitn printing, . iiuj 
pre-condition for the attainment of a higher level of economic development. 
This destruction could only be brought about by capitalist penetration which 
transforms land into a commodity with value, exploits minerals, and 
ultimately forces the creation of vast markets for the consumption or 
capitalist industrial products. 
' 
Marx, however, writing around the middle 
of the last century, could only see, and concentrate on, the positive or 
rather 'progressive' aspects of capitalist penetration in the colonies. He 
'failed to consider the consequences for underdeveloped countries of the 
removal of a major portion of their economic surplus to Europe' 
2 
and argued 
that the operation of capital in the backward regions would eventually 
speed up the industrialization of these regions. 
3 
In fact he was so certain 
of this 'inevitable' industrialization that he feared 'lest a developed 
bourgeois East may become the essential force preventing victory of the 
4 
socialist revolution in Europe'. But there can be no doubt that the writings 
of Marx provided a solid theoretical foundation upon which the modern 
neo-Marxist version of the theory of underdevelopment is based. 
5 
Indeed, neo-Marxist literature on underdevelopment is largely an application 
of Marx's methods and central ideas to the question of the failure of backward 
regions to achieve a 1-evel of development comparable to the developed regions 
after they had been incorporated into the world system. Baran6 (a leading 
K. Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, (London: Lawrence & Wishart 
1964). 
2. Francis G. Snyder, "Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory", 
Supra., p. 738. 
3. See e. g. S. Avinevi (ed. ), K. Marx on Colonialism and Mbdernization, (New 
York: Doubleday Anchor, 190), p. 464. 
4. Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, Supra., p. 147. 
5. Not all theorists of underdevelopment were Marxists. 
6. Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, Surpa. 
Marxist) for example, offers a framework of analysis which emphasizes an 
historical perspective and its importance for understanding the structure 
of underdevelopment as well as an analysis of the interactions between the 
developed and underdeveloped worlds. Like Marx, Baran argues that the con- 
tact between the two worlds at the dawn of colonialism had subjected the 
periphery to the hegemony of capital and had accelerated the decomposition 
of the pre-capitalist structure and established the base for the develop- 
ment of a new mode of production. But the method of contact extracted an 
important part of the surplus which was used in the colonial powers' 
industrial sectors, and thus the possibility of progress and industrialization 
which Marx had predicted was prevented. Indeed, it was impossible for the 
colonies to develop under a system of division of labour which compelled 
them to specialize in the production and export of primary goods. And 
central to the extraction process was the fact that the owners of capital 
invested in India, for example, lived in Britain, not in India, and the returns 
of investment were ploughed into the British, not the Indian, economy. But 
there can be no doubt tha t' had the economic surplus that Britain has torn out 
from India, been invested in India, India's economic development to date 
would have born little similarity to the actual sombre record. ' 
'It 
was 
this 'extraction' from the periphery, then, which inter alia, caused its 
underdevelopment. At a later phase of colonialism and under neo-colonialism, 
this extraction depended not so much upon brute force or plundering as on the 
fact that the socio-economic structures of the periphery underwent a process 
1. Ibid., pp. 281-2. 
of adaptation and change which made this extraction possible and self- 
reproducing. Bernstein1 maintains that: 
The original centres of capitalism established their wealth 
and their power through incorporating and exploiting other 
parts of the world. The primary accumulation of capital 
in the metropoles or centre was fed through a drain of wealth 
from the satellite or peripheral countries typically 
involving their colonization, a 'surplus drain' which 
continues to the present day even if its forms may have 
changed and direct colonial rule is no longer a necessary 
condition of this process. 
The two hypotheses basic to the Marx-Baran approach to the study of 
underdevelopment appear to apply to the metropolitan insurance institutions 
which had transacted business in the periphery in that: firstly, those 
institutions had performed a category of services alien to the domestic 
economic structures which had prevailed in the periphery before the operation 
of capital. 
2 Secondly, metropolitan insurers appear to have contributed 
a great deal to the extraction of surplus, and hence, the underdevelopment 
of the periphery. In the light of these hypotheses the role of insurers 
(mainly British) in the, colonial and neo-colonial underdevelopment is examined 
below within the context of the dialectical relationship between the periphery 
and the metropoles in the early imperalist epoch and under monopoly capitalism. 
This approach necessitates an account of the economic and historical develop- 
ments which paved the way for the imperalist hegemony in the periphery and 
facilitated the operation of insurance companies on a world scale. 
1. H. Bernstein, "Sociology of Underdevelopment v. Sociology of Development? " 
in David Lehmann (ed. ), Development Theory: Four Critical Studies, (London: 
Frank Cass, 1979), p. 83. 
2. As discussed in Chapters Three and Five below, various measures were 
enacted to exclude the AFrican population in the Sudan, Uganda and 
Tanganyika from the field of insurance. 
II. Insurance and Underdevelopment 
A. The Early Imperialist Epoch : 1870 - 1914 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the capitalist world was caught 
in a severe economic depression which caused grave social problems. The 
primary factor which had speeded up the depression was the over-production 
of capital that had continued for a long time. Industrial expansion, 
earlier in the century, whilst providing an opportunity for more expansion 
and extraction of greater surplus value, brought home to the minds of 
industrialists and statesmen that the growth of constant capital i. e. machines 
etc, coupled with the stagnation of variable capital i. e. labour, ultimately 
leads the rate of profit to fall. 
1 The expansion of British exports, which 
had risen by one-third between 1860 and 1873, came to a sudden end, and by 
1876 exports of British produce shrank by 25 per cent in value. 
2 
Investment 
in Britain attracted little capital because of meagre returns. The same 
conditions prevailed in most of the Western European countries. 
The fall of the rate of profit gave a stimulus for two developments: the 
imperalist expansion abroad in search for cheap raw materials and markets, 
and the concentration of capital at home in order to cope with the demands 
of capital investment. The expansion of capital abroad and the low cost of 
extracting materials were related in that the expansion of capital in the 
periphery had often been accompanied by massive displacement of the population, 
at mining cities,. for example, while the penetration of manufactured goods 
ruined indigenous crafts and industries, and the function of both processes 
1. K. Marx, Capital. Vol. III (London: Lawrence & Wishart, [6th ed. 1977]), 
pp. 211-66. 
D. Wadada Nabudere, The Political Economy of Imperialism, (Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania Publishing House, [2nd. ed. 1978]), p. 96. 
was to create an imbalance between the supply of labour and the demand for 
it. In other words, the operation of capital had created the conditons 
for reducing the reward for labour. On the other hand, raw materials 
extracted at a low cost could be sold cheaply in the metropoles, and thus 
the owners of capital could pay lower wages to labour, on a global scale, 
and retain an enormous rate of surplus value. 
' Thus the rate of profit 
was, among other things, dependent upon the exchange of primary and 
manufactured goods between the centre and the periphery. 
2 As Marx 
observed: 
3 
Since foreign trade partly cheapens the elements of constant 
capital and partly the necessities of life for which the 
variable capital is exchanged, it tends to raise the rate 
of surplus value and lowering the rate of constant capital. 
It generally acts in this direction by permitting an 
expansion of the scale of production. 
The Scramble for overseas territories and markets, assumed the utmost 
importance in European political and social life as a means of easing the 
crisis of capitalism. There was a frantic European race for the acquisition 
of 'places in the sun'. In Africa, towards the end of the last century, 
the French Republic founded a French empire extending from Lake Chad to the 
Atlantic Ocean. ` Britain controlled parts of West Africa, South Africa and 
West Africa. Germany occupied South West Africa (Namibia), Cameroun, Togo, 
Tanganyika and Guinea. Belgium acquired the Congo, and Portugal grabbed 
Angola and Mozambique. Spain and Italy also had their share in the African 
pie. 
4 
Samir Amin, op. cit. pp. 175-6, also, Latin American Perspectives, 
issue 21, Vol. VI, No. 2, Spring 1979, pp. 62-86. 
2. A. Emmannel, Unequal Exchange, Supra. 
3. K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, Supra. p. 238 
4. M. E. Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, (London: Longmann, [3rd. ed. 1977]; 
Another feature of the early imperialist epoch of capitalism was the 
export of capital for investment abroad. BukharinI explains the movement 
of capital southwards: 
The more developed a country, the lower is the rate of profit, the greater is the over-production of capital, and consequently, the lower is the demand for capital and the stronger is the 
expulsion process. Conversely, the higher the rate of profit, the lower the organic composition of capital, the greater is the demand for it and the greater is the attraction. 
By 1907, British capital invested overseas was 75 per cent higher than 
in 1890, and on the eve of the Great War, British foreign investments may 
have exceeded net home investments. 
2 By 1904, there were 50 British 
colonial banks with 2,279 branches, and 72 banks with 5449 branches in 
1910.3 French, Dutch and German banks had, at about the same time, a total 
of 274 overseas branches between them. 
4 Britain controlled the economy of 
Egypt by acquiring a large share in the Suez Canal Company, and of East 
Africa through the British East Africa Company. 5 Italy incorporated Libya 
and (later) Ethiopia into the capitalist system through the activities of 
Prasso Company, Banco di Roma and Banco di Napoli; while French capital 
dominated West Africa through various institutions such as the compagnie 
Francaise de L'Afrique, and the whole of North Africa by seven giant French 
1. N. Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy. (New York and London: Monthly 
Review Press, 1973 , p. 315. 
2. Maurice H. Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (London and 
Henley: Routledge paperback, 1963 [reprinted 1978]), p. 315. 
3. U. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Supra, pp. 63-4. 
4. Ibid. 
5. See -generally, L. Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa, (London: Allen and 
Unwin, [2nd. ed. 1968]). 
-10- 
banks. 1 
Thus European economic imperialism manifested itself in the invasion 
of colonies and their conversion into huge markets for manufactured goods 
and sources of cheap raw materials. Each colony was forced to trade with 
a 'mother country' by receiving most of its imports from it, and exporting 
its products to it, with enormous profits in the process accruing to 'some 
citizens of the European state. '2 The services which insurance rendered 
to colonialism will be discussed later, suffice it to say here that in this 
imperialist scenario insurance and banking had set the stage for an economic 
exploitation of the colonies on a scale unparalleled in history. They had 
financed the railways, harbours, missionary activities and imperialist 
expeditions, they invested enormous capital and reaped astronomical profits. 
The British insurance industry was not isolated from the economic and 
social conditions then prevailing in Britain; and as a capital market 
institution it also had a role to play in the underdevelopment of the 
periphery as was mentioned earlier. In the following section an attempt 
is made to show how British insurers responded to the changing economic 
conditions in Britain, and the nature of their activities overseas. 
1. Siddik Et-Tijani El-Mardi, "African Insurance Markets: Structure 
and Development", Economic and Social Studies Research 
Council 
(Khartoum, 1976). pp. 3-4. 
2. L. Wolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa, Supra. p. 19. 
-11- 
B. Concentration of Insurance Capital 
The economic depression, mentioned above, affected the British insurance 
industry as much as it affected other industries. There was an unprecendented 
decline in the yield of traditional insurance investments. In mortgages, for 
example, previously a popular field, investments fell from about a half to 
less than a quarter of total insurance investments between 1870 and 1913.1 
The creed of free competition was also forcing companies to close down, and 
between 1850-1884, there were 165 company failures, 
2 
and another 399 companies 
were wound up between 1850 and 1899.3 
Insurance capital, then, had to amalgamate in order to avoid competition 
by controlling national markets, and in order to reduce the costs of manage- 
ment, but also to cope with the demands of other finance institutions engaged 
in colonial investment. The early part of this century was marked by the 
intensification of insurance capital concentration reflected in the joining 
together of very large offices as when the Royal acquired the Lancashire in 
1 
1901, the Atlas acquired the Manchester in 1904, or the Alliance acquired the 
Law Fire and Country and the Imperial in 1906.4 The Commercial Union Group 
began its amalgamations in 1861 when it acquired the Mercantile Fire, and 
1. Barry Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 1720-1970, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), p. 331. 
2. H. A. L. Cockerell and Edwin Green, The British Insurance Business, 1547- 
1970, (London: Heinemann Books, 1978T. pp. 62-4. 
3. The Insurance Directory and Year Book, 1964-1965, (Post Magazine Almanack, 
London-. Buc iey Press, 1965). List of companies wound up, amalgamated and 
allied companies, pp. 278-96. 
4. Barry Supple, "Corporate Growth and Structural Change in a Service Industry: 
Insurance" in, Barry Supple (ed. ), Essays in British Business History, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 82. 
-12- 
its later subsidiaries included 24 other companies. 
1 Between 1891 and 
1915, there were 230 amalgamations. 2 
In addition to the formation of insurance giants, this century witnessed 
the appearance of Insurance Associations and Tariff Groups such as the 
Accidents Offices Association, Engineering Offices Association, The 
Fire Offices Committee, and over 20 other associations across all the 
branches of the industry. The object of these associations was to mitigate 
competition by concluding agreements on premiums to be charged in order to 
uphold rates at business levels. 
3 
By 1900, the Tariff Offices accounted 
for 90 per cent of the home premiums, and for 95 per cent of overseas 
4 
premiums. 
C. Overseas Insurance Business: 
As mentioned earlier, one of the motives behind the concentration of 
insurance capital was to strengthen the financial base of the companies 
so that they could meet the demands of other giant enterprises in the 
capital market. The transfer of capital by banks and bank-like institutions, 
for example, needed the intercessionary and complementary role of insurance 
to secure the safety of capital invested abroad and to ensure its repatriation 
to the lenders. The early colonial insurance offices were in fact set up, 
in many colonies, by the help of colonial banks which had financial traders 
1. Cockerell and Green, The British Insurance Business 1547-1970, Supra, pp. 
83-101, see also H. E. Raynes, A History of Britis Insurance, (London: 
Pitman & Sons Ltd., [2nd. ed. 1964]), pp. 366-72. 
2. Barry Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, Supra, p. 298 
Ronald Beale, After the V&G. Crash, (London: City Press and Compton 
Press, 1972), pp. 26-31. 
4. Barry Supple (ed. ), Essays in British Business History, Supra., p. 75. 
-13- 
and had sought to ensure the repayment of the loans advanced by them. 
1 
Colonial insurers covered the invested capital against destruction, tabour 
riots, fire and weather conditions, and secured the transfer of investment 
returns, primary goods and raw materials etc by providing cover against 
accidents in the course of cargo loading or ships and against the sea 
perils of the voyage until the goods were safely dispatched at the metropolis. 
At this end they were manufactured into processed goods and food stuffs, and 
again insured and shipped for marketing in the colonies. Part of the returns 
of marketing were invested in the extraction of further resources and again 
protected by insurance cover at all stages until they reached their final 
destination, and so on. The role of insurance institutions was to underwrite 
the success of colonisalism as an economic venture. 
British insurance offices set up their branches abroad from a very early 
date in America, South Africa, Latin America and the Far East, and wherever 
Britain had made its influence felt. Between 1797 and 1829, a very large 
number of companies were established in India including seven marine insurance 
offices. 
2 By 1866, the Ocean, the Imperial, the London Assurance, the 
Royal Exchange-and four other companies were represented in Valparaiso, 
and between 1875-1883, twenty one British companies were operating in Lima 
and Buenos Aires. 
3 By 1910, the Royal Exchange had overseas branches in 
Lima, the West Indies, Egypt, Argentina, Russia, South Africa and 22 other 
countries. 
4 
1. see generally, M. Grossmann (ed. ), Insurance Markets of the World, 
(Zurich: Swiss Reinsurance Co. 1964 
2. Ibid., p. 472. 
3. Charles Jones, "Insurance Companies" in D. C. Platt (ed. ), Business 
Imperialism, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 54. 
4. Barry Supple, The Royal Exchange op. cit. p. 472. 
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The head offices in London or Paris controlled overseas branches through 
regional satellite offices which, in turn, had their sub-satellites to super- 
vise. Through its regional office in Lagos, for example, the Royal Exchange 
transacted business in Liberia, Ghana and Siera Leone. 
1 The company's 
branch in Cairo had oversight of Sudan, Palestine, Malta and Cyprus, while 
the Levant office controlled other sub-offices in Constantinople, Smyrna 
and Rumania. 
2 Insurers who transacted business in East Africa did so by 
establishing regional offices in Nairobi. 
3 British insurers had dominated 
the world. 
For all British insurers without exception, overseas business was - and 
still is - the one whence most of the profit came. The overseas premiums 
of the Sun Fire Office between 1882-1891, were £1.2m. and in 1891 alone, 
overseas premiums stood at £551,900 while home premiums were £405,500.4 
At the turn of this century the Commercial Union Group derived three-quarters 
of its total premium income from abroad; 
5 
and by 1914, the Royal Exchange 
had an overseas income of £590,000 as fire premiums in a total fire portfolio 
of £856,000.6 Although many examples of the profitability of overseas 
branches could be given, it is difficult to estimate the total capital 
repatriated by insurers. As to the colonies whence this capital was extracted, 
the capital has been lost for ever. 
1, M. Grossmann (ed. ) Insurance Markets of the World, Supra, p. 384, p. 346 
and p. 355. 
2. Barry Supple, The Royal Exchange, op. cit. p. 484 
3. For example, The Prudential, see R. W. Barnard, A Century of Service: The 
Story of the Prudential, 1848-1948 (London: Wither y Ltd., 1948), 
V. 100. 
4. P. M. Dickson, The Sun Fire Office, 1710-1960, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1960), Appendix 1, pp. 304-5. 
5. B. Supple, The Royal Exchange, op. cit., p. 214, 
6. Ibid., Table 11.2, p. 242. 
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Apart from being efficient agencies for the impoverishment of the 
former colonies, British and other European insurers, one may speculate, 
might have played a role in the suppression of labour movements which 
characterized colonial rule, in view of the fact that insurers would have 
had to foot the bill for whatever insured property that was damaged by 
strikes and labuur riots. But what was beyond doubt was the fact that 
British offices abroad had formed great centres of power and had adversely 
influenced developments in the field of insurance in more than one territory. 
They delayed the emergence of indigenous insurers, contained them when they 
were set up, and sabotaged official attempts to impose restrictions upon 
themselves. In Chile, for example, a bill proposed for the regulation of 
insurance business in 1888, only became law in 1904, and even then, after 
British insurance offices had influenced the authorities to reduce the 
required deposits for life insurance by 80 per cent and for fire insurance 
by 40 per cent. 
1 Similar attempts to regulate-insurers were also contained 
in Argentina and Columbia, and with equal success. 
2 The methods employed 
by British offices in their compaigns against national legislatures included 
the media, access to the centres of power in congresses, reliance on British 
diplomatic support and, more effectively, the threat of denying reinsurance 
facilities in London. 
3 
1. Charles Jones, "Insurance Companies" in D. C. Platt (ed. ), Business 
Imperialism, Supra, p. 66. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
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The expansion of British insurers abroad provided them with great 
opportunities to minimize the effects of competition at home, and at the 
same time, a particular office could continue to serve its clients of 
officers, colonial bureaucrats and traders who followed the Union Jack. 
Francophone Africa provided similar opportunities to the French Companies. 
) 
But there was yet another important aspect for the expansion of insurance 
offices abroad which was - and still is - central to insurance business 
imperialism. This was the spread of the insured portfolio on a global scale 
which was absolutely indispensable to successful underwriting. Insurance 
itself is a device which is based on the law of large numbers i. e. on the 
assumption that the combination of uncertainties produces greater certainty. 
2 
It follows that the more spread the insurance portfolio, the better the 
results will be, the higher the profits made, but also the less reinsurance 
will be needed. This is so because every policy added to the portfolio, 
though a source of potential profits in itself, also increases the retention 
capacity of an insurer by strengthening its financial base thereby reducing 
its needs for reinsurance. 
3 The success of insurance business is, undoubtedly, 
synonymous with its geographical spread. 
1. See e. g. I. W. Hurley, "Insurance in the Former French Territories of 
North, West, and Equatorial Africa - The Changing Scene". Journal of 
the Insurance Institute of London, Vol. 52, pp. 30-40. 
2. See generally, Robert I. Meher and Emerson Cammack, Principles of 
Insurance, (Illinois, R. D. Inc. 1976). 
3. Jose Ripoll, "UNCTAD and Insurance", Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 8, 
1974, p. 76. 
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III Insurance and Underdevelopment Under Monopoly Capitalism 
The introduction to this chapter outlined two hypotheses (postulated as 
propositions which link the study of the insurance institution to the main- 
stream rhetoric on underdevelopment) which underlay the operations of metro- 
politan insurance institutions in the periphery: (a) that vis-a-vis the 
dominant economic formations in the periphery insurance was an alien instit- 
ution, (_b) that the extraction of surplus by insurers played a part in the 
underdevelopment of the now underdeveloped countries. In this section we 
will see how changes in the economic and social structures in the former 
colonies have facilitated, fostered and maintained underdevelopment through 
insurance institutions in the neo-colonial epoch. This examination is 
rather brief because the subject is dealt with in all the remaining chapters. 
The extension of the capitalist relations in the former colonies under 
the hegemony of capital had introduced the laws'of motion of the capitalist 
mode of production, and the relations of production that emerged were a 
function of this mode. Hence, in the majority of former colonies the 
transition to political independence took the form, largely, of a replacement 
of colonialists by an indigenous bourgeoisie which acted as a 'resident 
1 
ruling class' promoting its interest and that of its metropolitan partner. 
This indigenous bourgeoisie controlled export-import activities, insurance 
and credit institutions, and above all, state power to maintain its interests 
indefinitely. 2 Thus in nearly all neo-colonial situations the external 
orientation of the economy continued , the international division of labour 
persisted and the capitalist trajectory for development was accepted as an 
article of faith. 
1. Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, (London: Academic 
Press, 1980), p. 174. 
However, in a large number of countries the fortunes of metropolitan 
insurers were affected, as we shall see, in form rather than in substance. 
Direct insurance outflows from the underdeveloped countries gradually 
declined in importance in relation to reinsurance outflows; and insurance 
business imperialism became dependent upon the extraction of reinsurance 
premiums rather than on direct insurance premiums. This statement, however, 
must be qualified. Undoubtedly, in many former colonies foreign insurers 
still operate, 
' 
and in others it is still possible to place a local risk 
with an insurer situated abroad. But despite the dearth of information, it 
appears that reinsurance transfers to the metropoles are rapidly overtaking 
direct insurance transfers. In 1971, for example, the Commercial Union 
Groups (U. K. ) reported that it had ceased operating in 22 countries during 
the decade 1961-1971.2 In the same decade ending in 1971, the proportion 
of foreign business to total premiums for Swiss insurers was 25 per cent 
for life insurers, 59 per cent for non-life insurers, but reinsurers obtained 
92 per cent of their portfolios from abroad. 
3 
1. In Francophone Africa, in particular, little has changed since 
independence was obtained. For until 1975, D homey, Upper Volta, 
Mauritania and Chad had no indigenous insurance companies, while in 
most former French colonies French companies still rule supreme, 
see 0. Lijadu, "Government Control of Operations of the Insurance 
Industry in Developing Countries", Journal of West African Insurance 
Consultative Association, Vol. 1,1975, p. 41. 
2. Robert L. Carter, "Multinational Insurance Companies", Discussion Papers 
in Industrial Economics, No. 34, (University of Nottingham, 1975), p. 6. 
3. Karl Uster, "The International Activity of Swiss Insurers and Reinsurers", 
International Insurance Monitor, May, 1974, p. 177. 
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In many former colonies the growth of reinsurance business ceded abroad 
was caused by the same process which reduced direct insurance transfers: 
in many countries insurance was nationalized and in others the ownership 
of insurance companies was confined to indigenous entrepreneurs. In both 
categories of insurance markets it is not possible to cover z local risk 
abroad. The former category includes big markets like India (only life 
assurance was nationalized), Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and smaller markets 
like Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burma. The second category of markets includes 
big ones like Brazil and Argentina, and smaller ones like the Sudan. Both 
categories of markets, however, soon become the hunting grounds for pro- 
fessional reinsurers. 
The increasing demand for reinsurance coincided with and stimulated 
basic structural changes in the metropolitan insurance markets. Side by 
side with the amalgamation of industrial and commercial capital under monopoly 
capitalism went the concentration of insurance companies? into giant inter- 
national insurers and reinsurers. In Britain, in the 1950s and 60s, there 
were about 30 large mergers, acquisitions, sales or amalgamations, between 
insurers. 2 The seven giant British insurance companies3 took their 
1. Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, 
(Londcn: Panaf, 1966 , p. 64 and p. 78. 
2. Cockerell & Green op. cit., pp. 74-118. 
3. Thee are: the Guardian Royal Exchange, the Commercial Union Group, the 
Surf Alliance and London, the Legal and General, the Royal, General 
Accident and the Prudential. These companies took their present 
shape in the post-World War II period. 
present size during this period which was also marked by the fusion of 
banks, industrial and insurance capital through methods such as sales and 
interlocked directorships. Each of the giant British banks i. e. Barclays, 
National Westminster, Midland and Lloyds, for example, possesses an 
insurance company, and Barclays, in addition, owns Barclays insurance 
Brokers International and Barclays Brokers of South Africa. 
1 
Other giant 
financial enterprises in London either own insurance companies or are 
owned-by insurance and reinsurance companies. 
2 
The extraction of surplus from the underdeveloped countries through 
the operation of insurance branches now continues, thanks to monopoly 
capitalism, under the reinsurance veil. The expansion of world reinsurers 
in these markets was facilitated by a corresponding need, albeit exaggerated, 
in neo-colonial markets, by former colonial ties and by various other factors 
(see below) all of which stem from the attempt to follow a capitalist 
trajectory of development, the seeds of which were planted by the hegemony 
of the capitalist mode of production. In the section following the role 
of reinsurance in the renewed extraction of surplus is examined. 
1. Who Owns Whom (_U. K. ) 1978/79, Vol. II, (London: Dun & Bradstreet, 1979). 
During the decade 1961-1971 fire insurance companies were set up by five 
different British banks starting with M&B Trust and Abbey in 1961, 
Tyndall in 1964, Hambro in 1965, and Barclays Griffin in 1971, see Stephen 
Wynn, World Trends in Life Insurance (London,: Associated Business 
Programmes, 1975), p. 30, footnote 2. 
2. Abbey Life Assurance and Abbey Life 'Australia' are owned by ITT Hartford 
Europe Ltd., Grindlays Ltd owns,. Grindleys Brandts insurance brokers 
Ltd and Grindleys Brandts insurance services, while Britania steamships 
Insurance Association is managed by Tindall Riley and Co., see Cockerell 
& Green op. cit., p. 78. 
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Reinsurance and the Extraction of Insurance Capital 
Reinsurance is a contract whereby an insurance company agrees to 
reinsure, and a reinsurance company agrees to accept, a certain fixed 
share of risks upon terms agreed upon by the two parties. 
1 When an 
insurance company gives part of its business to a reinsurer, it is said 
to have ceded it and becomes'a ceding company'. 
Reinsurance contracts fall into two main categories: 
2 
facultative, or 
optional reinsurance, and treaty reinsurance. Facultative reinsurance is 
a contract whereby a risk is considered separately by a reinsurers) on 
a risk-by-risk basis. The ceding company provides the reinsurer with all 
information pertaining to the particular risk(s), and the reinsurer decides 
upon the information given whether to accept the risk or reject it, or share 
a fraction of it with other reinsurers. It involves a large amount of 
clerical work and is characterized by high administrative costs. Hence the 
commissions paid in respect of it are invariably less than in most forms 
of treaty reinsurance. This category of business is suited to giant risks 
which an insurer with a small capacity has no option but to reinsure. 
3 
1. C. E. Golding, The Law and Practice of Reinsurance, (London: Buckley Press, 
[4th ed. 1965], p. 5. See also L, iqui a tors of G asgow Assurance Cor- 
poration v. Welsh Insurance Corporation Ltd [1914] S. C. 320, and 
Attorney General v. Forsi ring S. National of Copenhagen). (1975), A. C. 639. 
2. R. Philippe Bellerose, Reinsurance For the Beginner. (London: Witherby & Co., 




Treaty Reinsurance on the other hand, consists of two main categories: 
proportional treaties, and non-proportional treaties. Proportional treaties 
are of two kinds: quota share treaties, and surplus treaties. 
1A 
quota 
share treaty is an arrangement between the parties to reinsurance under 
which the ceding company agrees to cede a fixed proportion of every risk 
which it underwrites and the reinsurer agrees to accept every risk ceded. 
It is very simple to operate, involves virtually no costs and is most 
profitable to the reinsurer. It gives the reinsurer access to most of 
the cedänt's business - more so than any other reinsurance arrangement, 
while the ceding company becomes bound to pass away tiny risks, even though 
they might fall within its retention capacity. However, because of its 
commissions, the highest of all reinsurance commissions, and the minimal 
costs and technical expertise it involves, it tends to encourage companies, 
especially small ones, to cede most of their business away thereby degenerating 
into de facto reinsurance brokers (see Chapter Three). For insurers in 
underdeveloped countries with their lack of expertise and know-how, quota- 
share reinsurance is, no doubt, an attractive method for ceding risks. 
The other form of proportional treaty is the surplus reinsurance treaty 
under which the ceding company cedes to the reinsurer a surplus only after 
its retention capacity is exhausted. This type involves enormous administrative 
expenses and professional knowledge of adequate retention-fixing. The 
commissions paid by the reinsurer under this class of business are generally 
far less than under the former type and, therefore, a ceding company is 
likely to be more inclined to resort to quota share instead of surplus 
reinsurance, especially if it lacks a reinsurance expert. 
1. Ibid. 
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Non-proportional treaties include excess of loss treaties and stop loss 
treaties. Under the former, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the cedant 
for losses which exceed a certain fixed point i. e. a monetary limit in 
respect of any one event; and under the latter he protects the total 
results out of a certain class of business from additional losses over an 
agreed loss point. Both types of non-proportional treaties appear to be 
well suited to branches with a high loss ratio such as motor insurance, 
1 
and as a rule no commissions are paid under them because the benefits 
accruing to reinsurers are minimal in relation to other categories of 
2 business. 
Thus, it can be seen that reinsurance naturally operates in the interest 
of the reinsurer, sometimes at the expense of the ceding company. For 
where a ceding company has no option but to reinsure a big risk the method 
available (facultative reinsurance) confers little commission , and in fact 
the reinsurance market tends to be less competitive. But where the reinsurer 
extracts the largest possible share of the cedant's business at the expense 
of the latter's retention capabilities (quota share) the reward is higher; 
and where the cedant keeps some risks within its capacity and cedes less 
desirable risks (surplus reinsurance) its commissions shrink, until they 
virtually disappear under non-proportional treaties where the retention 
potential of the ceding company is utilized more. 
1. It could be used for other branches of business if the ceding company's 
retention capacity is sufficiently large to accommodate large risks. 
In this case only a minimum net outgo could be released. 
2. Henry T. Kramer, "The Nature of Reinsurance" in, Robert W. Strain (ed. ), 
Reinsurance, (New York: College of Insurance, 19H0), pp. 1-31, also a 
rep y by Professor M. Grossmann to a questionnaire sent 
by UNCTAD 
Secretariat, 1967, also UNCTAD Secretariat, "Reinsurance Problems in 
Developing Countries", TD/B/C. 3/106/Rev. 1, (U. N. New York, 1975), 
paras. 20-38, pp. 9-13. 
-24- 
However, reinsurance, no doubt, serves various functions to a ceding 
company espeically a small one; but as discussed below, the methods of 
reinsurance and the technical problems it entails, primarily make it a 
lucrative trade for reinsurers who also enjoy a better bargaining position 
via-&-vis a ceding company from the Third World. 
The basic function of reinsurance is to help the ceding company to 
maintain stable results by preventing fluctuations in its accounts from 
one year to the other, the quid pro quo being the willingness of the ceding 
company to share its good results with the reinsurer in return for the 
latter's support in hard times. The concept of insurance itself, being a 
method of balancing the effects of chance according to the law of probability, 
requi res that some sort of reinsurance must be taken out by the direct insurers. 
For in order to obtain good results in any portfolio there must be a great 
number of insured risks which have in common a comparable size and a 
comparable degree of exposure to the happening of the event against which 
insurance was taken out. 
1 But this does not always happen especially in 
underdeveloped countries where the portfolios are often so small that the 
law of probability does not operate sufficiently well in favour of an 
insurer. 2 The other problem with small portfolios is that they can easily 
be made uneven by the acceptance of giant risks such as jets, refineries, 
big factories etc. And as the capacity to retain is dependent upon the size 
1. UNCTAD Secretariat, "Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries" 
Supra. p. 1- 
2. It goes without saying that the more the divided the portfolio in any 
country i. e. the national portfolio, the more reinsurance will be 
needed since each portfolio creates a need for levelling by reinsurers 
independently of other portfolios. 
AM 
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of the portfolio, it follows that the smaller the portfolio the more 
reinsurance will be taken out. Sometimes a variety of insured events 
such as catastrophes, earthquakes and conflagrations may occur and cause 
chain losses which disturb the balance of a portfolio and cause greater 
losses than anticipated. In this situation reinsurance can help to 
prevent the impact of catastrophic accumulations at the level of the 
ceding company. 
Thus reinsurance directly encourages the direct insurer to assume 
risks greater (in money value) than its own resources can permit, and 
which involve more liability than it can safely assume, it stabilizes 
the profits of the company and enables it to underwrite more business. 
For direct insurers of underdeveloped countries the ratio of added 
reinsurance capacity to the net capacity of the company may be as high 
as a hundred to one, 
1 i. e. a company may multiply its capacity to take 
risks by 100 by use of reinsurance as opposed to relying on its own 
resources -a fact which makes reinsurance particularly attractive. Also, 
a significant function of reinsurance is to strengthen the ceding company's 
financial position by increasing the ratio of its assets to its liabilities, 
thereby enhancing its solvency (insurance regulation statutes require 
certain standards of solvency, see Chapter Three). The effect of rein- 
surance upon a company's capacity may be illustrated by the following 
example: assume that a company's assets stood at £500 and its liabilities 
at £250 i. e. a ratio of assets to liabilities of 2: 1. If this company 
1. Robert A. Baker, The Purposes of Reinsurance", in Robert W. Strain 
(ed. ). Reinsurance, Supra; see pp. 33-4. 
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accepts a risk for an annual premium of £200, for example, which was 
paid at the inception of the contract with a cost of £20, then the 
position of the assets and liabilities will change in this order: the 
assets will increase from £500 to £680 i. e. £500 plus the £ 200 paid as 
premiums, minus the £20 cost of underwriting. The company's liabilities, 
on the other hand, will change drastically as the entire sum of £200 must 
be put into the unearned premium reserves, thus increasing total liabilities 
to £450 i. e. £250 plus £200. The ratio of assets... to liabilities, then 
will have changed from the former 2: 1 to 1.53: 1, i. e. £680: 450. However, 
if the company decides to reinsure this risk the ratio of its asserts to 
its liabilities will again be enhanced. In particular, if the company 
decides to reinsure 50 per cent of the risk then its asserts will decrease 
from the former £680 to £590 i. e. £680 minus 50 per cent of the premiums 
actually earned (the other 50 per cent or £90 being ceded to the rei nsurer) . 
Liabilities will also decrease from £450 to £350 consequent upon the 
unloading of 50 per cent of the total premiums of £200 (£100 i. e. 50 per 
cent of total premiums will be released to the rei nsurer) . But this trans- 
fer will increase the ratio of assets from the former l evel of 1.53: 1 to 
1 
1.7: 1 i. e. to £590: £350. " 
Finally, the need for reinsurance by a direct insurer is, fundamentally, 
analogous to that which animates an ordinary purchaser of insurance to seek 
the protection of a specialized risk-taker. And as much as insurance is 
community pooling of risks through which an individual seeks to distribute 
1. For illustration of how reinsurance affects new and existing business 
see Ib id, pp- 37.8. 
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his risk among other individuals, reinsurance is a method by which risk- 
takers seek to distribute their risks between them through the services 
of a reinsurer. 
Undoubtedly, the more competent the ceding company, and particularly, 
the more accurately it assesses its reinsurance needs, the less 'unnecessary 
reinsurance' will be taken out and the more adequate the cover obtained can 
be. The assessment of reinsurance needs is known as reinsurance planning 
which is an elaborate process 
1 in which the company should retain the 
optimum in respect of which its financial strength can still provide a cushion 
against adverse fluctuations in the portfolio while discharging a minimum 
net release. In a nutshell a reinsurance plan must ensure an adequate 
protection while achieving an economic cost. 
2 But it is precisely in 
this process that most difficulties lie. For fixing a company's retention 
capacity is a difficult matter to assess with -any precision with the result 
that ceding companies often err on the side of caution by over-reinsuring - 
a method which reinsurance science itself advocates. 
3 Over-reinsurance 
is characteristic of Third World insurers where the lack of reinsurance 
expertise is most acute. Coupled with this, as mentioned earlier, there is 
the problem of the small and uneven portfolios which encourage reinsurance 
cessions even to the extent of undermining one's own retention potential. 
1. Richard F. Gilmore, "Planning and Managing a Reinsurance Programme" 
in Strain (ed. ) o p. cit., pp. 347-417. 
2. "Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries", op. cit., paras 9-10, p. 7. 
3. See for example, R. S. Riegel & J. Miller, Insurance Principles and 
Practices, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Ha Inc. 1966 , pp. 95-100. 
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The temptation to receive reinsurance commissions also has a direct 
bearing on the volume of business ceded to reinsurers, 
1 
especially in cases 
of small portfolios where management costs eat up a high proportion of the 
premium income. A ceding company which underwritesý. an unfamiliar risk 
may also be tempted to seek the help of a professional reinsurer who is 
familiar with it for appraisal 
2i. 
e. to fix the appropriate premium level. 
The need to increase the underwriting capacity and to improve the ratio 
of assets to liabilities were dealt with earlier. 
Because of all these services which reinsurance renders to a ceding 
company, and because of the problems obtaining in underdeveloped countries 
regarding reinsurance planning, the flow of reinsurance premiums to 
developed countries is increasing steadily (see below). This flow, however, 
appears to be entirely incommensurate with the real needs-of reinsurance 
purchasers from underdeveloped countries; and, -indeed, reflects adherence 
to underwriting methods that are flagrantly unsound. The explanation of 
this touches on a technical and a fundamental aspect of insurance: the 
retention potential of an insurer. This potential is said to depend upon 
the difference between the total amount of losses in each class of business, 
as anticipated within a short period of time, for example one year; and the 
mean value of these losses as calculated over a longer period of time, for 
example, 10 years. 
3 The smaller the difference, the higher the potential 
1. "Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries", op. cit. para. 130, 
pp. 128-9. 
2. Riegel & Mi ll erg Insurance Principles and Practices, Su ` ra. P. 99 
3. Jose Ripoll, "Some Thoughts on Insurance and Development", Supra, 
pp. 43-8. 
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for retention, and the less urgent reinsurance becomes for the particular 
insurer if the potential is utilized. Thus the cost of reinsurance to 
a direct insurer should be proportionate to its retention potential, and 
should fluctuate according to the need for reinsurance protection, as 
indicated by the loss experience. But if this flow of reinsurance premiums 
abroad for a country or company is uniform and regular or is constantly 
increasing then the only conclusion that can be made is that reinsurance 
by the particular cedant country or company is absolutely unrelated to 
any need for protection supposedly deriving from random contingencies and 
misfortune. 
1 This is so, to repeat an earlier statement, because the 
essence of insurance business is the randomness and fluctuation of final 
results as the loss experience dictates. 
2 An example of market cessions 
which are divorced from actual needs are those ceded by the Middle East 
insurance market. This market, the biggest of-its kind in the Third World, 
ceded 80 per cent of its business in 1977 to London reinsurers3 although 
the flow back of claims had little to do with this enormous transaction. In 
1967, a rough estimate placed the size of insurance operations in under- 
developed countries at $550-700m. of which $300m. or about 50 per cent 
was ceded to western reinsurers. 
4 On the other hand, while excessive 
reliance on reinsurance reduces the chances for optimum utilization of 
1. Ibid., also Jost Ripoll, "UNCTAD and Insurance", Journal of World 
Trade Law, 1974, p. 79. 
2. Ibid. 
3. The Financial Times, 25 March, 1977 
4. UNCTAD, "Insurance and Developing Countries", Journal of World Trade 
Law, 1967, p. 230. 
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capacity and retards the development of insurance on sound basis, the 
dependency on international reinsurers has meant in practice that economic 
development in underdeveloped countries is readily reflected in increasing 
outgoing cessions. Development plans in Saudi Arabia and Iraq totalling 
$187.5 billion between 1976-1980, automati: ally resulted in massive re- 
insurance transfers to London. 1 
Another factor which divorces the flow of reinsurance from adequate 
local need - as measured by the flow back of reinsurance claims - is the 
price which reinsurers charge for their services. Reinsurance premiums, 
especially for non-proportional business, are fixed by international 
reinsurers on the basis of their global results (which include the results 
of their own markets) rather than on the experience of the particular 
country seeking reinsurance, despite the fact that non-proportional 
business from the Third World tends to be more-profitable than the 
business ceded by metropolitan-based insurers. 
2 Also, where the risk is 
ceded on facultative basis, the reinsurer may fix the premiums which the 
policyholders of the ceding company must pay, 
3 
and the same applies to 
a risk which entails difficult technical matters or is new as far as the 
ceding company is concerned. 
4 Undoubtedly, premium rates are fixed at 
profitable levels. 
1. Mustafa Rajab, "Current Developments of Arab Insurance Markets and 
Their Relationship with London and other International Markets", a 
paper presented to the Arab Insurance Conference, London, 1977, p. 7. 
2. "Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries", op. cit., para 53-4, p. 15. 
3. Answers by Professor M. Grossmann to a questionnaire sent by UNCTAD, 
Supra, , p-17. 
4. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
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Another important factor behind the dissimilarity of reinsurance 
transfers and the transfers back of reinsurance claims is, of course, 
the inequality of the bargaining power of Third World insurers vis-a-vis 
professional reinsurers which enables the latter to obtain the best possible 
deal from the former. The balance of power in reinsurance transactions is 
constantly in favour of the professional reinsurer. In fact, the conditions 
of the reinsurance market appear to be worsening rather than improving for 
Third World insurers. It is no longer possible to describe the international 
reinsurance market as being 'completely divorced from competitive 
I 
restrictions' . In London, the biggest international insurance market, 
a Reinsurance Offices Association (R. O. A. ) was formed in 1969 in order 'to 
facilitate and encourage co-operation between [reinsurance] companies on 
technical matters of general interest'. 
2 So far the Association has under- 
taken the study of various matters of interest to its members such as 
reinsurance premium rates, currency fluctuations, stability classes (see 
below) and rates of interest. 
3 
In reinsurance transactions there are no 
standard terms and the provisions of each treaty are agreed upon between 
the contracting parties. Undoubtedly, the less experienced theceding 
company, the more restrictive and onerous are the conditions and clauses 
that could be imposed upon it. 
4 At any rate, it is not uncommon for a 
1. Ibid., p. 8 
2. "Progress of R. O. A. " Polic , 1971, p. 678. 
3. Ibid. 
4. "Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries, " op. cit. para. 62, p. 17. 
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treaty to incorporate a clause enabling a reinsurer to interfere in the 
business of the ceding company by compelling it to keep all its books 
and documents available for inspection by the re i nsurer on demand. 
1 it 
is also common for reinsurers to insist on a 'revision clause' by which 
they could adjust the rates to cope with inflation in their countries. 
2 
But treaties do not always protect a leading company against inflation 
in its own country, and at best, the effect of such inflation could be 
apportioned equally between the two parties. 
3 A clause to this effect is 
the stability clause which limits the amounts to be paid by the reinsurer 
and the power of the ceding company to settle claims in excess of a 
certain amount without the reinsurer's consent. 
4 
Thus the extraction of capital from underdeveloped countries, a 
function formerly carried out by metropolitan insurers, has now become 
the function of indigenous entrepreneurs or the state, as the case maybe, 
but the destination of the extracted surplus has remained the same over 
the years. In theory, of course, the flow of reinsurance could change 
directions if big losses were met by the reinsurer, or if sufficiently 
large deposits were established by him in the ceding company's country 
of origin. 
5 It must be added, however, that this is a rare exception in 
I. See for example, R. Philippe Belbrose, Reinsurance for the Beginner, 
Supra. pp. 65-78. 
2. Policy, July 1971, pp. 666-78. 
3. Gunnar Benktander, "Inflation, Insurance and Reinsurance", International 
Insurance Monitor, April 1975, pp. 47-9. 
4. R. Philippe Belbrose, op. cit., p. 48. 
5. M. Grossman, "Reinsurance", in UNCTAD Secretariat", Inter-Regional 
Seminar on Insurance and Reinsurance-Prague, 20-30 October, 1969", 
TD/B/C. 3/83, (Geneva, UNCTAD, 1971), p. 94. 
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reinsurance transactions. As Golding maintains: 
' 
This is a reversal of ordinary trade procedure and illustrates 
the difference between insurance and other forms of commercial 
undertaking. [But] it is of technical interest only, for in 
the long run reinsurance must produce a profit to the reinsurers 
or it cannot continue... 
Unfortunately, information pertaining to the volume of reinsurance 
ceded from underdeveloped countries, and hence the effect of the trans- 
actions on their balance of payments, is only fragmentary and scattered. 
In 1953, Professor S. J. Lengyel, attempting to analyse the scope of 
international insurance transactions, commented that: 
2 
It sounds strange, and yet it is true that insurance business, 
itself based on statistical experience, in many countries 
lacks proper statistics about the state and development of 
its own affairs. Either no statistics are available at all, 
or else they are very defective. 
Although nearly 30 years have elapsed since Lengyel attempted to study 
the problem, the situation has not changed much. In fact, information per- 
taining to the size of world insurance and reinsurance transactions is 
deliberately concealed by professional insurers and reinsurers especially 
in Britain, and rarely finds its way to the insurance press, in view 'of 
the sensitivity of the developing countries over the possible earnings of 
outside insurers in their territories. '3 No proper statistics exist in 
1. E. C. Golding, The Law and Practice of Reinsurance, Supra. p. 30. 
2. S. J. Lengyel, International Insurance Transactions, (London: Wadley and 
Ginn, 1953), p. 17. 
3. Policy Holder Insurance Journal, London, 11 September, 1970. 
-34- 
underdeveloped countries either. But there can be no doubt that the loss 
of insurance and reinsurance premiums by the underdeveloped countries is 
reflected in the gains which the professional insurers and reinsurers draw 
from these countries. In Britain, about two-thirds of the premium income 
of non-life insurers and reinsurers, and about one-fifth of the life 
business, are earned from abre. ad. 
1 The surplus generated from invisibles - 
and particularly from insurance and reinsurance - has financed visible 
trade deficits throughout the last 200 years. 
2 During the five 
year period 1967-1971, for example, insurance earnings offset all visible 
trade deficits and made a surplus of £296m. 
3 
The contribution of Lloyd's 
in British foreign earnings increased both relatively and absolutely 
during the decade 1965-1975, as it rose from £14m., or 17.2 per cent of 
all insurance earnings, to £217m. or 48 per cent of the same, a fact which, 
no doubt, explains the bestowal upon Havelock Hudson, the Chairman of Lloyd's 
of a knighthood in 1975 for his 'services to exports'. 
4 
1. Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, 
Second Stage Evidence, Vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1979), p. 8. 
2. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
3. The U. K. ffalance of payments, 1972, Annex 5 (London: HMSO, 1972). 
4. Sir Francis Sandi lands, The Role of the City in the Export of 
Invisibles including insurance and reinsurance". A speech given at 
the C. 11. in 1976, see also, Committee to Review the Functioning of 
Financial Institutions, Supra. Vol. 2., Appendix B., p. 65. 
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Little wonder then that the British insurance industry which is the 
largest internationally-operated industry of its kind in the world, 
1 has 
been the most vocal antagonist of the 'domestication of insurance' slogan 
advocated by some underdeveloped countries. In 1972, for example, in a U. N. 
Conference in Santiago, Britain alone abstained on, and later voted against, 
a recommendation to the effect that in underdeveloped countries transactions 
must be carried out largely by domestic companies, and that technical 
reserves must be invested locally. Britain has, for many years, been an 
advocate of the 'freedom of insurance doctrine' which argues that 
restrictions on the foreign supply of insurance 'can only mean that the 
insured may be prevented from buying the sort of cover he needs at the 
price he can afford. ' 
2 This doctrine is also popular in European 
insurance circles elsewhere. That is hardly surprising in view of the 
enormous income travelling annually from underdeveloped countries. But the 
general thinking in European countries, ironically, members of the E. E. C., 
appears to be that premium income generated in their territories should 
be invested in government paper in order to prevent insurance outflows 
and to protect policyholders. 
3 In some E. E. C. countries the freedom 
to transact insurance business has become more restricted for 
British companies than it was before Britain joined the E. E. C. 
4 
1. John H. Dunning, Insgrance in the Economy, (London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 34,1971), p. 7. 
Per Sir Havelock Hudson, The Chairman of Lloyd's, in Best's Review, 
Oldwick New Jersey, April, 1976, p. 48. 
3. The Times, "Supplement on Insurance", 8 Feb. 1971. 
4. Per Sir Havelock Hudson, Lloyd's List, 4 March, 1977. 
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The Economist' tells the following story: 
A British Insurance Company, applying to the French insurance 
control authorities in the usual way for permission to under- 
write in Paris, was kept waiting for so long that it finally 
demanded an explanation. In reply it was told that things 
would be easier if foreign companies could get into the Institute of London Underwriters, the club of the company 
marine underwriters in the London market ... It then emerged that other British companies had also been getting nowhere in 
their applications to write in France. French insurance 
companies are not alone on the Continent in their complaint 
that in practice the London insurance market ... is hard to get into, even though in theory it is open to all comers 
having routine Department of Trade and Industry permission. [emphasis added. ] 
So far, a genuine common market in insurance is no more than a fiction. 
2 
Each market in Europe appears to be closed for its domestic'companies, 
3 
although 
relations with the companies of former colonies are strongly maintained. 
Emerging companies of the former colonies are, in fact, regularly warned 
against attempting to "'go international', while their goals to build their 
own industries are castigated as 'nationalistic'4, or as 'a misdirection of 
efforts' 
4 For professional 'insurers and reinsurers on the other hand, the 
expansion across boundaries is most essential for successful underwriting. 
1. The Economist, 12 Feb. 1972 (London). 
2. See T. H. Ellis, European Integration and Insurance: Creating a Common 
Insurance Market, (London: Witherby, 1980). 
3. Until 1974, the number of foreign insurers in any one E. E. C. country 
did not exceed 13 and in some countries there was only one foreign 
insurer. The share of foreign offices in domestic premiums in some 
of those countries was not more than 1.5 per cent, see International 
Insurance Monitor, May 1974, pp. 177-9. 
4. Journal of the Insurance Institute ofLondon, 'Vol. 53, pp. 111-126, see 
Financial imes, ZZ November, 
5. G. Frederick Richardson, The Effect of Legislation in Latin America 






The effect of this expansion on direct insurance portfolios was dealt with 
earlier; for reinsurers expansion serves the same purposes, and every 
reinsurance risk included in the portfolio spreads the portfolio further, 
reduces the frequency of loss, and stabilizes global results. 
There is yet another reason behind the desire to expand a reinsurance 
portfolio or a global scale. It was mentioned earlier that the bulk of 
business in the British reinsurance market comes from abroad and that 
the flow of reinsurance premiums from overseas does not correspond to any genuine 
need for reinsurance protection. However, had it not been for the 
unbalanced expansion of British reinsurers, i. e. underwriting more foreign 
than domestic business (the same applies to direct insurers), the British 
insurance industry could not have possibly been what it is now. This is 
so because reinsurance in particular, taken out by British insurance 
companies with British reinsurers (with whom they share the bargaining 
power) is, undoubtedly, nearly almost commensurate with their appropriate 
needs as indicated by their loss experience. British reinsurers could, 
therefore, only make meagre profits on the home front. But what keeps 
them in business to continue to serve their clients (and the British 
economy as a whole) are the large premiums coming from overseas and never 
returning in any sizeable quantity. The function of these premiums thus 
retained in Britain is to subsidize the services rendered to domestic 
purchasers of reinsurance. For in any collectivity where the bulk of 
revenue is contributed to by a segment that claims less than it contributes, 
the segment which contributes less and claims more will undoubtedly reap 
all the benefits of risk-distribution. The uneven expansion of British 
reinsurers (and direct insurers) has produced exactly this result. It has 
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made it possible for them to provide the widest possible range of 
reinsurance (and direct insurance) services at the lowest cost, 
1 
all at 
the expense of overseas insurers whose demand for reinsurance appears to 
be enormously exaggerated in relation to their actual needs. 
IV. Insurance and Economic Development 
A- Insurance in the Economy: 
The treatment of the subject so far suggests that professional insurers 
and reinsurers do have a role in the polarization of wealth at one end of 
the world and of misery and want at the other end. In that the insurance 
institution is not different from other capitalist institutions. But this 
is a result of, not a reason for, its existence. In every country be it 
socialist or capitalist, developed or underdeveloped, insurance does 
perform valuable services to the economy. The'role of insurance, anywhere, 
centres around the minimization of the effects of risks by distributing 
risks among a very large number of enterprises or individuals who wish to 
have the burden of risk transferred away from them in consideration for 
small payments to the insurer. In other words, the person or corporate 
body who seeks the help of an insurer, substitutes the certainty of a known, 
fixed and small premium for the uncertainty of incurring losses which are 
unknown in time, and unpredictable in size and severity. 
2 Risks are spread 
by a risk-taker in two directions: over time and between a large group of 
1. Committee to Review the Functioning and Financial Institutions, 
op, cit. Vol 2, p. 2. 
2. R. L. Carter, Economics and Insurance (Cheshire: P. H. Press, 1972) 
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risk averse individuals or enterprises. Long term insurance, or life 
assurance, has an emphasis on spreading risks over a long period of time, 
sometimes a life time; whereas general or non-life insurance pools the 
risks between a large group of individuals or enterprises to soften the 
effects of any one risk when the event insured against occurs. 
I 
Two further aspects of insurance must be examined: firstly, an insurer 
cannot eliminate the risk of misfortune altogether, but an enterprise which 
transfers its risk through insurance, could venture into hitherto un- 
explored fields without fear of loss. In this way insurance directly 
promotes economic activities by enlarging their scope. Likewise, for an 
individual who takes out a life policy, for example, insurance cannot 
prevent the risk of death or misfortune, but in case of premature death 
insurance secures the payment of an agreed sum of money to a deceased 
policyholder's dependants. In this latter case, insurance represents a 
very important means for the mobilization of individual savings and 
a useful institution for society. Secondly, although it is true that 
the covering of anticipated losses causes a reduction in national income 
represented by the small premiums paid to an insurer, 
2 the premiums 
accumulated by insurers are readily invested back into the economy with 
enormous benefits to the society in which such investments are made. 
1. J. S. Revell, The British Financial System (London: Macmillan, 1973), 
p. 401. 
2. A. R. N. Ratcliffe, "Services to the Economy", Journal of the Insurance 
Institute of London, Vol. 71, pp. 155-64, at p. 155. 
Thus the capital reduction at one end is paralleled by capital formation 
at the other end. In performing their economic functions, therefore, 
insurance companies have the most serious implications for the capital 
markets in which they operate in that they act as intermediaries between 
those who wish to lend their money and those who wish to borrow it. In 
this process, insurers are part of the financial network which leaves no 
sum of money to remain idle. 
The assumption of risk by insurers, and the accumulation of capital 
for investment, were interwoven and concomitant processes upon which the 
development of capitalism in Britain was, in part, dependent. British 
insurers underwrote the economic hazards which characterized each phase 
of capitalist development, and amassed great wealth which promoted 
capitalism to a more advanced phase. Under commercial capitalism, for 
example, (a phase which witnessed the expansion of trade across the seas) 
insurers protected vessels against perils of the sea, thieves, rovers and 
enemies. 
1 In the slave trade period, half the total trade was carried 
by British ships 
2 
for which insurers provided cover against sea voyage 
disasters, while the owners of insurance companies took an active part in 
the lucrative trade. 
3 The massive capital accumulated by the slave trade 
1. See for example, the original marine insurance policy in E. R. Hardy, 
Ivamy, Marine Insurance, (London: Butterworths [2nd. ed. ], 1974), 
pp. 103-6. 
2. Sir R. Coupland, The British Anti-Slavery Movement, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 933 [reprinted Cass, 1964]), pp. 19-24. 
3. For the role of insurance men in the slave trade see Cockerell & Green 
op"cit, p. 8, and for the involvement of Lloyd's, Phoenix Assurance and 
the Liverpool Association of Underwriters, see Eric Williams, Capitalism 
and Slavery, (London: Andre Deutsch, [3rd ed. 1972]), pp. 104-5. 
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and the trade with the East, laid the foundations for the industrial 
revolution. The increasing rate of fire and other industrial hazards 
consequent upon industrialization gave rise to the practice of fire 
insurance by the early fire offices which rose from only 12 in 1790 to 
50 by 1881.1 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, liability 
insurance appeared after the Employers Liability Act, 1880 had made the 
master liable for injuries caused to certain classes of employees . The 
economic depression of the 1870s and 80s, resulted in massive unemploy- 
ment, defalcations and burglaries, and led to the emergence of certain 
categories of insurances viz: fidelity, cash in transit, housebreaking 
and burglary insurance. 
2 Thus the assumption of risk by insurance 
companies, though inevitable for economic development, appears to be a 
means to an end: capital accumulation, and the investment of accumulated 
capital. 
B. Insurance and Development in Underdeveloped Countries: 
In recent years there has been a sudden burst of interest regarding 
the insurance industry. in the majority of underdeveloped countries. Two 
reasons appear to have been responsible for this: firstly, most of those 
1. Supple, The Royal Exchange, op. cit., pp. 212-3, P. M. Dickson, the 
Sun Fire Office, Supra, p. 73. 
2. See e. g. W. A. Dinsdale, History of Accident Insurance in Great Britain, 
(London: Stone & Cox, 19S-4 T. pp. 263-6. 
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countries - especially non-oil producing ones - are characterized by 
severe shortages of capital (although this was not the reason for their 
underdevelopment), and insurance has been suggested as one of the 
important sources for financing economic development through domestic 
1 
means. Foreign supply of capital, despite its problems2, does not 
appear to be a substitute for domestic capital, and has not been an 
effective vehicle for economic progress. 
3 But the problem which 
insurance gives rise to in these countries is that the historical origin 
of the industry still bears heavily on its present day roles in that the 
industry has largely remained as a conveyor belt for the transfer of 
capital to the metropoles thereby adding to capital shortages at the other 
end. Secondly, there has also been much concern about the 'domestication 
of insurance' so as to make it function in the interest of underdeveloped 
countries by underwriting their specific socio-economic hazards. Two 
reasons call for the domestication of the insurance institution in these 
1. U. N., "Domestic Financing of Economic Development". (U. N., New York, Inter- 
Department of Economic Affairs, 1950, pp. 13-87. 
2. See e. g. U. N. Secretariat, "The Tying of Aid: Progress Report", TD/7/ 
Supp. 4, (U. N., New York, 1967), also Robert I. Rhodes (ed. ), Imperialism 
and Underdevelopment, (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1970-F; 
and Teesa Hayter, Aid As Imperialism, (New York: Penguin Books, 1974). 
3. In some countries economic progress took place without any significant 
flow of aid, and in others, like India, foreign aid had little impact 
on economic development, see J. E. Spero, The Politics of International 
Economic Relations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1-9-78). -p. 141. 
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countries: (a) insurance practices which obtain today in these countries 
were largely the result of economic and social developments in Europe 
where the institution developed as a handmaiden of other enterprises in 
society. In the periphery, where the institutions were superimposed 
through the operation of capital, they remained an alien body to the economic 
structures which had prevailed before. And as indigenous insurers later 
emerged, their institutions followed the European model and copied its 
business tradition. Hence, many of the socio-economic hazards characteristic 
of peripheral societies are still difficult, indeed impossible, to marry 
with insurance principles. Famines, for example, fall outside the scope of 
insurable hazards because in these societies famines are bleak certainties 
rather than random contingencies to which the law of probability can apply. 
1 
Fire insurance is not available to straw huts (which form the majority of 
residences) because of their high exposure to fire! Property insurance only 
benefits a miniscule, privileged class of property owners; and life insurance 
is virtually unheard of in rural areas where a variety of epidemic diseases 
take their tolls of human life every year. Thus, it appears that in 
underdeveloped countries, insurance is unlikely to contribute to economic 
development if it remains divorced from the basic socio-economic needs i. e. 
of providing cover against the specific hazards which prevail there. (b) 
By following principles developed elsewhere, insurers in the periphery cannot 
develop to the same size and strength as their metropolitan counterparts, 
for neither the past nor the present of Third World insurers resembles in 
1. Jose Ripoll, "Some Thoughts on Insurance and Development" op. cit., 
p. 48. 
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any way the past of metropolitan insurers; and the conditions which 
stimulated the development of the latter such as slave trade and wars, 
cannot be repeated in favour of the former. 
1 
It follows that a meaning- 
ful role for insurance in emerging countries is primarily dependent upon 
the evolution of novel insurance functions which could add to the 
functions which insurance serves at the present. 
It appears that a rational policy aimed at the utilization of the 
insurance institution in order to contribute to economic and social 
development in underdeveloped countries, could address itself to four 
basic areas: (a) it could enhance the capital formation role of the 
institutions, (b) it could direct its investments to the appropriate 
fields, (c) it could direct the institution to play as positive a role 
as possible in the country's balance of payments, and (d) it could ensure 
an adequate protection to the public who purchase insurance policies. With 
regard to a redefined role in the formation of capital-which caters for 
social demands - it has been suggested that agricultural insurance schemes 
could be initiated in underdeveloped countries so that small farmers could 
be assured of financial backing during a time of natural calamity such as 
a bad harvest or drought, all in return for very small fixed premiums. 
2 
1. The war against Napoleon, for example, which made England great 
also ended with the greatness of Lloyd's see F. Martin, The History 
of Lloyd's and of Marine Insurance in Great Britain, (London: 
Macmillan, 1 
2. Jose Ripoll, "Contributions of Agricultural Insurance Toward Economic 
Development", The Platform, Jan/Feb. 1980. 
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A programme of this kind is particularly relevant to countries where no 
agricultural credit system exists for small farmers who often resort to 
traditional credit from money lenders who, in turn, charge exorbitant rates 
of interest. Also, the programme could promote increased and selected 
agricultural production, improve crop specialization, increase intensive 
investments, credit facilities and might even become a means for the re- 
allocation of resources to ensure a more even national development. 
1 
The success of a programme of this nature will depend upon the level of 
premiums to be paid by farmers. The smaller the premium, the more likely 
a farmer can afford to participate. Although this may mean a smaller fund 
for the insurer i. e. insufficient contribution to capital formation, the 
fund could be made to grow gradually under state control (and support in 
its early phase). Also life insurance could be made to function on a very 
large scale, especially in countries with no adequate social insurance 
systems. Based on small premiums life insurance could have signficant 
implications for a particular economy, especially if the accumulated funds 
were invested in social services such as low-cost housing, health and 
education. 
To the extent that an agricultural insurance programme and a life 
insurance scheme could contribute a great deal to the financial solvency 
of a particular insurer, the country in which such insurer operates could 
derive several benefits. Its balance of payments, in particular, could 
improve because vast coverage could become available for insurance buyers 
at home and there would also be a reduction in the need for reinsurance 
1. Ibid. 
consequent upon the increased retention capacity. The balance of payments 
could also be enhanced through tightened controls upon reinsurance cessions. 
This could be achieved in two ways: (a) regulations could be made to the 
effect that only risks which have foreign exchange implications i. e. those 
which would have to be met by foreign currency, could be reinsured abroad, 
(b) the market could be concentrated into few companies (ideally one concern 
only) to increase its retention capacity and minimize the need for re- 
insurance. A redefinition of the functions and practices of the institution 
appears inevitable for an optimum allocation of resources, because every 
dollar spent on insurance or reinsurance by an underdeveloped country is, 
no doubt, a dollar lost for capital goods or some other matter, and must be 
evaluated against the benefits which other goods or equipments would have 
brought to the country had the dollar been spent on such goods or services. 
1 
The underlying theme of our discussion so far is that the insurance 
institution has had a role to play in the underdevelopment of the Third 
World and that it now continues to do so under the veil of reinsurance. As 
we have seen, in view of the 'services' which reinsurance renders to companies 
of emerging countries and in view of the methods and techniques which underlie 
the trade the interests of the developed and the underdeveloped countries 
are in constant conflict in the field of insurance. And as we have indicated 
above, the institution could only be of value to underdeveloped countries 
if it ceased to be a factor of underdevelopment and if its functions could 
be redefined to serve the goals of economic and social change (some of the 
1. Jose Ripoll, "Some Thoughts on Insurance and Development", op. cit. 
p. 44. 
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reforms which could go some length towards creating an institution with 
redefined roles were outlined above). 
The promotion and implementation of novel insurance strategies and 
hence, the utilization of insurance for economic development, appears to 
depend upon the degree to which insurance is regulated or controlled 
toward the achievement of redefined goals. The case studies of the Sudan 
and Tanzania examined in this Thesis represent two different models of 
insurance control :a regulatory model and a direct interventionist model. 
The Sudan adopted a regulatory model ; Tanzania adapted a direct interventionist 
model. Under the former the state sought to regulate or influence the con- 
duct of private economic actors in society through a regulation law which 
set out the norms and rules of action: under the latter the state itself 
became the economic actor and no regulation code was deemed necessary. Under 
the regulatory model the extent to which insurance could lend itself to serve 
development is limited to the provisions of the Zaw under which it is 
regulated toward that end; under the direct model the achievement of 
development goals through insurance is the task of wider state action. 
Therefore, under the regulatory model the implementation of national 
strategies tends to depend upon the quality and nature of the regulation 
code, the ability to enforce it, and the degree of the industry's conformity 
to the code. Under the direct model the state is in a position to implement 
its strategies directly through an intermediary administrative body set up 
to govern the insurance concern by carrying out state policy, and the 
problems which afflict the regulatory model are generally avoided. 
The remaining chapters of this Thesis attempt to show how the 
differences between the two models of control have influenced the chances 
of each country regarding the utilization of insurance for economic develop- 
ment. In other words, the object is to see how the same institution has 
responded to the problems common to the two countries, and how the different 
characteristics of each market viz: juridical ownership of the institution, 
the market structure and the quality of control, have enhanced, or otherwise 
frustrated, the attempt to redefine the functions of the insurance industry 
so as to make it serve the interest of the particular country rather than 
the metropolitan centre. 
Before the Sudanese case is examined some aspects of the political economy 
of the Sudan (which ultimately affect the insurance sector) are investigated 
in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO : ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SUDAN 
'You are aware that the end of all our effort and this expense is to procure negros [from Sudan]. Please show zeal in carry- ing out our wishes in this capital matter. ' 
Mohmed Ali Pasha Khedive of Egypt to Defterdar, September 
1825, quoted by M. P. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 33. 
I. Introduction 
What has been said so far brings out the role of one. institution i e. 
insurance, in the underdevelopment of the periphery. However, insurance 
was only one factor of underdevelopment and the investigation of its role 
to the exclusion of other factors could only tell part of the story of 
underdevelopment. In this chapter, therefore, (and at the cost of touching 
on arguments made earlier) the emphasis is on the wider processes of colonial 
exploitation and distortion of the economies and societies of the periphery 
i. e. the rise of underdevelopment, and on the structural underpinnings of 
underdevelopment in neo-colonial situations. These aspects are examined 
with reference to the Sudan. The object, however, is to set the stage for 
the examination of the Sudanese insurance industry with which the following 
chapter is concerned. Undoubtedly, proper understanding of any institution 
- insurance included - begins with the study of the economic and social 
framework in which the institution operates. And only an interdisciplinary 
approach which considers some major social and economic aspects of the Sudan 
could meaningfully assess the chances of the country in utilizing its 
insurance industry to further economic and social development in the manner 
outlined in the last chapter. The issues examined here should, therefore, 
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provide answers for some basic questions concerning the sort of environment 
in which the institution operates, and the l, ike, lihood of the promotion of 
novel insurance strategies to suit the needs of the country. 
The task of investigating a country's conditions of underdevelopment 
appears easier to achieve if such conditions are examined against the back- 
ground of some theoretical propositions common to the experiences of all 
underdeveloped countries. The search for propositions underlying colonialism 
imposes no strain on originality for, as was mentioned earlier, the theory 
of underdevelopment has provided a wealth of propositions on the origin 
and causes of underdevelopment. But what makes the background of common 
experiences a reliable framework of reference is the fact that colonialism, 
though uniform in its ends and purposes, adhered to no one policy of exploitation, 
and even within the same colony, sometimes displayed a multitude of economic 
and social policies all ultimately leading toward the achievement of imperial 
designs. In some colonies, and due to certain colonial policies, peculiar 
conditions and characteristics existed. It is therefore, 'safer' to test 
the propositions available in the literature in the case of each individual 
country lest the peculiarities of that country blur- the vision for a full 
understanding of its conditions of underdevelopment. 
In the literature on underdevelopment an underdeveloped country (especially 
one that adheres to a capitalist trajectory of development after the 
termination of colonial rule) is the one to which the following hypotheses 
apply: 
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(A) Before its incorporation into the world system, the country was not 
1 
underdeveloped, though it may have been 'undeveloped'. It had met the 
demands of its people, and more often than not, had possessed most of the 
conditions necessary for human progress. 
(B) Underdevelopment of such a country was the function of imperialist 
hegemony of the centre in that: the acquisition of subsistence farms for 
large-scale plantations or mining, and the shunting around of human resources 
and their forced engagement in such plantations and in mines, upset the 
self-sufficiency of the country and appropriated, for colonial ends, the 
social labour upon which its progress depended. 
2 
(C) Underdevelopment was also the product of imperialism, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter, in that the surplus accruing to a country was exported 
to the centre the development of which was not possible without a concomitant 
situation of underdevelopment in such a country.. 
3 
1. A. G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Supra., 
2. Paul A Baran, the Political Economy of Growth, Supra., pp. 275-6. 
3. See e. g. G. Ospiev, Sociology, Problems of Theory and Method, 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), pp. 8-9. 
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(D) An underdeveloped country experienced a change in the nature of the 
social relations of production consequent upon the operation of a capitalist 
mode of production and the relations of production in it generally followed 
those under an advanced capitalist country. l: 
(E) If an underdeveloped country attempts to develop along a capitalist 
path, its development becomes 'a development of underdevelopment' .2 In 
a number of underdeveloped countries which experienced this retrogression, 
two factors related to the manner of surplus appropriation featured 
prominently: 
1. The maintenance of colonial economic structures by a bourgeoisie in a 
country, has meant that this bourgeoisie could appropriate an enormous 
part . of the surplus accruing to society just as the foreign entrepreneur did 
under colonial rule. This surplus, however, is either wasted in lavish con- 
sumption or it is hoarded. But as this bourgeoisie controls state power, 
it initiates economic and social policies which maintain the underlying 
structures of underdevelopment and thus reproduce underdevelopment. 
3 
2. The continuing economic relations between the centre and the underdeveloped 
country has meant that the centre could continue to drain a large part of the 
surplus made in such a country through the exchange of advantages between them. 
This exchange is an 'unequal exchange. '4 This is so because the continued 
1. A. G. Frank, Lum enbour eoise: Lum endevelo went, (New York and London: 
Monthly Review Press, 1974), passim. 
2. Andre G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Supra. 
3. See e. g. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, The Political Economy of 
Neo-Colonialism, S_uýra., passim 
4. Arghiri Emmannel, Unequal Exchange, Supra., Passim. 
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division of labour manifested, at the peripheral end, in the export of 
agricultural products, together with the persistence of low reward for 
labour, make the goods exported from the periphery relatively cheaper 
than the goods coming from the opposite direction. Thus the centre with 
its high wages could benefit from the lower wages obtaining in the periphery 
by being able to purchase goods at lower prices than if goods were produced 
locally. The periphery, however, could only lose because it pays higher 
prices for goods produced in high wage countries than if goods were 
produced locally. This exchange tends to perpetuate underdevelopment 
of the periphery in that the lack of surplus necessary for development 
becomes cumulative and technological progress becomes difficult to achieve. 
The remaining part of this chapter is an attempt to test the application 
of these characteristics and hypotheses to the Sudan. A close look at the 
hypotheses suggests that the conditions of underdevelopment in a particular 
country could be investigated with reference to three basic areas: (a) the 
conditions of a country before its incorporation into the world system, and 
the manner in which such incorporation was achieved, (b) the effects of such 
incorporation upon future developments in the country, and (c) the degree to 
I 
which the interests of the bourgeoisie play a role in the maintenance of 
colonial economic structures in a neo-colonial form. Without adhering to 
this order, these areas are examined below in the case of the Sudan. 
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II. The Roots of Underdevelopment in the Sudan: 
A. Colonial Rule : 1820-1956 
1. Turko-Egyptian Colonialism : 1820-1885 
Like fellow Africans elsewhere, Sudanese people eked out their living 
from subsistence agriculture and herding for many centuries. The Nile 
Valley was the most populated part of the country. It provided a means of 
communication, ,a path for migration and invasion from the North, and was 
the cradle of early Sudanese civilizations. Occasional tribal conflicts 
ensued from time to time over pastures and spheres of influence, and 
consequent economic hazards were not entirely unknown. But undoubtedly, 
nearly all the conditions necessary for human development had existed in 
one way or another. 
The nineteenth century, however, opened with a disadvantage to the 
Sudan. The Turkish occupation of Egypt had upset the balance of power in 
the Nile Valley and, militarily, Egypt became the most powerful country 
in Africa. An imperialist power was born. And from earlier times Egypt 
i 
was anxious to secure the sources of the Nile upon which its livelihood 
depended, to exploit the gold mines of the Sudan, and to enslave Sudanese 
who could man the Turko-Egyptian armies. 
1 In the wake- of these imperial 
ambitions, the Sudan was annexed to Egypt in 1821. The nature of primitive 
accumulation from the Sudan under Turko-Egyptian colonialism corresponded 
1. M. P. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, Supra., pp. 35-7. 
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to the low level of capitalist development in Egypt. Egypt was a feudal 
society dominated by a landed aristocracy. There was, therefore, no attempt 
to destroy rural handicrafts or to turn the Sudan into a market for Egyptian 
goods, nor was there any serious attempt to build a communication network 
to link the Sudan to Egypt. But in a frantic orgy of resource accumulation, 
the colonial administration exploited products such as gum arabic, ground 
nuts, ostrich feathers and opium, although only ivory, captured cattle and 
heavy taxes could swell its coffers satisfactorily. 
1 
In fact, as no gold 
could be found, the administration resorted to heavy taxation upon native 
Sudanese. Taxes, however, bordered on confiscation, and the manner in 
which they were levied was 'cruel and extortionate to the last degree'. 2 
And when Southern Sudan was annexed to the Egyptian empire, slaves became 
the most important 'item' of the booty. The nearest to a modern colonial 
plantation was a small scheme in Eastern Sudan developed to augment Egyptian 
cotton exports in the cotton boom during the American Civil War, but was 
later abandoned. 
3 
This rule which lasted over six decades, was a great economic and social 
setback for the Sudan. Two developments, in particular, which took place 
during this time featured prominently as factors of great importance in the 
underdevelopment of the Sudan. Firstly, the hunt for men and elephants 
of the Sudan and the battles against the natives who defaulted in taxes or 
1. Richard Hi11, Egypt in the Sudan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 
pp. 49-57. 
2. Muddathir Abd A1-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 73. 
3. Holt, ocit., p. 73. 
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showed some independence, were primary factors in the depopulation of the 
Sudan (which is now one of the most sparsely populated countries in Africa). 
This depopulation process was intensified at a later phase of colonial rule 
because, as common in slave-trade ridden socities of Africa in the nineteenth 
century, the procurement of slaves depended not solely upon series of raids 
which permitted the extraction of human hunt by sheer brute force. Rather, 
the entire structure of society underwent a process of adaptation and 
change1, all ultimately leading toward the export of slaves to Egypt. 
Slave raids had initially caused the disintegration of the clan organization 
and speeded up the emergence of 'nomad feudalism' founded on a territorial 
basis and dominated by warrior nobles. 
2 
Warrior nobles were, in turn, 
encouraged to invade their enemies whose virtual physical removal from 
the vicinity became possible under the slave trade institution. 
3 Secondly, 
the onerous taxes and the forced recruitment of-men into the colonial army, 
resulted in an unprecedented human dislocation of Sudanese society north 
and south. Peasants fled in thousands, abandoned their homes along the 
Nile, and often had to settle for a lower standard of living in barren areas, 
beyond the reach of the administration, but in circumstances which inhibited 
human innovation and progress. 
1. See e. g. G. Duprd and P. P. Rey, "Reflections on the Pertinence of a 
Theory of Exchange", Economy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2,1973, pp. 131-163. 
2. Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa", (1971), 
A paper presented for the U. N. African Institute for Economic Development 
and Planning, Dakar, Senegal, quoted by Carole Collins, "Colonialism and 
Class Struggles in the Sudan", Middle East Research and Information Project, 
No. 46, p. 5. 
3. See e. g. M. Omer Beshir, SouthernSudan: Background to Conflict, (London: 
Hurst, 1968), pp. 11-12. 
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It was against this background that Sudanese people united under 
the leadership of al-Mahdi to throw off the yoke of foreign rule and 
establish their 'Mahdist state' in 1885. Though largely peasant-dominated, 
the Mahdist movement's failure 'to understand the dynamics of its own 
oppression led to the entrenchment of a new system of semi-feudal social 
relationships', 
1 
and a tribal autocracy which accelerated its own 
eclipse. 
2 At any rate, as was shown in the earlier chapter, the close 
of the nineteenth century was a period of European scramble for Africa, 
and throughout its short l ife (1885-1898), the nascent state was regularly 
harassed by Italians from the East, Belgians from the South, and the 
French from the West, until it was finally invaded by an Anglo-Egyptian 
army from the North in 1898. After one major battle with the invading 
force, the Mahdist state was over. 
2. Condominium Colonialism 
Soon after the reconquest of the Sudan by Britain and Egypt, the 
Condominium agreement 1899 was signed to establish a formal link between 
the Khedive (of Egypt) and Britain in a joint sovereignty over the Sudan. 
The relevance of this agreement to the issues examined in this chapter will 
appear later, suffice it to say here that the agreement was no more than 
1. Carole Collins, "Colonialism and Class Struggle in the Sudan", Supra., 
p. 5. 
2. M. P. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898, (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1958). 
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a legal fiction. There was no provision governing 'sovereignty` over 
the Sudan I, and it seemed quite clear that Britain simply regarded the 
Sudan as its own colony. The agreement provided for a post of Governor 
General of the Sudan who was to be appointed by a Khadival decree, and 
who was to be an Egyptian official (not citizen); but the agreement 
provided that such appointment could only be made by the recommendation 
of the British Government. 
2 However, all Governors of the Sudan until 
independence in 1956 were British, and the upper echelons of power in 
the bureaucracy were filled by British officials. Egyptians only served 
in the lower ranks and with little chance of promotion. More significant, 
however, were the provisions dealing with the non-applicability of 
Egyptian laws to the Sudan, and the imposition of import duties upon 
goods coming to Sudan from Egypt. 
The implications of the agreement for the Sudan were that the Sudan 
was to respond primarily to the needs of Britain, a highly industralized 
capitalist country, rather than to the needs of the landed aristocracy of 
feudalist Egypt. The nature of capital accumulation or extraction of 
surplus from the Sudan was to undergo a tremendous change from the previous 
Turko-Egyption period to satisfy the needs of British Capitalism. Thus 
some of the present conditions of underdevelopment in the Sudan, though 
with roots in earlier colonialism, must largely be sought 
in this second 
phase of colonial hegemony when the impact of colonialism was, no 
doubt, 
greater. 
1. See e. g. M. A. Mahgoub, Democracy on Trial, 
(London: Andrg Deutsch, 1974) 
p. 35. 
2. Article X of the agreement, see Mudhathir Abd Al-Rahim, Imperialism and 
Nationalism in the Sudan, Supra., 
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B. Economic, Social and Political Underdevelopment Under British 
Colonial ism: 
The British administration did not seek to make the Sudan a settl er 
colony in view of its unfavourable weather conditions, and accordingly, 
their land policy differed from that in some other colonies such as 
Kenya for example. Though land was converted into a commodity, the 
intention was to end confusion in land tenure caused under Mahdism, to 
prevent speculation in land and to create a landed class of yeoman 
farmers to lead the support for British policies in the Sudan. Legis- 
lation passed in this connection consisted of the Title to Lands 
Ordinance 1899, under which absolute title to land was obtained after 
uninterrupted possession for five years, and the Land Settlement Ordinance 
passed in 1905. 
The primary colonial task was to orient the economy toward the outside 
world. Railways were built (at the expense of Egypt) to link production 
areas to world markets. One such line extended to Gezirain central Sudan 
to transport, at first, gum arabic. Port-Sudan was developed into a 
modern port and was linked to Kassala in the East by rail to facilitate 
the export of eastern products, while Nile steamers linked remote production 
areas to the nearest railway loading terminals. 
' It was equally important 
to annihilate rural handicrafts and small industries such as cloth, shoes 
and kitchenware in order to create a market for manufactured good from abroad. 
1. C. Wilkins, " Transport in the Sudan, " in Ali Mohmed El-Hassan, (ed. ). 
An Introduction to the Sudan Economy, ' (Khartoum: Khartoum University 
Press, 1976 , pp. 102-3. 
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Britain was, of course, the major supplier of these imports and the 
principal customer for Sudanese exports, while the share of Egypt in 
Sudanese trade was falling constantly. 
1 Also, all major investments 
in the Sudan were British. These included the Sudan Light and Power 
Company, the Sudan Meat Products and a mining firm which exploited all 
gold deposits it could lay its hands on, in Eastern Sudan. 
2 And all 
loans advanced by the Government were made available to British entre- 
preneurs. These amounted to £10m. between 1919-1924, and were mainly 
advanced for railway construction and development of agricultural schemes. 
3 
The monetary system was yet, another field in which British interests ruled 
supreme. Nearly all banks and most insurance agencies were branches of 
British enterprises and were adminstered from abroad through regional 
satellite offices in Cairo and elsewhere. 
The major colonial development in the Sudan was the establishment of 
the Gezira scheme (the biggest farm in the world) for cotton production. 
The development of the scheme was primarily a response to pressures upon 
the British Government by the British Cotton Growing Association and 
Lancashire MPs in the House of Commons to develop a cotton scheme in view 
of the competition to the British textile industry by the U. S., Japan and 
1. Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question, (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1951), 
pp. 93-7. 
2. Ibid., p. 93. 
3. Abdel Rahman M. Wahab, "Development Planning in the Sudan, in 
An Introduction to the Sudan Economy, Supra., p. 217. 
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Egypt, and the uncertainty of cotton supplies to Britain. 1 As Gaitskell 
maintains: 
2 
The failure of the American and Egyptian crops in 1909 
brought home to Lancashire spinners the perils of relying 
on these two countries, especially for the longer and 
finer cotton increasingly demanded for better quality 
yarns. 
With greedy eyes upon the Sudan the British Cotton Growing Association 
pressurized the British Government to carry out the type of 'development' 
which the Association desired there. In the words of a member: 
3 
Experiments have abundantly proved that the Sudan is not, only 
the finest cotton growing country in the whole of the British 
Empire, but what is more important, that it can grow the 
sort of cotton Lancashire requires.... [A] loan will develop the 
resources of the Sudan under British guidance in a way which 
will ensure the more permanent prosperity of the cotton 
industry. 
Thus a loan of £3m. (described by a Lancashire MP as a 'bounty to 
Lancashire') 4 was granted by the British Government to the Sudan Plantation 
Syndicate and Kassala Cotton Syndicate to construct a dam and a main canal 
at Sennar on the Blue Nile for irrigation. When production started, cotton 
was marketed by the Gezira Marketing Board which had its headquarters in 
1. Tony Barnett, The Gezira Scheme : An Illusion of Development, (London: 
Frank Cass, 1977 , pp. 4-5. 
2. A. Gai tskel l, Gezi ra: A story of Development in the Sudan, (London: 
Farber and Farber Ltd, 1959)2 p. 54. 
3. Quoted by Tony Barnett, the Gezira scheme, Supra., p. 5. 
4. Ibid., p. 6. 
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London and which sold mainly to British manufacturers. The success of 
the scheme depended-depends- upon the supply of cheap labour from western 
Sudan through the cusomary colonial methods of heavy taxes upon the 
inhabitants of a region designed to force them to seek employment. It 
must be mentioned, however, that the proceeds of the Gezira cotton are the 
backbone of Sudanese economy now. 
The development of the scheme confirms the argument made earlier that 
it was in the interest of Britain, not Egypt, that the Sudan was developed/ 
underdeveloped during this period. For the construction of a dam had a 
direct bearing on the share of Nile waters accruing to Egypt, while the 
development of a cotton scheme of the Gezira size threatened the Egyptian 
economy which depended heavily on cotton exports. 
British rule in the Sudan was a period of great economic stagnation. 
The reason behind this was the administration's concern about maintaining 
self-sufficiency and balanced budgets in each colony in order to minim4 ze 
the pressures on the British Treasury. 
1 Thus, in the Sudan 'development 
policy' was made subservient to fiscal policy, and all capital projects 
planned were to be financed from a General Reserve Fund. Economic develop- 
ment was, therefore, constrained by the level of reserves accumulated each 
year. 
2 While those developments represented 'expenditures' (incidently 
these were largely services to the European personnel), the bulk of 'revenue' 
1. E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics 
of Economic Change 1919-1939, (London: Heinemann, 1973). pp. 141-3. 
2. Abdel Rahman Abdel Wahab, "Development Planning in the Sudan" in All M. 
E1-Hassan, (ed. ), An Introduction to the Sudan Economy, o, p. cit., p. 212. 
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was drawn from fiscal levies on import and export activities related to 
foreign trade. 1 In the aftermath of World War II, and as a concession 
to the Nationalist movement, the administration embarked on two development 
programmes for the periods 1946-1951 and 1951-1956. The first of these 
devoted a sum of £14m. for 'an odd collection of about 200 unrelated 
projects', 
2 
and the second listed another 312 schemes at a cost of 
£E. 45.5m., but was no better than the former programme. 
3 On the political 
and social planes, two colonial policies must be mentioned before this 
section is concluded. The one concerns the customary 'divide and rule' 
policy which characterized British colonialism, the other concerns the 
colonial educational policy. 
Because of the distance of Southern Sudan from the port on the Red Sea, 
and because of weather conditions, and the dominance of peculiar tribal 
values in the South which did not encourage a demand for manufactured 
goods, the British administration ignored southern Sudan as being too 
expensive to exploit. 
4 Later, however, it was envisaged that the administration 
should encourage the development of the Southern region along distinctly 
African or negroid lines to the exclusion of Afro-Arab and Islamic influence 
1. A. E1-Musin Mustafa. "The Structural Malformation of the Sudanese Economy". 
(Economic and Social Research Council, Khartoum 1977), Part I, p. 19. 
2. Abdel Rahman Abdel Wahab, "Development Planning in the Sudan" in A. M. 
El-Hassan (ed. ), An Introduction to the Sudan Economy, oop. cit. p. 218. 
3. Sayyed Nimeri, Economic Planning in the Sudan (in Arabic), (Khartoum: 
Khartoum University Press, 1978), p. 28. 
4. Joseph Gararg, "On Economic and Regional Autonomy' in Dunstan M. Wai (ed. ), 
the Southern Sudan: the Problem of National Integration, (London: Frank Cass, 
19 3, P. 88. 
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obtaining in the North, as much as possible, in an attempt to undermine 
the unity of the country. Thus as late as 1945, the Governor General 
of the Sudan could still argue that: 
' 
The approved policy is to act upon the fact that the people of Southern Sudan are distinctly African and negroid, and that 
our obvious duty to them is therefore to push ahead as fast 
as we can with their economic and educational development on 
African and Negroid lines, and not upon the Middle Eastern 
and Arab lines of progress which are suitable for the 
Northern Sudan. It is only by [separate] economic and 
educational development that these people can be equipped 
to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their 
future lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan 
or with East Africa. 
The administration began its separation policy by outlawing Muslim dress 
in the South, superimposing English as a Lingua franca instead of Arabic 
and restricting travel and communications between the two regions. Also 
Christian missionary activities were encouraged, Islamization prevented, 
and independent Equatorial Battalions were set up as separate units from 
the Sudan Defence Force of Northern Sudan. It was a classical example 
of 'divide and rule' in which ethnic, religious and cultural factors could 
not have operated any better in the interests of British designs. 
2 
1. Quoted by Peter Russel &S Torrs McCall, Can Cessession be Justified? : 
The Case of Southern Sudan", in, the Southern Sudan the Problem of 
National Integration, Supra., p. 96. 
2. M. Omer Beshir, Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict, Supra., 
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The colonial policy on education1 was to establish a rudimentary 
institution to train native Sudanese to occupy the lower posts in the 
colonial bureaucracy. To this end the Gordon Memorial College was set 
up early this century and consisted of a primary school, a secondary 
school, an industrial workshop and training college. 
2 Any form of higher 
education was vehemently opposed by the administration. In the words of 
a colonial bureaucrat: 
3 
I can conceive much harm and no utility from higher education 
among a people so profoundly backward as the Sudanese. 
C. The Rise of Sectarian Capitalists 
The rise of sectarian capitalists in the Sudan, with economic interests 
and political 'ideologies' identical to those of their colonial masters, 
is inseparable from the question of the continuity of colonial policies 
under neo-colonialism which this chapter examines later. This part of the 
section deals with the changing social relations of production in the Sudan 
under colonial rule with reference to the rise of a class of indigenous 
capitalists. 
1. For details of Government Educational Policy under colonialism, see 
M. Omer Beshir, Educational Development in the Sudan 1898-1956, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1969). 
2. University of Khartoum Calendar, 1974-6. (Khartoum: Khartoum University 
Press, 1976), p. 117. 
3. Quoted by Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a 
Traditional Society: The Case of Sudan, (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 
p. 36. 
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Upon the reconquest of the Sudan and the extension of commodity 
relations on a large scale, the social structures underwent the change 
which is inevitable in such circumstances. A class of capitalists appeared. 
Notable among these was al -Mi rghani the leader of the Khatmiyya sect (an 
Islamic Order), who had accompanied the Arglo-Egyptian armies to the Sudan 
(having been forced into exile by the Mahdists), and who became the true 
protege of the colonial state which subsidized his activities in an attempt 
to fill the politico-religious vacuum in the country in the aftermath of 
the fall of Mahdism. 
1 But when the Khatmiyya became a sizeable sect with 
thousands of adherents, the administration suddenly promoted a Mahdist 
rival. This was Abd al Rahman al-Mahadi, the posthumous son of al-Mahadi. 
With British support, al-Mahadi immediately pursued economic interests 
in order to establish a base for his new movement. Vast plantations, 
confiscated in 1899, were returned to him, and . along the White Nile, north 
of Khartoum and various other places fortunes for the new Mahadi were to 
be found. Al-Mirghani had already established himself. His fortunes 
depended upon the activities of his agents who acted as middlemen in getting 
the produce of his supporters from northern Sudan to markets up the Nile 
and to Egypt, 
2 
with phenomenal profits in the process accruing to the 
Khatmiyya sect. While the two Sectarian leaders strove to the utmost to 
form their respective bases, in their rivalry only the colonial administration 
could enhance its position. In fact as early as 1924 and with the approval 
of the two leaders (who openly competed in loyalty to Britain), the British 
1. Ibid., pp. 21-22 
2. Carole Collins, op. it. p. 6. 
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administration evacuated all Egyptian troops and tightened its grip on 
the country. This was, however, only to make a de facto situation 
de j urge .1 
Later on, the position of the two leaders was enhanced by yet another 
development. In the 1930s native bureaucrats in the colonial service began 
to play an active role in politics after their association, the Graduates 
Congress, was formed in 1938. The graduates, however, could not maintain 
an independent position as a political rival to the two leaders, and 
soon had to split into two factions each supporting a leader. 
2 Al-Mir. ghani 
whose commercial interests necessitated close relation with Egypt became 
a patron of the Ashigga (blood brothers) faction of the Congress which 
advocated the 'Unity of the Nile Valley' policy i. e. union between Sudan 
and Egypt. Al-Mahadi who was suspicious of a union with Egypt which might 
enhance the position of al-Mirghani, gave his support to the Umma (nation) 
faction of the Congress which advocated 'the Sudan for the Sudanese' 
slogan and insisted on a formal link with Britain against Egyptian ambitions. 
3 
The two factions later became the most powerful political parties in the 
country (the Ashigga splitting into the People's Democratic Party and the 
National Unionist Party), they fought and won the (verbal) battle for 
independence and controlled political power. 
1. Peter Woodward, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism, (London: Rex 
Collings, 1979). 
2. M. A. Mahjoub, Democracy on Trial, Supra., pp. 40-44. 
3. Peter K. Bectold, Politics in the Sudan, (New York: Washington & London: 
Praeger Publishers, 1976 ppp. 77-88, also Islam, Nationalism of 
Communism in a Traditional Society, Supra, pp. 2 -. 
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At the eve of independence the two leaders and many of their 
supporters were really powerful in economic terms. The deliberate 
economic encouragement by the administration was yielding quick results. 
A Mahdist landed-aristocracy was well established in Gezira, north of 
Khartoum, and in the mechanized farming regions along the White Nile. 
In urban areas Khatmiyya supporters controlled trade and industry. Their 
fortunes were enhanced a great deal by small industries (all dependent 
upon colonial schemes) such as ginning, oil milling and textile industries. 
Import- substitution industries stimulated by shortages of materials during 
World War II were partly owned by this category of capitalists. And 
although most of those industries closed down at the end of the war, 
1 
sizeable capital was accumulated and later ploughed into commerce. This 
class of capitalists, however, was overwhelmed by Greeks, Syrians and 
Asian traders who had followed the colonial armies into the Sudan. 
2 But 
it was the grievances of Sudanese capitalists against foreign entrepreneurs 
which speeded up the transition to independence. In January, 1956, the Sudan 
became independent of both Britain and Egypt, but real political power was 
still in the hands of the two sectarian leaders whose rise to power was no 
more than a move to cement colonial rule in the Sudan. 
3 It must be added 
here that one year before independence a Civil War between the north and 
south was in full swing. 
1. A. El-Muhsin Mustafa, "The Structural Malformation of the Sudanese 
Economy", Supraes pp. 22-3. 
2. Carole Collins, 2p. cit. p. 13. 
3. For the collaboration of the Mahadist and Khatmiyya with the British 
administration see, Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of 
European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration", in, 
Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, (eds. ), Studies in the Theory of Im erialism, 
(London: Longman, ( 6th impression .1980), 
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Thus, the development of the Sudanese economy and society under 
colonialism was a development of underdevelopment. Under Turko-Egyptian 
colonialism, the accumulation of capital was geared toward the needs of 
the Turkish landed-aristocracy in Egypt, and the social disruption which 
followed, i. e. depopulation, human dislocation and so on, were 
characteristic of the dominance of a feudal mode of production. 
1 The 
economic and social structures in the Sudan were forced to undergo the 
necessary changes which this accumulation demanded. Under British 
colonialism, capital accumulation depended, for the most part, upon 
restructuring the economy and society to cope with the needs of a highly 
industrialized capitalist economy by creating economic institutions and 
imposing economic conditions which could only continue to function by 
being dependent upon the British centre. This system was maintained, 
under the second colonial rule, through the collaboration of indigenous 
sectarian capitalists who supported colonial rule in return for economic 
benefits. 
In the following section an attempt is made to show how this develop- 
ment of underdevelopment was maintained by the neo-colonial state. 
For the economic and social consequences of primitive accumulation 
under a feudal mode of production, see K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I., 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart Jreprinted, 1977]), Part VIII, pp. 667- 
724. 
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III. The Neo-Colonial State and the Persistence of Underdevelopment. 
A. The Politics of Continuity 
A flag independence which brings to power those who have collaborated 
with colonial rule so faithfully, is bound to be little more than a mere sham. 
Rarely has a transition to independence, anywhere in Africa, been a 
different exercise. In Kenya 'the post-colonial state.., has been 
dominated by the hegemonic fraction of indigenous capital and the 
apparatus and functions of the state have been realigned since 1963 to 
foster the development of this class'. 
1 In the Sudan the rising bourgeoisie 
whose fortunes depended upon the colonial economic structures i. e. export 
of primary goods and import of manufactured goods, took control of state 
power through political organizations or parties. It was in the interest 
of this class to maintain those structures. Left wing groups, consisting 
of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and the Sudan Workers Trade Union 
Federation (SWTUF), who vigorously opposed traditional elements and who 
advocated a transition to socialism as a path for development, were represented 
by one MP only following the first elections. 
2 
Little wonder then, in the absence of strong opposition, virtually 
all colonial economic and social policies remained intact, and were in 
fact reinforced by post-independence developments! The economy still reflected 
the legacy of a prolonged colonial rule. The share of manufacturing in the 
Gross Domestic Product (, GDP) was a mere I per cent. The agricultural sector, 
1. Nicola Swainson, The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya: 
1918-1977. (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 182. 
2. G. Warburg, op. cit., P. 99. 
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which constituted 61 per cent, provided employment for 85 per cent of the 
work force, and contributed to over 90 per cent of the total value of 
exports. 
' 
Cotton remained the backbone of the economy. The dominant 
thinking about economic policy was a mere colonial hangover i. e. the 
allocation of funds for unrelated schemes and an obsession with budget 
balancing. In the colonial tradition of post-war planning, annual 
programmes known as the 'new scheme programmes' were to be implemented 
between 1956-1961, with a total allocation of £S69m. 
2 These consisted 
largely of public utility services such as the railways, ports, electricity 
etc and the development of small industries dependent on agricultural 
materials such as cotton ginning, oil pressing and textiles Private 
enterprise was assigned a leading role in the economy and the activities 
of the public sector were to be complementary i. e. confined to areas 
where private enterprise and knowledge were wanting; and private capital 
was either shy or not forthcoming. 
4 Industry, in particlar, was 'reserved' 
for private enterprise, and there was to be no discrimination between 
foreign and private firms. This policy was confirmed by the enactment of 
the Approved Enterprises (Concessions) Act, 1956. Under the Act approved 
1. Sadiq El-Raheed, "The Experience of Public Industrialization in the 
Sudan" in All M. El-Hassan, (ed. ), Essays on the Economy and Society 
of the Sudan, (Khartoum; Khartoum University Press, 1977), p. 83, 
footnote 1. 
2. Abdel Rahman A. Wahab, op. cit. pp. 219-20. 
3. Saad edin Fawzi, The Labour Movement in the Sudan: 1946-1955 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 195 p"9" 
4. Sadiq El-Raheed, "The Experience of Public Industrialization", Supra , 
pp. 83-4. 
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enterprises were automatically entitled to a relief from business profit 
tax for two to five years, and profits up to 5 per cent of the capital 
employed were exempted from all sorts of taxes. 
' 
Various forms of 
'assistance' were also made possible for entrepreneurs, foreign and 
indigenous. 2 On the other hand, the monetary system still reflected a 
strong colonial flavour. Virtually all insurance services were controlled 
by foreign agencies which exceeded 100 before 1960, and all banks were 
foreign too (see next Chapter). 
Nor was the political arena any different, of course. The same old 
sectarian parties simply carried their feuds into the post-independence 
era, and the public continued to be swayed by evasive issues behind the 
facade of a democracy. 
3 
A secessionist movement in southern Sudan was 
dealt with in a manner only equalled in colonial situations. The leaders 
of independence were completely insensitive to southern demands for regional 
autonomy or self-rule. They had all insisted on forced cultural 
assimilation of the south as a condition for political participation. The 
first Prime Minister had, as early as 1944, urged for 'Unity of the Nile 
Valley' as 'a necessary safeguard against incorporation in an African 
system'4 [sic], and the Minister of Interior in 1958 clearly stated in 
response to the southerners demand for an Afro-Arab policy in the Sudan, that: 
5 
1. Francis A. Lees & Hugh C. Brooks, The Economic and Political Development 
of the Sudan. (London: Macmillan Press, 1977). pp. 2- . 
2. Ibid. 
3. Such as the border dispute with Egypt at a time of falling cotton 
prices in the world market. 
4. Quoted by G. Warburg, 
_p 
cit. p. 54. 
5. Quoted by Peter Russell & Storrs McCall, "Can Cessession be justified? " 
Supra., p. 104. 
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the Sudan is an integral part of the Arab world ... anybody dissenting from this view must quit the country. 
The colonial policy of intra-regional conflicts could not have been 
preserved by an 'indigenous government' any better. 
Equally bad, social gaps were widening between Sudanese and at an 
appalling rate. Wage differentials were fuelled by the maintenance of a 
colonial salary structure and the promotion of a very large number of 
bureaucrats into the upper echelons of the administration under the 
Sudanization policy which followed the departure of the colonists. The 
mass of workers occupied the 'unclassified' lower scales of service, 
irrespective of skills or responsibilities. 
1 It was mentioned earlier 
that 85 per cent of the population had no regular jobs. Thus at all 
economic, political and social levels the formal termination of colonial 
rule over the Sudan has meant little difference to the mass of the Sudanese. 
B. Neo-Colonial Governments and the Expansion of the Private Sector 
1. The Neo-Colonial Governments up to 1969. 
It may be recalled that this chapter is an attempt to outline some 
social and economic factors which could be of some guidance to the under- 
standing of insurance problems as discussed in the following chapter. 
While most post-independence developments were, in one way or another, 
related to this question the growth of the private sector and the control 
of state power by the bourgeoisie at present (both topics are examined later) 
1. Saad edin Fawzi, The Labour Movement in the Sudan, Supra, p. 130 and p. 135. 
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appear to have a more direct relevance to insurance matters. We will, 
therefore, briefly sketch the political developments which led to the 
present state of affairs in the country. 
The first government (1956-58) was overthrown by, or rather, handed 
over to, the Military in November, 1958.1 The Military were, in turn, 
thrown out of office by a popular uprising in 1964. Parliamentary politics 
were restored, and traditional parties alternated in power, but all 
political and economic developments were geared towards the interests of 
the Mahdist landed-aristocracy, or the urban-based Khatmiyya industrialists 
and traders, depending upon which party was in power. In May 1969, the 
Military stepped in again, seized power, and has remained in office (except 
for a three-day interval in 1971 as will be seen) up to now. Unlike 
former governments, however, the May regime regarded itself as a revolutionary, 
anti-sectarian mass-movement whose aim was to develop Sudan along a 
socialist path. A five year plan (. 1970-1975) was drafted by a team of 
Soviet experts, and an independent Ministry for Planning was set up for the 
first time in the country. 
2 On the first anniversary of the coup, the 
Nationalization of Banks Act, 1970 was passed and the Insurers 
(Control) Act, 1960 was amended. Under the former, all foreign and 
national banks (6 in number) were nationalized, and the latter required 
all foreign insurance agencies in the Sudan to cease issuing new policies 
and to transfer their portfolios to Sudanese insurers who were to be merged 
into three companies (see next chapter). And virtually all major foreign 
1. It was 'a coup by courtesy, set a foot by an army commander... in 
response to the demand for emergency measures by the head of the 
government', R. First, The Barrel of Gun, (New York: Penguin Books, 
1972), p. 223. 
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companies were nationalized under the Nationalization of Companies Act, 
1970. Also, 18 companies dealing in the export of cotton and import of 
textiles were taken over and merged into four companies which were to 
form the Cotton Marketing Corporation. ) Between May and July, 1970, a 
number of 33 companies and the properties of 10 foreign entrepreneurs 
were- confiscated. 
2 Land reform policies were initiated, plans for 
educational reforms, housing improvements and rural development were 
drafted, and the Sudan became a host country for freedom fighters from 
the Southern African complex. And in line with the regime's socialist 
rhetoric, workers participation in management was seen as a necessary 
condition for the success of nationalized corporations. Trade unionists 
were encouraged to sit in the various boards of directors and there 
were even plans for profit-sharing by workers in all industries. 
3 
Thus never had the neo-colonial economic and social structures been 
shaken off so strongly ever since independence. However, before the 
transition to socialism could have any real impact, a sudden 'gallop to 
the right'4 took place, and a complete swing followed in all economic and 
social fields. This sudden change of heart was, inter-aZia, a response 
to a coup d'dtat in July 1971 (which lasted for 3 days) for which communists 
were held responsible. To the effect that the reversal of socialist policies 
reintroduced the bias for capitalist development in the absence of small 
foreign enterprises, this regime has promoted the rising Sudanese bourgeoisie 
- insurers included - both 
Mahdist and Khatmiyya, as no other national 
government has done in the entire history of the Sudan. 
1. A. A. Taha & A. H. Saeed, The Liberation of Sudanese Economy, (in Arabic), 
(Khartoum: -Khartoum University Press, 1971), pp. 12-18. 
2. Ibid., 
3. Ibid., p. 37. 
Norwtt O'Neill "Imperial i srtr i& 
Class Struggle in the Sudan" Race and Class, 
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In the remaining part of this section the development of Sudanese 
capitalism before and after the May regime will be outlined. 
2. The Expansion of the Private Sector 
It was seen earlier how political developments after independence 
were divorced from the needs of the masses until the early part of the 
junta's second rule in 1969. Party governments benefited those supporters 
who were traders, industrialists and cotton growers. Military governments 
benefited the same categories. After all the difference between a big 
farmer and an industrialist is one of degree not of kind. The Umma govern- 
ment (1956-58) sought to establish an Agricultural Bank in 1958 to finance 
Mahdist cotton growers who had been refused access to loans from the foreign 
1 
commercial banks after the cotton failure of 1957. U. S. aid was sought 
for the purpose. Leftist opposition led the party in power to hand power 
to the military who immediately accepted the loan and established the Bank 
in 1959. From its inception, the Agricultural Bank was to finance agri- 
business of big farmers. 30 per cent of every loan was to be provided for 
by the former applicant himself, in order 'to create a sense of responsibility 
and... ensure ... commitment'. 
2 The only forms of security acceptable by 
the Bank for short-term loans were movable property and crop guarantees, 
and for long-term loans, real estate security, deeds, shares and other 
1. Sayed Ali A. All, "Sudanese Financial Institutions and Their Functioning" 
in Ali M. El-Hassan (ed. ), Growth, Employment & Equity, (Khartoum: 
Khartoum University Press, 1976). pp. 14-18. 
2. Lees & Brooks, The Economic & Political Development of the Sudan, 
Supra, p. 93. 
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col l ateral s. The value of security offered in all cases was to be 30 
per cent more than the amount of loan obtainable. 
1 Thus ordinary peasants 
had (indeed still have) absolutely no access to any form of credit apart 
from shail (traditional credit) from moneylenders at the extortionate rate 
of 250 per cent interest, sometimes. 
2 
For urban-based capitalists, the 
junta's favour took the form of yet another credit institution. This was 
the Industrial Bank of Sudan established in 1961. Under the Industrial 
Bank Act, 1961, the Bank was to provide medium and long-term loans for 
the expansion or establishment of private industrial enterprises, by way 
of giving secured guarantees for payments in acquisition of machinery and 
material assets, extending liquid assets and technical advice. 
3 On the 
other hand, the Insurers (Control) Act, 1960, was passed, among other 
things, to remove onerous conditions imposed upon national insurers by 
a British-backed Council of Ministers in 1954 (see next chapter). Soon 
after the Act was passed two Sudanese insurers emerged to transact 
insurance business. Although a ten year plan (1961-1971) launched by the 
regime was the first modern plan of its kind to be made in the Sudan, much 
emphasis was laid on the importance of the private sector for the fulfilment 
of the plan. In the words of the regime's Ministry of Finance: 
4 
1. Ibid., 
2. Tony Barnet, 
_p. 
ci t. , p. 79. 
3. Lees & Brooks, op. cit. p. 93. 
4. The Ten Year Plan (1961-1971) (_K'hartoum, Government Printer, 1961), p. 7. 
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I would like to reaffirm the Government's belief in the effective role which private enterprise whether local or foreign, can play in economic development; especially in the field of industry. It is also the intention of the Government to review the facilities 
and concessions which are currently granted to approved enterprises to determine their effectiveness in achieving the role to be 
played in the plan by the private sector. 
The Federation of British industries was said to have Expressed its 
immediate satisfaction with the facilities offered by the plan and with 
the country's continued reliance on British Industries for capital and 
equipment. 
1 On the other hand, the lack of adequate sectoral distribution 
in the plan encouraged private capital to increase its investments at the 
expense of the public sector. These investments increased from the planned 
ratio of 26 per cent of total investments in 1962/63, to about half the 
total investments in the terminal year of the plan. 
2 
With official backing the rise of Sudanese entrepreneurs continued 
throughout the 1960s. Government contracts were assigned to Party supporters, 
manufactured goods were purchased from Party industrialists for Government 
Schools and Colleges (which, incidentally, increased in number but adhered to 
the old colonial educational system) and vast ranches were granted to 
cattle-raisers. Insurance companies increased in number from only two in 
1961 to six by 1969, and invested enormous amounts in real estate. Banks, 
foreign and national, financed traders and public corporations and trading 
firms grew to an unprecendented size. 
1. Dina S. E. Osman 'The Problems of Public Corporations and Development 
in the Sudan' Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, (Harvard University, 1978), 
p. 112. 
2. Abdel Rahman A. Wahab, op. cit. p. 223. 
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But it was really under the May regime that what might be called 
'Sudanese Capitalism' was to flourish, albeit under foreign dominance 
by giant multinationals. As mentioned earlier, the change of development 
strategies came in the aftermath of the abortive communist coup, especially 
as LonrhoI and Western Intelligence2 helped to reinstate the regime. 
Lonrho was immediately rewarded by a concession for a huge sugar factory 
at Kenana, was made the sole agent for the Sudan Government in London for 
the purchases of capital goods, and with the help of the Sudan became the 
Economic Advisor for the O. A. U. (_Organi zati on for African Unity) on oil 
matters. 
3 The reversal of socialist policies brought in its train the 
denationalization of several industries which were restored to their 
original owners. Land reform policies, which had hit the Mahdist landowners, 
were denounced, and confiscated properties again passed to their original 
owners who had been blamed earlier for tax evasion, alleged relations with 
metropolitan-based Zionists, and illegal transfers of money abroad. 
4 
The Five Year Plan (_1970-1975) with its socialist flavour, ceased to 
be a guide to action and was replaced by a more pragmatic Interim Action 
Programme (I. A. P. ) 1972-1977. This entailed not only a change of stragegies, 
but also of the volume of capital to be i nvested, in view of the termination of 
aid embargo (imposed in 1970) by Western countries. This, in fact, coincided 
with the normalization of diplomatic relations with the U. S. and West Germany, 
1. Suzanne Cronje,, Margaret Ling & Gillian Cronje, Lonrho: Portrait of 
a Multinational, (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 181. 
2. The Times, 8 August, 1971. 
3. Lonrho: Portrait of a Multinational, Supra., p. 182 and p. 193. 
4. A. A. Taha & A. Saeed, The Liberation of Sudanese Economy, Supra, pp. 16-18. 
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the latter being wooed-by the withdrawal of recognition of the German 
Democratic Republic. Under the I. A. P., the private sector could no longer 
be guided by the public sector, and in fact positive action was taken to 
restrict the expansion of the latter. This perhaps explains the drop in 
the government's share in exports from 84 per cent of total exports in 1971 
to 80 per cent by 1972, and the rise in the share of private sector imports 
from 52 per cent in 1971 to 64 per cent of total imports by 1972.1 
IV. State Power and Capital Accumulation 
The concern, so far, has been with the historical process of under- 
development in the Sudan, and with the way in which this underdevelopment 
is fostered and maintained through political and economic decisions in a 
neo-colonial situation. In so far as the bourgeoisie is the principal 
beneficiary of this situation the manner in which state power is made 
subservient to the needs of the bourgeoisie is central to the question 
of the continuity of underdevelopment. In this section, therefore, we shall 
see how state power is controlled by the Sudanese bourgeoisie and how this 
control serves the goals of capitalist accumulation. 
A. Who Controls Political Power in the Sudan? 
Upon the reinstatement of the present regime in the aftermath of 
the 1971 coup d'e tat some major political institutions were set up in 
the country. The leader of the regime was reinstated, not as the Chairman 
1. Ali Ahmed Suliman, Issues in the Economic Development of the Sudan, 
(Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1975), p. 5. 
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of the Revolutionary Command Council, as he was before, but as a President 
of the Republic, following a hasty referendum in which 'voters' had no option 
but to agree to the Presidents self-promotion. 
' The so-called Sudanese 
Socialist Union (S. S. U. ) was set up as the sole political party in the 
country in the early part of 1972. The S. S. U. was meant to be an alliance 
between workers, peasants, elites, soldiers and indigenous capitalists who 
are not tied to imperialism(! ). The party structure drew heavily on the 
Arab Socialist Union of Nasser's Egypt, though ironically, the Sudanese 
party was emerging at a time which marked the beginning of the end of its 
Egyptian model under President Sadat's administration which castigated it 
as bureaucratic, corrupt and inefficient. But the founders of the Sudanese 
party, undeterred by developments in Egypt, seemed to have spent 'very 
little time analysing the functional requisites for single party effective- 
ness ', 
2 
and, perhaps too intoxicated by 'the glittering facade and clever 
publicity of [the] Egyptian phantom organization'3 in earlier years, that 
Egypt's denunciation of its own invention simply passed unnoticed. 
But what is important for our purposes here is the control of the 
S. S. U. by the Sudanese bourgeoisie. Unlike the rank and file of the civil 
service, the bourgeoisie rushed into the party of its own free will. It 
was assured of an atmosphere of prosperity for the private sector by the 
regime's swing to the right. On the other hand, the grant of licences 
for export, import, rationed foodstuffs and petrol, depended upon party 
1. For the method of voting and the Psychological coercion exercised 
upon voters, see M. A. Maghoub, op. cit. p. 244. 
2. P. K. Bectold, Politics in the Sudan, Supra., p. 123. 
3, Ibid. 
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membership. Monopoly retail trade in specific rural communities was not 
possible without the control of the licence-granting machinery of the 
party. 
' At present, cement, sugar, flour and basic consumer goods are 
marketed through official licences controlled by the National Capitalist's 
Panel of the S. S. U., and government contracts, tenders for the supply of 
capital goods and joint ventures between the public sector and the 
private sector are, largely, confined to the members of this panel. Little 
wonder then, that almost every notable capitalist in the Sudan is a member 
of the panel. The other twin organization to be formed was the People's 
Assembly, or the Sudanese Parliament, established to share with the 
President his legislative powers, 
2 
although the president was given powers 
to dissolve it altogether The Assembly is largely dominated by big 
rural farmers, rural retail businessmen, tribal leaders and urban-based 
capitalists, and about one-tenth of its seats are reserved for unelected 
party members to be appointed by the President. 
4 
In the pages below, an attempt is made to show how this control of 
state power through the Party and parliament was made subservient to the 
goals of capital accumulation by indigenous and foreign entrepreneurs. 
Three areas in particular deserve some attention. These are: control of 
1. Carole Collins, op cit" p. 15 
2. Article 118 of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, 1973. 
3. Article 108 of the Constitution. 
4. Article 120, ibid. 
-83- 
the labour movement, foreign aid and foreign investment and credit 
facilities to the private sector. To these areas we now turn. 
B. Control of Labour Organizations 
The Interim Action Programme, mentioned earlier, required the creation 
of the 'right' atmosphere to woo foreign capital into the country. This 
was sought to be achieved by subduing labour organizations through increased 
government intervention in union affairs. Immediately after the rein- 
statement of the regime, some prominent left wing trade unionists were 
put to death, and various laws affecting trade union rights were passed. 
The Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation, the 21 year old radical labour 
organization, was dissolved under The Trade Union Act, 1971. Under the 
Act, the Minister of Labour (now Public Service and Administrative Reform) 
has power to 'determine the economic sectors, industries, crafts and 
professions in which workers are entitled to establish trade union 
organizations, and to determine the number and type of those unions. '1 
Two further regulations were passed in 1972 to empower the Minister of 
Public Service and the Trade Union Registrar to dissolve any trade union, 
to appoint any person into a trade union, and to pass regulations to 
govern trade union activities. 
2 
1. S. 9(1). 
2. see e. g., Al -Milan (the Sudanese Communist Party Circular)', No. 696, 
May, 1979. 
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A new and complaisant union leadership was superimposed by the 
regime. The leadership of the nwcw renamed Sudan Workers Union, was 
said to be lacking in administrative and union affairs experience. 
' 
This encouraged the government to interfere even more in labour 
organizations under the guise of providing administrative support - an 
intervention which was made possible by the incorporation of unions in 
the politburo. This containment of unions has stimulated a trend among 
multinationals in the country to enter into agreements with their labour 
force to prevent any possibility of a strike or lock-out. 
2 It is scarcely 
necessary to add that the former policy of worker participation in 
management no longer exists. At any rate, and even before July 1971, 
worker participation has meant no more than the physical existence of 
worker -representatives in the boards of directors of some corporations, 
and in some corporations this participation was confined to special 
production units 
3 
in an attempt to prevent workers intervention in manage- 
ment affairs. 
1. A. E. Ali Taha, "The Industrial Relations System in the Sudan" in 
All M. El-Hassan. An Introduction to the Sudan Economy, Supra. p. 192. 
2. One such agreement was made between Shell Co. (Sudan) and its labour 
force in 1971, ibid., p. 197. 
3. A. E. A. Taha & A. Saeed op. cit. pp. 38-9. 
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C. Foreign Investment and Foreign Aid 
In many a neo-colonial situation in Africa indigenous capital serves 
and complements foreign capital, but does not replace it. 
1 
In fact, it 
is only under the hegemony of foreign capital that an indigenous bourgeoisie 
could flourish. 
2 This was true of the Sudan as it was elsewhere. Soon 
after the reversal of socialist policies by the Khartoum Government, the 
U. S. opened up $18m. worth of credit to Sudanese importers. The I. M. F. 
granted the Sudan a further $40m (denied in 1970) and Britain paid another 
£25m., while an Anglo-American consortium agreed to finance $600m. worth 
of development projects. 
3 
In order to create an hospitable investment climate, a spate of 
legislation followed between 1972-1980 to entice foreign private capital 
into the country. Control of the state machinery by the bourgeoisie has 
made this possible and desirable. Legislation-passed during this period 
consisted of the Development and Promotion of Industrial Investments Act, 
1972, the Organization and Encouragement of Investment in Economic Services 
Act 1973, the Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment Act, 
1974 (which repealed the 1972 Act), and the Agricultural Investment Act, 
1976. Under the various Acts, foreign and national enterprises which 
1. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, o . cit. p. 149. 
2. Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania. (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
Publishing House, 1975 pp. 163-78. 
3. Africa Confidential q Oct 6,1972, also Carole Collins, op. ci t0 p. 15. 
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invest in industry, agriculture, tourism, transportation and warehousing, 
were entitled to various concessions including the exemption from business 
profit tax for varying periods, custom duties, surcharges, local government 
taxes etc in addition to reduced rates of electricity, freight and 
the provision of land, raw materials, intermediary commodities, spare parts 
etc. Profits resulting from investment of foreign capital are transferable 
abroad at the prevailing rate of exchange. It was, perhaps, for this 
purpose that exchange control regulations were liberalized gradually until 
they were finally abolished in 1979. 
There is, however, no evidence that foreign or national investors 
have had a positive effect on the Sudanese economy to the extent which 
might justify the various concessions granted private capital. On the 
contrary, it has been argued' that the benefits which investors claim under 
the various laws, far exceed all possible benefits to Sudanese economy 
through private investment, especially in industry. No statistics are 
available after 1970, but it was estimated that between 1961-1970, about 
£S60 m. of revenue must have been lost to the country (-under two less 
generous statutes compared to the post-1970 legislation) because of 
exemptions. of private and foreign enterprises from business profit tax, 
custom duties etc although the total amount of private investment in 
manufacturing and mining (two major fields of investment) did not exceed 
£S34m. 
2 And although the post-1970 Acts have recently been consolidated 
1. All Ahmed Suliman, Issues in the Economic Development in the Sudan, 
Supra., pp. 43-5. 
2. Ibid. 
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in the Investment Act 1980, this might have worsened the government's 
chances of earning revenue judging by similar occasions in the past as 
each of the Acts mentioned above had extended tax holidays granted under 
an earlier Act, with the result that enterprises continued to enjoy 
exemptions much longer than the government had wished. 
' 
D. Credit Facilities to the Private Sector 
Central to the promotion of private enterprise is the existence of 
efficient credit facilities. In Sudan, finance institutions, which had 
existed before 1970 were strengthened, and new ones were created in a bid 
to stimulate economic growth. The Industrial Bank, mentioned earlier, 
received two loans of £S7m. and £S5m. respectively, 
2 
in 1975 in order to 
enhance its lending capacity to serve national and foreign enterprises. 
At the present, commercial banks feature promirently as credit institutions 
for the private sector. During 1974-1979, a total of £S1,513m. was loaned 
by commercial banks to private business, foreign and national. 
3 
In fact, 
in 1975 and 1976, commercial loans for businesses exceeded total deposits 
of all banks with the result that the Central Bank had to finance the 
deficit of the banking system. 
4 
And to complement agricultural credit by the Agricultural Bank, a 
Mechanized Farming Corporation was set up under the Mechanized Farming 
Corporation Act, 1969. At present, the Corporation undertakes to prepare 
S. Nimeri, "Industry in the Sudan" in Ali M. El-Hassan (ed. ). An 
Introduction to the Sudan Economy, op, cit. p. 89. 
2. Dina S. E. Osman, 'The Problems of Public Corporations of Development' 
Supra., p. 133. 
3. The Economic Survey (Sudan) 1978/79, (Khartoum: Government Printer, 1979), 
p. 90. 
4. Ibid, ##" 
r 
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the land for an intending farmer, surveys and distributes farms, grants 
loans to farmers and markets crops, 
1 
all for a development fee of £s 100.2 
In 1974, the Sudan Development Corporation was formed through a 200m. 
Eurodollar loan in order 'to bring local entrepreneurs and foreign private 
capital together. '3 This 'unity' is achieved through financial support 
for revenue-earning profits in industry, foreign trade and agriculture. 
4 
There was also an influx of foreign banks and monopoly finance institutions 
into the country. The giant finance institutions which exist in Khartoum 
at present include: the Arab African Bank, the Arab Bank for African 
Economic Development, the Arab Investment Company, Citibank, Chase. Manhattan, 
the National Bank of Abu Dhabi, the Bank of Credit and Commerce and 
Soci dt6 Gdn¬ral d. 
E. National Capitalism and the Development of. Underdevelopment 
The discussion so far suggests that the hypotheses outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter apply to the Sudan just as well as they 
apply to the rest of capitalist underdeveloped countries. The expansion 
. 
of the private sector and the control of state power by the bourgeoisie 
1. M. Mirghari A. Salaam, ''Agriculture in the Sudan'', in All M. El-Hassan 
(ed. ). An Introduction to the Sudan Economy, op. cit. p. 56. 
2. "Mechanized Farming of the Development of Capitalism in the Traditional 
Sector", (SCP Publications), No. 4,1976. 
3. Dina, op. cit. p. 133 
4. Ibid. In February 1981, the U. S. increased its 'aid' to Sudan from 
. to 
$104m., provided that 50 per cent of the 'aid' i. e. $52m. 
must be used to purchase American goods by the Sudanese Private 
Sector, see Asharq Al-Awsat, Sunday 22, February, 1981. 
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which inherited the affairs of the former Sudan colony were presented 
as being central to the continuation or persistence of underdevelopment 
in the country. In this part of the section this line of argument is 
continued in an attempt to show how the expanding private sector - as 
sponsored by state power - has reproduced this underdevelopment. Three 
areas in particular viz: foreign trade, industrial expansion, and agricultural 
activities by the private sector appear to have a leading role in this 
reproduction of underdevelopment. 
(1) The expansion of the private sector in the field of foreign trade, 
and under the conditions of trade prevailing between the metropolis and 
the Sudan, has meant an intense balance of payment crisis. Taking 1953 = 
100, the price of imports rose from 94.5 in 1965 to 138.2 in 1972, although 
'real imports' fell from 98.6 to 89.1 during the same period. 
1 And while 
the growth of exports in the 14 years ending 1974 has been in the region 
of 4.5 per cent, imports grew by about 6 per cent, and the 'terms of 
trade' deteriorated from 112.5 in 1953 to 94.1 in 1973.2 Thus the 'unequal 
exchange' between the periphery of Sudan and the outside world only benefits 
private trading firms national and foreign, and especially metropolitan- 
based exporters. As the Lloyd's Bank Report puts it: 
3 
1. Ali A. G. All. "Money, Banking and Foreign Trade" in Ali M. El-Hassan, 
(ed. ) An Introduction to the Sudan Economy , op cit. p. 152. 
2. Ali M. El-Hassan, "Structure of the Sudan Economy" in All M. El-Hassan 
(ed. ). An Introduction to the Sudan Economy, op. cit. pp. 17-18. 
3. "SUDAN - Economic Report", published by Lloyd's Bank Ltd., 
Overseas 
Division, March, 1980, p. l. 
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The good relationship traditionally enjoyed between British 
and Sudanese businessmen holds some additional hope for the 
United Kingdom exporter in this time of economic difficulty 
for the Sudan. 
The deterioration in the terms of trade coupled with the transfers 
of profits, insurance and reinsurance premiums, and other forms of capital 
led to excessive reliance on foreign sources of supply, and increased the 
balance of payment problems. Sudan's total indebtedness was nearly $3.5 
billion around the middle of 1980.1 For 1980-1981, the trade deficit is 
estimated at $1,245 m., and remittances and balance of payment support 
will mean an overall balance of payment deficit of an extra $2,400 m. - 
a parlous economic future, no doubt. 
2 
The expansion of the- private sector in industries has created problems 
of regional imbalance in terms of economic development. Industries tended 
to concentrate in urban areas for reasons such as availability of markets, 
electricity, finance etc in these areas. This imbalance tends to perpetuate 
itself in that new industries tend to concentrate in industrial areas where 
other industries and services exist. Between 1962-1972, over 60 per cent 
of total advances made by the Industrial Bank to private entrepreneurs 
benefited, businesses in Khartoum3 and until 1971, over 70 per cent of all 
industries in Sudan concentrated around Khartoum. 
4. 
1. "Statement to the People of the Sudan", S. C. P. Circular, April, 1980. 
2. Middle East Economic Digest, 14 July - 10 August, 1980, p. 12. 
3. Dina Osman, op_ . p. 131. 
4. Lees & Brooks, op. cit. p. 74. 
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3. The expansion of private capital in agriculture has been even greater 
than in trade and industry, consequent upon the reversal of industrialization 
policies and the change to agriculture in an attempt to convert the Sudan 
into a granary for the Arab world. After the enactment of the Agricultural 
Investment Act, 1976, massive foreign and national capital flowed into 
rural Sudan. Arizona-Colorado for land and Cattle with Saudi capital has 
been granted an investment licence to exploit one million feddans (a feddan 
is 1.038 acres) for cattle raising and agriculture. A West German Company 
obtained another 2 million feddans while the Arab Authority for Development 
and Agricultural Investment has acquired areas totalling 5 million feddans, 
I 
and undertaken to invest $6 billion in ranches and large scale agriculture. 
2 
Activities in these ranches are very highly capital intensive and their 
expansion has been described as 'an agricultural strip mining ... featuring 
an absence of long term concern for the environment'. 
3 This expansion also 
forced thousands of subsistence farmers and nomads either to urban areas 
or across the borders to neighbouring countries. The clearance of the 
vegetation cover for ranching has thus destroyed subsistence life , but the 
displaced peasants have not been recruited into the ranches in view of their 
1. "Traditional Sector and the National Democratic Revolution", (S. C. P. 
Publications), February, 1976, pp. 24-5, also Mechanized Farming and 
the Development of Capitalism in the Traditional Sector, Supra., 
2. The Banker, January, 1978, p. 34. 
3. K. M. Barbour, "The Sudan Since Independence", Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 79. 
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capital intensive bias. Little wonder then that famines were reported 
in areas where ranches existed such as in Southern Funj. 1 
Thus, the fruits of the May regime's gallop to the right appear to 
have been claimed by private businesses both foreign and national. In 
the eyes of astute Sudanese on the other hand, twenty five years of 
political independence have meant very little in terms of real economic 
and social transformation. This situation is not unique to Sudan. For 
when a bourgeoisie controls state power in an underdeveloped country, 
it could only fostor reaction and underdevelopment under the guise of 
economic development, as it did in the Sudan, and the conditions of the 
masses could only stagnate, or even deteriorate. 
2 
1. A. G. M. Ahmed, The Relevance of Indigenous Systems of Organization 
of Production to Rural Development: A case from Sudan". in,, All M. 
El-Hassan, (ed. ) Essays on the Economy and Society of the Sudan, (Khartoum: 
University of Khartoum Press, 1977), p. 63. 
2. A. G. Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment, Supra., Passim. 
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CHAPTER THREE : INSURANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUDAN 
Part One 
[I]n the Sudan, the situation is very different [from 
other countries] as many accidents occur here, but the 
relatives of a deceased or injured person do not bother to claim compensation. Indeed, it is considered ...... a grave, social stigma to do so. But there is no reason 
why we should not benefit by this state of affairs..... 'nature has decreed that when some suffer; others 
prosper' ...., and, at any rate, most accidental deaths 
and injuries occur to pedestrians in that class of society for whose members compensation would be minimal ." 
From a letter by the National Trading Co. 
(now Khartoum Insurance Co. Ltd. ) to the 
Minister of Finance and Commerce, 25 May, 
1954 
I. Introduction: 
There are two sides to the picture which emerges from the discussion 
so far: (1) on the one hand, there is the distinct role which insurance, the 
alien institution, has played in the underdevelopment of the periphery under 
colonial rule; and in the neo-colonial situation under the veil of reinsurance. 
But as was shown, this historical role could be challenged, and insurance could 
be utilized to achieve economic development in the now underdeveloped countries. 
(2) On the other hand, we have seen that the insurance institution was only one 
part of a whole system of underdevelopment, and that in many a neo-colonial 
situation the attempt to follow a capitalist path of development, following 
the footsteps of former colonial powers, has only fostered and maintained 
underdevelopment. It is hoped that the case of the Sudan studied in Chapter 
Two has substantiated the second side of the picture. In this chapter an 
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attempt is made to link these two sides in a case study of the Sudanese 
insurance industry. We will investigate the historical role of insurance 
in the Sudan (albeit briefly as the subject was dealt with, generally, in the 
first chapter), the changes, if any, in the nature of its operations in the 
neo-colonial situation, the degree to which it has been utilized to promote 
economic development, and the factors which prevent, or else permit, such 
utilization. 
II Background 
(A) Structure of the Insurance Market in the Sudan: 1898-1960 
As an institution of advanced capitalism, insurance business was not 
known under Turko-Egyptian colonialism. It was mentioned in the last chapter 
that primitive accumulation of capital under this period corresponded to the 
low level of development in feudalist Egypt where insurance may not have been 
known; and no substantial capital was invested in the Sudan to have 
necessitated the existence of a capital market institution anyway. But not 
long after the invasion forces had set foot in the country, the business of 
insurance was transacted by the foreign (mainly British) trading houses which 
had dominated the export-import activities. The business of insurance during 
this time consisted almost exclusively of marine cargo insurance effected 
upon agricultural products exported to the metropolis, and consumer goods 
imported into the colony, in accordance with the colonial division of labour 
consequent upon the incorporation of a peripheral colony into the world system. 
At first, insurance was directly placed with metropolitan insurers as the 
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magnitude of business did not justify the establishment of specialized 
branches. But as the economic exploitation of the colony intensified later, 
small insurance departments were gradually formed by the trading houses which 
acted as agencies for foreign insurers situated abroad. 
1 These houses were 
said to have insured their own transactions with their metropolitan head 
offices in order to preserve the secrecy of their trade transactions. 
2 
Unfortunately, not much is known about the conditions of the insurance 
market in the Sudan before 1960. What is known is that there were absolutely 
no restrictions of any kind upon insurance agencies. They were not required 
to pay taxes, obtain a licence, or submit returns, or any document whatsoever. 
3 
In that 'ultra-liberal environment' as a U. N. study about the Sudanese 
insurance market concluded, 'there was scope for the unscrupulous, self-styled 
agents and representatives, and fictitious or insolvent companies were able on 
occasion to sell policies on which just claims wc-re not met. '4 
Insurance agencies in the Sudan were said to have exceeded 100 before 
1960.5 They were mostly British until a few Egyptian offices later joined the 
market, albeit in a proportion fairly representative of the nature of 
condominium colonialism in which Egypt was only nominally involved as a colonial 
power. 
6 The clientele of insurance appeared to have been drawn initially, almost 
1. Siddik Et-Tijani El-Mardi, "Insurance Industry in the Sudan", in All M. 
El-Hassan (1975), op. cit. pp. 162-181, at p. 163, see also J. 0. Irukwu, 
Insurance Management in Africa, (Caxton Press, West Africa , 1977), pp. 6-10. 
2. "The Role of The Insurance Section in the Development of Sudanese Economy, " 
A Paper prepared by the insurance section of the Ministry of Finance 
(Khartoum) undated, p. 1. 
3. Proceedings of UNCTAD, E/CONF. 46/5, Appendix iv, 'Sudan', (New York, 1964). 
4. Ibid., p. 3. 
5. M. Grossmann op. cit. pp. 396-7. 
6. Ibid. 
-96- 
exclusively, from traders, businessmen, and civil servants. Native Sudanese 
had little to do with insurance until 1952 when the first indigenous company 
was formed by the Kordofan (a western province) Lorry Owners' Association 
consequent upon the refusal of foreign agencies to charge reasonable premiums 
for compulsory motor insurance. 
I 
But although there were no restrictions to 
be observed by insurance carriers, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution 
in 1954 requiring the promoters of the company to deposit a sum of £E40,000 
with the Government (later reduced to £E15,000) as security for policyholders, 
to specialize in motor insurance only, and to confine the business to the 
company's policyholders. 
2 
Thus the dominance of a colonial system in the Sudan seemed to have 
permeated the structure of the insurance market, and the functions of insurance 
agencies. This colonial hegemony in the field of insurance has found expression 
in the exclusion of indigenous population from the insurance sector; in the 
concentration of insurance services in the field of foreign trade; and in the 
repatriation of insurance surplus from the Sudan to the metropolis. 
(B) 1960-1970 
The most important development in the insurance market of the Sudan up to 
1960, was the enactment of the Insurers (Control) Act, 
3 1960, the principal 
1. Ibid. 
2. Council of Ministers, Resolution No. 171, Meeting No. 41, dated 19.7.1954. 
A British actuary was first instructed by the Minister of Finance to 
laydown some 'suitable' requirements to be satisfied by the company 
before it could transact business. The Resolution was then passed on 
the basis of the actuary's report. 
3. Act No. 27,1960, referred to after as the Act. 
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legislation governing insurance regulation up to now. 
' 
Although the 
circumstances leading to the promulgation of the Act fall outside the 
period studied in this part of the section, they are extremely important to 
the understanding of the nature of insurance regulation in the Sudan. The 
Act owes its existence to a memorandum issued in August 1954 by the Minister 
of Finance of the first national government (1954-1956) which recommended 
that 'some restriction' (not specified) on the business of insurance be 
imposed. 
2 
In 1955, an Interdepartmental Committee headed by Mr. P. W. Glassborrow 
then Actuary of the Government of the Sudan, was formed to consider the 
introduction of the appropriate legislation. 3 This responsibility, however, 
was immediately transferred to the British insurance offices which had 
informed the Actuary that they 'would welcome the opportunity of considering 
and commenting on any bill which might be introduced to Parliament and of 
offering assistance in the matter of drafting measures in the interest of the 
companies. '4 The Minister of Finance himself had promised the agencies a 
leading role in the preparation of the bill, a promise which was repeated by 
the Attorney General 5 when he visited Britain in 1957. Thus the Chairman of 
1. Insurance regulation in the Sudan was said to have been considered for 
the first time when an Egyptian bill was drafted in 1938, but was later 
abandoned. In the second half of the 1940s the Governor General of the 
Sudan required that insurers issuing motor insurance policies under the 
Road Traffic Act, 1945, must be approved by him, see Ahmed M. E. Osman, 
"The Sudanese Insurance Market. " Undated memorandum, p. l. 
2. Memo. by Ahmed Abdel Magid (Minister of Finance) dated 15, June, 1960. 
P. I. 
3. Letter by Mr. Glassborrow to Attorney General, dated 1 July, 1955, 
Attorney General's Records (Khartoum). 
4. Memo. by the Joint Committee of British Insurance Offices in the Sudan 
to Mr. Glassborrow, undated. 
5. Memo. by Mr. Glassborrow to Attorney General, dated 22 June, 1958. 
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the Interdepartmental Committee could write in 1957 that: l 
It has .... been agreed that copies of the draft bill should be sent to the various insurance associations 
representing companies operating in the Sudan before 
the agreed draft is submitted to the Council of Ministers I hope, therefore, it will be possible to have the draft readyby the beginning of October. We should then be in 
a position to consider it in the Committee and send it out to the industry by the beginning of November. It should then be possible to submit an agreed draft to the Council 
of Ministers as soon as possible after the elections. 
In August 1958, the Council of Ministers formally approved a proposal 
for the enactment of insurance regulation legislation, and showed concern 
about the extra-ordinary delay which had accompanied the drafting of the 
bill. 2 The delay was said to have been caused by some government units 
concerned with the bill, and by the inability of the Attorney General's 
Office to effect the drafting of 'a difficult and complicated bill' before 
the arrival of an English draftsman. 
3 But when the bill was finally sent by 
the last government unit4 to the Attorney General, the latter was 'too busy'5 
with the so-called mutiny trials in the aftermath of the civil war. 
1. Letter by Mr. Glassborrow to Attorney General, dated 13.7.1957. 
2. Council of Ministers, Resolution No. 321 - Meeting No. 321, dated 9.8.1958. 
3. Letter by the Attorney General to the Council of Ministers, dated 1.5.1958. 
4. Letter by the Minister of Industry, Commerce and Supply to Attorney General, 
dated 10 July, 1958 / Att. Gen. Records. 
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It was in these circumstances that a draft bill was prepared by 
Mr. McKenna, a British 'expert' selected by Messrs. Linklaters and Paines 
of London, and was finally submitted to the Ministry of Justice in November 
1959, more than five years after the Interdepartmental Committee was set 
up to draft it. 
1 In December 1960, the Act was passed by the first Military 
Government. 
Undoubtedly, the British insurance agencies were behind the move to get 
the draft ready, and their decision to have it prepared in London was made 
without the Attorney General's knowledge (or so it appears) as he requested 
to be 'informed'2 in similar cases in the future! Thus foreign insurers 
appeared to have rushed to pre-empt the field of insurance regulation by a 
statute of their own making before Parliament could pass a more restrictive 
Act. The likelihood of Parliament making such a move was, perhaps, apparent 
from the economic conditions of the late 1950s which were discussed in Chapter 
Two. On the other hand, the only indigenous insurer at the time (the Lorry 
Owners' Association) and prospective insurers might have also campaigned for 
the drafting of a bill which would remove the onerous conditions upon indigenous 
insurers imposed in 1954 (see above). 
As a product of British insurance agencies, the bill was framed largely 
in permissive rather than restrictive powers of control, according to British 
tradition, 3 and was an impossibly liberal document in all respects. Unlike 
indigenous insurers, foreign agencies were not required to deposit their paid 
up capital in the Sudan, and a statement by the head office as to the capital 
situation sufficed for the purposes of regulation. 
4 This liberal attitude 
1. Letter by Controller of Insurance to Attorney General, dated 15.11.1959. 
2. Letter by Attorney General to Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of 
Finance, dated 9.11.1959. 
3. For the general principles of Insurance regulation in Britain, see Murray 
Picker ---If f Insurance Business in Great Britain", Wisconsin 
Law view, 1969, pp. 1141-11 69. 
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with respect to capital requirements - which is characteristic of Anglophone 
African insurance regulation statutes - was said to have enabled foreign 
agencies to establish their branches in many countries in Africa without 
having to deposit capital or any other form of security. 
I Also, the Act did 
not require foreign agencies or indigenous insurers to establish technical 
reserves until 1964 when it was amended (see below), nor did it, at first, 
require insurers to invest any sum of money in the country, and all insurers 
were free to transfer abroad as much money as they could make without the 
least restriction. In fact the underlying philosophy of the Act was that 
insurance could only flourish best 'if it is allowed to flow freely about 
the world'. 
2 Thus the Act had no impact on the extraction of insurance surplus 
from the Sudan whatsoever. 
The Act, however, stimulated the appearance of Sudanese insurers. The 
Kordofan Lorry Owners' Association, which had existed before the Act, was able 
to conform to the requirements of the Act because the discriminatory measures 
(mentioned above) could no longer be justified and were removed altogether. 
S. 7(l)(a) of the Act provided that: 
'no person shall, after the date when this 
Act comes into force, begin to carry on 
business as a Sudanese insurer unless he is 
a corporate body registered under the Companies 
Act, 1925 and having a paid up capital of not 
less than £S50,000. ' 
1. In Sierra Leone, for example, the registration of a company with the 
British Board of Trade was regarded as 'a fact of stability', see 
UNCTAD Secretariat, "Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing 
Countries", TD/B/393, (U. N. New York, 1972), p. 45. 
2. Memo. by the Joint Committee of the British Insurance Offices in the 
Sudan, supra. 
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Apart from the capital requirement an insurer, or an intending insurer, 
was required to apply to the controller of insurance (see below) for a 
licence to transact insurance business. l Thus with the discriminatory 
measures out of the way the Lorry Owners' Association registered as the 
Sudanese Motor Insurance Company Ltd., in 1961 (now Khartoum Insurance 
Company). Also the General Insurance Company Ltd., (Sudan) was licenced 
in 1961, and was followed by the Blue Nile Insurance Company Ltd. in 1965, 
and the Sudanese Insurance and (later) Reinsurance Company in 1967; but 49 
per cent of the share capital of the last two companies was owned by Lebanese 
and Bulgarian interests respectively. 
2 In 1968, the African Insurance and 
Reinsurance Company Ltd., also emerged and was followed by the United 
Insurance Company in 1969. Meanwhile foreign agencies continued to decrease 
in number and their share in the market was diminishing progressively (see 
Table 1 below). 
Indigenous companies however, resorted to excessive reinsurance abroad, 
and throughout the 60s their reinsurance amounted to over 90 per cent of all 
gross premiums written. 
3 And like foreign agencies, the Sudanese companies 
concentrated on marine. cargo insurance which was the branch mostly ceded 
abroad (see Table 2 below). Thus, it can be seen clearly that the operations 
of indigenous insurers in the Sudan drew heavily on those of the foreign 
agencies to the extent that one can safely conclude - at this stage - that 
Sudanese companies could only carry out what the foreign agencies had carried 
1. S. 8(3) and S. 9 of the Act. 
2. "Performance of Insurance Companies", the Annual Report of the 
Controller of Insurance to the Minister of Finance, 1977. 
3. Memo. by Mohmed Sadiq (UNCTAD export seconded to the Sudan). "Final 
Report to the Government of the Republic of the Sudan" 1971, p. 17. 
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out before them. In other words whatever role insurance had played under 
colonialism, this role has rested for its fulfilment upon indigenous insurers. 
The composition of the Sudanese companies was - is - predominantly tribal. 
This was (and still is) reflected in the ethnic origin of the majority of 
shareholders and the management of most companies. Each company appeared to 
Table 1 
Percentage of Gross Premiums Written by Foreign 
and National Companies in the Sudan (1963-1970) 


























Source: Siddik Et-Tijani El-Mardi, 'Insurance Industry 
in the Sudan' in Ali M. El-Hassan (1975) op. cit. p. 171. 
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Table 2 
Gross Premiums ceded by the National Insurance Companies 
(1967-1970) 
(ts) 
Year Marine Fire Accident Life 
1967 235,896 106,039 119,777 23,768 
1968 351,777 134,778 141,126 26,701 
1969 543,742 211,718 192,911 29,427 
1970 706,479 318,405 241,667 29,215 
Source: Insurance Controllers' Records 
have emerged to fulfil a need for economic and social reinforcement felt 
by a particular ethnic group; and each has primarily lent its services 
to other enterprises under the same ethnic control i. e. lending liquid 
assets and providing insurance cover. As will appear later, this ethnic 
composition is not without its own problems for an underdeveloped country 
seeking to utilize its insurance industry for economic development. 
(C) 1970 and After 
In the aftermath of the coup d'etat of May 1969 indigenous insurers put 
their full weight behind the campaign for 'the liberation of the Sudanese 
economy from foreign hegemony' which characterized the revolutionary era 
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of the junta's rule. 
' The controller of insurance consistently echoed the 
wishes of the national companies in his recommendations to the regime's 
Minister of Finance regarding 'Urgent reforms' 
2 in the market. In April 
1970, the Minister submitted to the Council of Ministers a number of 
recommendations aimed at the liberation of the Sudanese insurance market 
from foreign influence. These were: (a) the enactment of a strict Insurers 
(Control and Supervision) Act, (b) the formation of a local reinsurance 
corporation, (c) the termination of the activities of foreign insurers in 
the Sudan, (d) the elimination of foreign capital invested in indigenous 
companies, and (e) state participation in the ownership of insurance 
companies by at least 20 per cent of each company's share capital. 
3 On 
the 25th of May 1970, the first anniversay of the coup, the Act was amended4 
to provide that: 
5 
No foreign insurer li cenced in the Sudan 
to transact insurance business in accordance 
with the provisions of this Act shall issue 
new insurance policies from such date as the 
Minister may specify. 
1. In fact this desire had been expressed by the national companies from 
as early as 1967, see e. g., Kamal A. Moniem (an insurance businessman). 
"Self-Sufficiency in Insurance", in F. B. Imam (ed. ), Sudan Path to Self- 
Sufficiency, (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1967), p. 40. 
2. See e. g., memo. by the controller of insurance to the Minister of Finance, 
dated 13 January 1970 - Insurance-General Records. 
3. Memo. by Ahmed Suliman (Minister of Finance) to the Council of Ministers, 
dated 4.4.1970. 
4. Act No. 84,1970. 
5. S. 39B(1). 
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The Minister was also empowered to order foreign agencies to transfer 
their portfolios to Sudanese insurers. 1 In May 31 , 1970, i e. six days 
later, the Minister of Finance issued an order2 under the above section 
(39B(l)) to the effect that all foreign agencies (39 in number) should cease 
to transact insurance business in the country, and that all their life and 
non-life policies should be transferred to Sudanese insurers, together with 
the corresponding mathematical reserves in the case of the former. As to 
non-life policies, a sum of £S250,000 which the agencies had collectively 
deposited in the Post Office Saving Bank (POSB) - as they were required to 
do under the Act3 - was held as security for policyholders, until the 
corresponding commitments under such policies expired. 
4 Though the freezing 
of deposits was an adequate measure for the protection of policyholders 
pending the cessation of the agencies' business, it provided the agencies 
with an excuse for not paying their taxes for 1.968%69.5 
With the foreign agencies out of the market the second major reform 
sought to be enforced was the concentration of domestic insurers into fewer 
companies. Concentration was to serve two fundamental purposes: (a) to 
undermine the ethnic composition of the companies (by allowing for increased 
public participation in the ownership of the share capital), (b) to reduce the 
number of insurers to fewer, stronger, and more efficient companies. Thus the 
Act was amended to empower the Minister of Finance and National Economy 
1. S. 39B(2) 
2. Taha & Sneed, op. cit. pp. 13-14. 
3. The Act was amended in 1964 to require insurers to deposit in the POSB 
or invest in government securities, a certain proportion of their reserves. 
This subject is examined later. 
Memo. by Ahmed Suliman to the Council of Ministers, dated 4.4.1970. 
5. Letter by the Business Profit Tax (of the Department of Taxation) to the 
controller of insurance, dated 13.12.1969. 
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to: 1 
.... merge all the existing Sudanese insurance 
companies into two or more companies, as he deems fit, provided that the companies so formed shall be public companies 
whose shares shall always be owned by Sudanese nationals 
and whose authorized capital and paid up capital shall 
not be less than three hundred and fifty thousand Sudanese 
pounds, and two hundred thousand Sudanese pounds respectively. 
Under the Act as amended in 1970, the above measures were to be complied 
with within two years2 (but see below), and the Minister alone was to decide 
which companies were to be merged. Another major goal sought to be achieved 
(as mentioned earlier) was the state participation in companies share capital 
by about 20 per cent. No provision to this effect was included in the amendment; 
but the confiscations made in 1970 (discussed in the last chapter) must have come 
as a relief to the Ministry of Finance which was considering measures for 
achieving state participation in the ownership of insurance companies. This 
was so because the confiscations brought the government into direct ownership 
of the portion of shares which the confiscated interests had held in the 
Sudanese insurance companies. The value of these assets was £S25,366 in 
United Insurance Company Ltd., £S21,000 in the General, and £52,000 in the 
Sudanese Insurance and Reinsurance Co. 
3 
This was how the insurance sector in the Sudan was affected by the 
political conditions of the early 70s. And as will appear from the discussion 
in the second part of this chapter, these measures were the best ever to have 
1. S. 39A(2) of the Act. 
2. S. 39A(3). 
3. The Controller of Insurance, 'Unclassified Records'. 
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been enacted to reform the Sudanese insurance market. However, when the 
regime renounced its earlier policies following its sudden swing to the 
right, a new Minister of Finance refrained from exercising his powers to 
reform the market. Consequently, the share capital of the companies was not 
increased. Enthusiasm for state participation gradually died away, and all 
the shares which the government had acquired following earlier confiscations 
were sold to other shareholders in the companies, because it was no longer 
possible for foreigners to own shares in insurance companies in the SudanI 
and thus the shares could not have been restored to their original foreign 
owners. Finally, the concentration of the market (this will be discussed 
later) was not possible to achieve. One merger only took place between the 
African Insurance Co. (which was insolvent, anyway) and the Sudanese Insurance 
and Reinsurance Co. The former, however - despite its difficulties - was later 
relicenced in 1976 to do business on its own. Indeed, despite the rhetoric 
1. It may be recalled that S. 39A(2) of the Act empowered the Minister of 
Finance in 1970 to merge all existing companies 'into two or more companies... 
provided that the new companies so formed shall be public companies whose 
shares shall always be owned by Sudanese nationals and whose authorized 
capital and paid up capital shall not be less than three hundred and fifty 
Sudanese pounds and two hundred thousand Sudanese pounds respectively... '. 
The companies, however, were quite selective in interpreting this section. 
In a questionnaire addressed to the companies during the period of April/ 
May, 1979, the companies argued that under the above section no foreigners 
could own shares in the Sudan anymore. But when they were asked why they 
didn't increase their capital to the amount required by the section since 
it became the law, they argued that the section was intended to apply to 
new companies to be formed by mergers, but that this had ceased to be an 
objective of regulation. 
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of concentration in 1970, the number of companies has increased throughout 
the decade. In an attempt to reduce the flow of reinsurance premiums abroad, 
the National Reinsurance Corporation (N. R. C. ) was formed in 1974 as a joint 
venture between the government (51 per cent) and the insurance companies and 
the public (49 per cent). In 1976, the Regional Insurance Co. was registered 
as the only insurer in the Southern Region. In 1977, the Estate Bank 
established a subsidiary known as the Estate Insurance Co. to provide life 
insurance for the borrowers of the Bank's housing loans as security for redemption. 
The final development which undermined the concentration goal (and reversed the 
1970 measures in one fundamental aspect) was the establishment in 1978 of a 
foreign company known as the Islamic Insurance Co. Ltd. This company was 
completely exempted from government regulation because of the special nature 
of its transactions. But as we will see shortly, these transactions are in no 
way special and the company does not merit any exemption from regulations. Thus 
at present, and apart from the National Reinsurance Corporation (N. R. C. ), there 
are 9 insurance companies in the Sudan, 
' 
one of which is exempted from government 
regulation (the Islamic Co. ) and another transacts one branch of business and 
to the borrowers of loans from its owning bank only (the Estate Insurance Co. 
Ltd. ). So, effectively, the companies which transact all branches of business 
and which are subject to regulation by the government now are seven in number. 
These are 'the insurance companies' referred to in this chapter. At present, 
occasional applications for licences are made to the controller and it may not 
be long before insurers mushroom in the tiny Sudanese insurance market. 
2 
ý 
1. These are: the General Insurance Co. Ltd., the Blue Nile Insurance Co. Ltd., 
Khartoum Insurance Co. Ltd., the Sudanese Insurance and Reinsurance Co. Ltd., 
the Estate Insurance Co. Ltd., the Regional Insurance Co. Ltd., the African 
Insurance Co. Ltd., the Islamic Insurance Co. Ltd-, and United Insurance Co, 
2. A number of companies (perhaps up to 3) are planned for 1981. 
Thus the 70s opened with a great advantage for Sudanese insurers when 
the state lent its power and coercion to their expectations. Foreign agencies 
were terminated and their business was transferred to their Sudanese competitors 
who, ironically, remained to be governed by the same legal provisions previously 
designed by foreign insurers to give the authorities a false sense of security 
i. e. that insurance is regulated, while the extraction of insurance surplus 
from the Sudan continues. And, as we will see later, the attempt to create 
a 'national insurance market' does not appear to have been achieved. The 
Sudanese companies have remained 'national' in a purely geographical sense 
only. For since its early childhood the Sudanese insurance industry had been 
disfigured by the characteristics of a dependent industry so much that even 
when its metropolitan partners withdrew from the market, it could not escape 
or transcend its predicament as a satellite insurance industry heavily dependent 
upon metropolitan insurers who had introduced the rituals of the trade many 
decades ago. 
III Insurance Regulation in the Sudan 
(A) Raison d'etre of Insurance Regulation 
The Interdepartmental Committee which was set up in 1955 to consider the 
preparation of the insurance bill stipulated four objectives for the regulation 
of insurance in the Sudan. These were: (a) to Sudanize as far as possible 
the insurance industry in the country, (b) to ensure that a higher proportion 
of Sudan funds is employed in the country for economic development, (c) to 
protect the insured public against weak companies which are likely to be unable 
to meet their liabilities towards their policyholders, and (d) to promote the 
development of insurance activities on a sound basis. 
' 
1. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee, July 1957, also letter by the 
controller of insurance to Deputy Undersecretary of Finance, dated 10.1.1962, 
also ;., F narAL, urance Industry in the Sudan", in A. M. El-Hassan 
(ed,. ), An Introduction t the Sudan Economy, op. cit. pp. 177-80. 
ý I, 
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The objectives do not conflict with each other, but they are 
complementary and overlapping. In order to protect the public and preserve 
their savings, for example, insurance funds should partly be kept in the 
country. This would stimulate investments in the country and ultimately add 
to domestic capital formation, but will also enhance the balance of payments' 
situation through sizeable retention of insurance funds in the Sudan. This 
interaction of objectives was well illustrated by a Ministerial speech before 
the Council of Ministers in connection with the proposed bill: 
' 
Insurance undertakings are in effect trustees [of] 
public funds which represent - especially in the case 
of long term insurance business - the savings of the 
community. It would, therefore, be essential for 
many considerations to preserve part of these funds 
in the country where they can be used for investment purposes. 
The outflow of funds in the form of insurance premiums 
prejudices the chances of investment in the country at a 
time when funds are needed and sough t after from abroad. 
The official policy towards the industry, however, has hardly observed 
these objectives and the successive Ministers of Finance during 1960-1969, 
rarely agreed on any one policy to be adopted. Indeed contrary to the 
Sudanization of insurance goal, in the early 60s it was often argued that 
foreign agencies should be protected because their 'existence was a necessity 
for development. '2 After May 1969, new objectives, as above, were sought to 
be achieved. These included: the liberation of the industry from foreign 
influence, the minimization of the flight of insurance funds outside the 
country by measures such as mergers, increase of underwriting and retention 
1. Speech by the Minister of Finance before the Council of Ministers, 30th 
July, 1958. 
2. Controller of insurance - Records for 1960-1969, see generally, Ins. 
82/2/2/15 Gen. 
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capacities, enhancement of services etc. ... It appears, however, that the 
earlier objectives, though reviewed in the new economic and political 
situations of the 70s, have remained a broad framework of reference for 
official aims, and a source for new objectives. 
1 
The extent to which the old and new objectives have been achieved will 
appear from the examination below of the various provisions of the Act, its 
amendment in 1970, and from the various Ministerial Orders and Decrees. 
(B) Sources of Insurance Regulation 
The principal source of insurance regulation in the Sudan is the 
Insurers(Control) Act, 1960 as amended in 1970. The Act consisted of 41 
sections and was divided into six broad chapters comprising: a preliminary 
chapter, the administration of insurance regulation, restrictions on the 
business of insurance, conditions for licencing, the regulation of associations 
of underwriters (which no longer exist) and other general provisions. The 
Act provided for the establishment of a government bureaucracy affiliated 
to the Ministry of Finance, headed by a controller of insurance, and entrusted 
with the task of the supervision of insurance companies in the country in 
accordance with the Act. 
2 An Insurance Advisory Council (I. A. C. ) was also 
set up to advise the Minister on the operation of the Act. 
3 Regulations in 
the Act may be classified into three main categories: (a) licencing and 
1. In the controller's annual reports to the Minister of Finance, the 
objectives of 1955 are generally repeated from one year to the other 
with very minor alterations. 
2. S. 4. 
3. S. 5. 
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pre-licencing regulations, (b) regulations related to the management of 
the insurance fund and to the solvency of insurers, and (c) investment 
regulations. No corporate body was to carry on insurance in the country 
unless it was registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1925 and having a 
paid-up capital of not less than £S50,000, or its equivalent. 
' A licence 
was to be obtained from the controller of insurance2 (who may also revoke 
a licence in certain circumstances) before an applicant could transact 
business3, and once obtained, a licence could be amended on application to 
the controller. 
4 Insurance agents were also required to obtain a licence 
from the controller. 
5 An applicant may appeal to the Minister against the 
administrative decision refusing him or her a licence. 
6 Regulations under 
(b) above required the maintenence of separate records of each branch of 
7 business, and in 1964,8 the setting up of technical reserves covering each 
branch of business. 
9 At the end of each financial year insurers were to 
prepare revenue accounts, balance sheets, and profit and loss accounts. 
10 
Also, certificates of solvency showing the excess of assets over liabilities 
1. S. 7(1)(a), (b). 
2. S. 9(l). 
3. S. 8(l). 
4. S. 25. 
5. S. 28. 
6. S. 10. 
7. S. 14. 
8. Act No. 4,1965 which amended the Insurers (control) Act, see below. 
9. S. 15. 
10. S. 16. 
were required to be submitted to the controller by every insurance carrier. 
l 
Insurers carrying on long term insurance business were required to conduct 
actuarial investigations into their financial affairs once every five years. 
2 
The controller may investigate all documents referred to him by the companies 
and may report his findings to the Minister. 3 When the investigation reveals 
a state of insolvency certain procedures will follow (depending upon the 
nature of business carried out by the insolvent insurer) for the protection 
of the public4 as we will see later. Amalgamations and transfers of life 
portfolios were not possible without the written consent of the Minister. 
5 
Finally, insurers were made subject to investment regulations in 1964 
6 
which prescribed that a certain proportion of technical reserves was to be 
invested in the POSB or in government paper or in both? as we will discuss 
later. In 1970, as we have seen above, the Act was amended to compel foreign 
agencies to cease issuing new policies to the public and to transfer their 
portfolios to Sudanese insurers. A number of measures (discussed above) were 
also enacted to reform the market. 
In 1962, the Insurers (Control) Regulations8,1963 were passed under 
S. 41 of the Act (which had empowered the Minister to issue regulations) and 
dealt with some general matters such as the I. A. C., the licencing of agents 
and canvassers etc. Two circulars were issued in 1964 and 1969, respectively, 
to regulate the investment of insurance funds. In 1977, the Financial and 
1. S. 18. 
2. S. 20. 
3. S. 23. He could also seek the help of an actuary under S. 24. 
4. S. 36. 
5. S. 21. 
6. Act No. 4.1965. 
7. S. 22 and investment circulars discussed below. 
8. Sud aze toe ö. , 1963 (L. R. O. No. 10), 1963. 
t 
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Accounting Procedures Act, 1977 was passed to govern, inter alia, the 
insurance of public sector risks with respect to the types of public 
properties to be insured, 
1 
and the manner in which cover should be obtained, 
2 
and other related provisions. In part two below the important aspects of all 
regulatory instruments will be examined. 
(C) The Structure of the Regulation Machinery 
The structure of the insurance regulation bureaucracy in the Sudan 
consists of the Minister of Finance and National Economy, the Insurance 
Advisory Council (I. A. C. ) and the controller of insurance. The role of 
each in the regulation process is examined below. 
1. The Minister 
The Minister is entrusted with the major aspects of regulation and 
supervision and with general policy matters. In particular, he appoints the 
Chairman of I. A. C. 
3 
and the controller of insurance. 
4 He prescribes the 
types of public properties to be insured, the manner in which insurance cover 
should be obtained5 and the risks which should be covered by insurance. 
6 He 
prescribes the amount of reserves to be invested by insurers, the manner in 
which they should be invested? and the portion of premiums to be refunded to 
the policyholders of an insolvent insurer. 
8 He is the appellate authority 
1. S. 78(l), (2) of the Financial and Accounting Procedures Act, 1977. 
2. S. 80 of the Financial and Accounting Procedures Act, 1977. 
3. S. 6(1) of the Act. 
4. S. 4(l) of the Act. 
5. S. 24 and S. 78(l) of the Financial and Accounting Procedures Act, 1977. 
6. S. 78(2) of the Financial and Accounting Procedures Act, 1977. 
7. S. 22(l), (2) of the Act. 
8. 
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where a licence to do business is refused by the controller' and may revoke 
the licence of an insolvent insurer2 as we will see in part two. He may 
prescribe the number of Sudanese insurers who may be licenced to do business3 
and may merge all existing insurers into any number of companies he deems fit. 4 
He may extend any period for the performance of an obligation under the Act 
5 
and generally has power to issue whatever regulations he deems fit for the 
achievement of the objectives of insurance regulation. 
6 
2. The I. A. C. 
The I. A. C. is a dead body and its examination is only of academic 
rather than of practical relevance. It consisted of 10 members, 4 of whom 
represented the industry. 
7 The other 6 members were: the Undersecretary 
of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy- (. who was the Chairman of the 
council), two officials of the Ministry of Finance nominated by the chairman, 
two officials of the Ministry of Industry nominated by the Undersecretary of 
that Ministry, and one official from the Attorney-General's Chambers nominated 
1. S. 10(1). 
2. S. 26(c). 
3. S. 39A(1). 
4. S. 39A(2). 
5. S. 37. 
6. S. 41. 
7. S. 6(1), (2). 
by the Attorney-General. ' The function of the I. A. C. was to advise the 
Minister of Finance on the operation of the Act 'and upon any matter 
concerning insurance which the Minister may refer'2 to the I. A. C. At 
present, the functions of the Council are exclusively discharged by the 
companies which advise the Minister on national insurance matters, although 
the Chairman of the Board of Directors of N. R. C. is the official advisor to 
the Minister on Insurance. 
3 The effect of the disappearance of the I. A. C. 
upon recent developments in the Sudanese insurance market will be examined 
later. 
3. The Controller of Insurance 
The controller of insurance is appointed by the Minister of Finance 
and National Economy, 
4 
and may be removed by him as his appointment 'is 
not irrevocable, nor does it attach to him permanently'. 
5 In contrast with 
the Minister, who is the person entrusted with decision making in major policy 
matters, the controller is the official charged with the day-to-day functions 




and may refuse to do so, 
8 
or revoke a licence in certain 
circumstances9 as we will see. He obtains for the public sector units the 
1. S. 6(2). 
2. S. 6(1). 
3. Interview with Ahmed Mohmed E. Osman, Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of N. R. C., Khartoum, 1979. 
4. S. 4(1) of the Act. 
5. Letter by Osman El-Tayib (Attorney-General) to Acting controller of 
insurance dated 15th July, 1962, also S. 5 of the Act. 
6. S. 9(1). 
7. Insurers (Control) Regulations (1963 L. R. O. No. 10), 1963, insurance forms 
No. 3,4 and 5, see also reg. 13. 
8. S. 9(2) of the r t. 
9. S. 26; a), (b). 
I 
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appropriate insurance cover, 
1 
prescribes the manner in which premiums should 
be paid to the companies, 
2 
and obtains on behalf of the government units 
insured the amount of claim on the maturity of the risk or risks insured 
against. 
3 The controller's dual agency both for the government units and 
for the companies, as we will see in part two of this chapter, is one of the 
most serious defects of the Sudanese regulatory model as it leads the controller 
to refrain from enforcing investment regulations effectively. 
(D) The Scope of Insurance Regulation 
A large number of classes of business are regulated under the Act. These 
include: permanent disability, loss of profits, endowment, capital redemption, 
annuity contracts, personal accident, ordinary life insurance, marine, aviation 
and transit, employers' liability, fire insurance, motor insurance and any 
other class not specifically mentioned. 
4 Insurance intermediaries are also 
covered by regulation. And insurance transactions by Sudanese insurers outside 
the Sudan also fall within the scope of the controller's regulatory jurisdiction. 
This follows from the definition of 'Sudan insurance business' by which is 
meant 'any insurance business carried on [by a Sudanese insurer] in any place. '5 
But before foreign agencies had ceased to exist in the Sudan, long term policies 
issued by them to non-Sudanese resident in the Sudan were not subject to 
regulation. 
6 
1. SS. 79(1), (2) and S. 80(l) of the Financial and Accounting Procedures Act, 
1977. 
2. S. 81, Ibid. 
3. S. 82(1), Ibid. 
4. S. 8(2) of the Act. 
5. S. 2 of the Act. 
6. S. 2 of the Act. 
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A self-imposed limitation on the scope of regulation is provided for 
by the Act itself. The following activities are exempted from regulation: 
) 
(a) registered or lawfully registered trade unions which grant insurance to 
their members only, (b) pension, provident, or other funds created under 
trusts by employers to provide benefits to their employees at the end of the 
service. According to (a) above, insurance by the Taxi Drivers Trade Union 
was said not to fall within the scope of the Act as the basic function of a 
trade union was not to transact business of insurance. 
2 And according to (b), 
transactions such as the O. A. U. Staff Pension Fund in the Sudan were not 'long 
term insurance transactions' within the meaning of S. 2 of the Act and the 
controller had no capacity to regulate them. 
3 
The Social Insurance Corporation which is controlled by the Ministry of 
Public Service and Administrative Reform4 is not subject to regulation by the 
controller. Insurers in the Southern Region (an independent region within the 
united Sudan) appear to be subject to the controller's authority; but N. R. C., 
the reinsurance branch of the Sudanese Insurance and Reinsurance Co. Ltd., and 
all reinsurance and retrocession arrangements between Sudanese insurers or 
reinsurers and foreign reinsurers are exempt from regulation as we will discuss 
later. Rates of premiums and policy terms (both examined later) also fall 
outside the controller's jurisdiction. 
1. S. 3. of the Act. 
2. Memo. by Isaach El-Rabeed of the Attorney-General to controller of 
insurance, dated 18.7.1968. 
3. Memo. by the Attorney-General to Acting controller of insurance, dated 
10th Jan. 1967. 
4. S. 13(l) of the Social Insurance Act, 1974. 
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The Islamic Company: 
The controller's jurisdiction was seriously limited by the establishment 
of a foreign company in 1978 known as the Islamic Insurance Co. Ltd. The 
company is an affiliate of Faisal Islamic Bank and is, like the Bank, part 
of Al -Faisal'sI financial empire in the Arab world. The Bank was empowered 
to establish inter aZia, co-operative insurance companies which were to be 
exempted from the application of 'the laws regulating insurance. '2 Thus when 
the Islamic Co. was formed by the Bank it was free from all sorts of government 
regulations of insurance. The exemption of the company from regulation was 
justified on the basis that the insurance business which the company intended 
to transact was qualitatively different from ordinary insurance transactions 
which are aleatory and usurious while the Bank, founded on Islamic principles, 
prohibits usury and interest, and its insurance-business is of a simple 
co-operative type. 
3 However, legal opinion in the Sudan (given by some 
officials of the Attorney-General's Chambers) did not favour the arguments of 
the company concerning its exemption from regulation because its transactions 
were thought to be similar to ordinary commercial insurance transactions carried 
out by 'non-Islamic' companies in the market. The following reasons were given: 
4 
1) The only form of insurance transactions which is 'unquestionable' under 
Sharia law (the legality of other transactions being questionable) is the type 
1. Son of former King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. 
2. S. 6(b) of Faisal Islamic Bank Act, 1977. 
3. Explanatory Note to Faisal Islamic Bank Act, 1977, pp. 6-7. 
4. Memo. by Osman El-Tuhami (of the Attorney-General's Chambers) on "the 
exemption of the Islamic Co. " dated 8.11.1978, also memo. by William 
Katan (of the Chambers), dated 8.10.1978. 
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of insurance which is mutual in form and Islamic in substance. To satisfy 
the first of these conditions, the business of insurance transacted must, 
essentially, be a community pooling of risks intended to alleviate the loss 
of any one member of the collectivity (just as in ordinary insurance 
transactions) by spreading it among a large number of individuals. But the 
premiums paid by the members are essentially contributions which must be 
repaid to each member, proportionate to the value of his initial contribution 
should the volume of premiums paid exceed the amount of Loss incurred by the 
collectivity at the end of any one year. If the loss exceeds the amount of 
money collected, each member will be called upon to contribute a proportionate 
share toward balancing the deficit, or, else, each will have a proportionate 
set off against subscriptions or contributions that are due when a loss 
happens to him and indemnity is sought. And although contributions vary in 
value from one member to another according to the amount of risk which a 
member anticipates, all members are treated equally in terms of rights and 
obligations. In other words there are no categories of members within the fund. 
As to the substance of transactions, the objective underlying the scheme should 
be the desire to alleviate losses of members and not to make profits. 
2) According to (1) above, the Islamic Company does not conform to the 
legal i. e. Islamic form of an insurer, and its- transactions are not Islamic in 
substance either. As to form, the Islamic Company is a limited liability 
company1 -a legal form which it is not possible to marry with that of a mutual 
or co-operative insurance association whose members may be required to contribute 
1. Article 1 of the Company's Articles of Association. 
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additional funds should the accumulated money fall short of covering sustained 
losses. The membership of the company also casts doubts on its alleged 
Islamic character. The reason for this is that there are two distinct classes 
of members in the company: subscribers, or ordinary shareholders, and ordinary 
policyholders. 
' The former have various advantages over the latter. They are 
automatically entitled to attend the general meeting, but an ordinary policy- 
holder could only do so if he is insured with the company for three consecutive 
years provided that the annual premiums paid in respect of the last year 
preceding the general meeting amounted to, at least, £S1000.2 Subscribers 
are entitled to investment returns proportionate to their interest in the 
share capital, but ordinary policyholders may or may not receive a return on 
premiums paid, especially if the surplus is transferred to the company's 
reserves. 
3 In fact, unlike in a mutual insurance fund of the Islamic type, 
the accumulated premiums may not be repaid to policyholders irrespective of 
the value of losses sustained in any one year. 
4 The substance of the company's 
transactions is also divorced from the spirit of Sharia regarding the object 
of the formation of an insurance collectivity. For unlike in Islamic mutual 
insurance the premiums paid into the company's coffers are essentially 
investments intended to cover the risk of any one policyholder, and at the 
same time provide a measure for his share in profits at the end of the year; 
5 
but as mentioned above, these may or may not be returned to a policyholder. 
1. Article 2 of the Memorandum of Association. 
2. Article 5(a), (b) of the Memorandum of Association. 
3. Article 47(a), (b) of the Memorandum of Association of the company. 
4. Article 47(b), Ibid. 
5. Article 2(a), Ibid. 
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Thus in legal form and in substance of transactions the Islamic company is 
not different from any other company in the market. 
But despite legal objection) the company was formed free of all 
regulation shacklesand is now completely beyond the reach of government 
control. 
2 
It is submitted that the company does not merit an exemption 
from regulation for at least two further reasons: firstly, it is by no 
means certain that ordinary commercial insurance transactions are illegal 
under Sharia law3 (although this has been the subject of debate for over a 
century! ) so as to justify the exemption, from the regulation of such 
transactions, of an insurer alleged to be founded on Islamic principles. 
Secondly, commercial insurance in the Sudan is not regulated because of its 
illegality or otherwise under Sharia law as we have seen above. For apart 
from the services which insurance provides for policyholders, and hence, the 
need to ensure adequate protection, the business of insurance has a tremendous 
effect on the capital market, on investments, and on a country's balance of 
payments. This will continue to be the case irrespective of what Sharia might 
say about the legality of transactions. 
1. Letter by Osman El-Tuhami (of the Attorney-General) to controller of 
insurance dated 8.11.1978. 
2. Interview with the controller of insurance, Khartoum, May 1979. 
3. See e. g., Burham M. Atta-alla, "Insurance and Sharia Law" (in Arabic), 
Journal of the Administration of Government Legal Actions, (Cairo), 1970, 
No. 3. PP" -. 
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(E) The Quality of Insurance Regulation in the Sudan 
Where an insurance industry in a country is in the hands of the 
private sector the quality of state regulation upon it tends to depend 
upon the capacity of the regulation agency to discharge its functions1 
(to an extent this could also be true in the case of a nationalized industry), 
and upon the power of the industry and its influence upon the agency. 
2 In 
this part of the section an attempt is made to examine the controller's 
capacity to regulate insurance companies, and the power of the industry and 
how it affects regulation policy. The object is to set the stage for the 
second part of the chapter which investigates the possibility of utilizing 
the insurance industry in order to effect economic change. 
1. The Capacity To Regulate 
From its inception the insurance regulation institution in the Sudan 
was designed as no more than a depository of annual documents, a body whose 
functions centre more around rituals than substance, and whose weakness would 
provide a lasting assurance against cumbersome regulation of foreign agencies. 
And to this day the regulation agency has remained what it was initially 
designed to be. Mr. Glassborrow, the architect of the insurance regulation 
system in the Sudan, was clear about the kind of regulatory agency that was 
to be established and the nature of its function. In a memorandum written 
four years before the Act was passed he argued that: 
3 
1. See generally, Spencer L. Kimball and H. S. Denenberg (eds. ), Insurance, 
Government, and Social Policy: Studies in Insurance Regulation (Georgetown, 
Richard D. Irwin nc., , see pp. 
2. Laura Nader and David Serber, "Law and the Distribution of Power". 
Unfortunately, the book in which this article appeared could not be traced. 
3. From a memo. by Mr. Glassborrow, dated 20.5.1956, controller of insurance 
records. 
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For companies formed in the Sudan it is 
clear that the Sudan Government must exercise 
full control. Most foreign companies will have 
a? ready had to conform to conditions, at least 
as secure as those we propose here. I suggest 
that we only require them to register and then to make 
annual returns of their Sudan business in a simple form. 
In any case it will be very difficult to obtain sufficient 
qualified staff to deal even with the Sudanese companies. 
When it was set up to discharge its functions the insurance section of 
the Ministry of Finance was very small and was at a great numerical disadvantage 
vis-a-vis a market which, in 1960, was dominated by 65 foreign agencies. 
' Even 
worse, foreign agencies were under no pressure to provide the controller with 
any significant information, and he was in no position to know about developments 
in the market. In the mid 1960s, for example, six Egyptian companies in 
Khartoum were merged together without the controller's knowledge; a foreign 
insurer who had terminated his agency in the Sudan in June 1961, only informed 
the controller in November 1962; and another insurer passed similar information 
three years after his agency had closed down. 
2 The impotence of the regulation 
machinery was very conspicuous when the enforcement of the Act was in question. 
S. 40(2) of the Act provides that: 
If any person commits a breach of any of the .... 
provisions of this Act or any regulations made 
thereunder, or any such regulations.... , shall 
be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to 
a fine not exceeding £S50, and in the case of a 
continuing default, to a penalty not exceeding i S5 
for every day during which the default continues. 
1. M. Grossman (ed. ) op. cit. pp. 396-7. 
2. Letters by Siddik E. El-Mardi (Acting Controller) to the Attorney-General, 
dated 23.7.1968, also letter by the Alliance Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., to 
the commercial registrar, dated 2.10.1962, Ins. 82/2/5/15/Gen. 
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This was the penal measure which the controller sought to inflict - 
through courts - upon insurance agencies which failed to submit their 
revenue accounts, profit and loss accounts, balance sheets, 
1 
and certificates 
of solvency2 as required by the Act. 
3 However, the lack of a legal department 
at the insurance section was a great constraint upon the capacity of the 
section to have the measures taken against the agencies. The controller had 
to rely on the Attorney-General's staff for representation in court, but the 
latter were often too busy with other important issues that the controller, 
sometimes, had to extend the period of submission beyond the legal limit 
allowed by the Act. 
4 The number of defaulting agencies amounted to more than 
30 in 1963; but never went below 16 at any one time, and by November 19685 
there were 23 cases before the courts for default in submitting returns; some 
of which related to the financial year 1963/64.6 
The termination of foreign agencies must have come as a relief for the 
regulation personnel who had felt the limits of their power in earlier times. 
After 1970, and with a market dominated by fewer companies the task of 
regulators was, undoubtedly, made much easier than before. On the other hand, 
the section was reinforced by a number of university graduates (over 10) and 
a few clerks and secretaries. Some officers were also trained abroad and others 
are sent occasionally to attend regional seminars on insurance. But the 
1. S. 16 of the Act. 
2. S. 18. 
3. S. 19. 
4. Letter by the Attorney-General to Dr. Siddik E. El-Mardi (A/controller), 
dated 12.8.1969, Ins. 28/2/2/11/9. 




insurance section is still lacking in qualified personnel. There is no 
acturay, certified accountant, reinsurance expert (reinsurance is not 
regulated, anyway) or a lawyer in the service of the section. Undoubtedly, 
this lack of personnel has the most direct bearing on the quality of 
regulation. Even under the American system (the most advanced system of 
regulation) insurance regulation is often devoid of effect in view of the 
lack of adequate human resources. And as Dr. Denenberg -a once prominent 
commissioner himself - warns, the lack of qualified officers has a deadly 
effect upon a regulation agency: 
1 
The [controller] is keptbusy with brush-fires and 
day-to-day encounters. He lacks time and resources 
to take the long look. His staff often lacks the 
imagination and initiative to come forward with new 
ideas and new programs. [Consequently h]e is chanelled 
into programs and dialogues the industry is interested 
in pursuing. 
And, most ironically, the training of staff abroad, which is relied 
upon to improve regulation capacity, has been the factor mainly responsible 
for the weakness of the Section vis-a-vis the market especially in the last 
few years. The reason for this is that qualified personnel, as we shall see 
shortly, tend to join the companies the more experienced they become. This 
in turn worsens the quality of regulation as the regulator becomes the regulated. 
At present, there is a plan to re-organize the section to include: a legal 
section, a rate regulation section, and various other sub-sections (see Fig. I 
below). This re-organization will depend upon the enactment of a new Act (or 
1. M. S. Deneberg, "The search for Countervailing Power, " International 
Insurance Monitor, Vol. XX111, No. 7-8, July-August, 1969, p. 1 . 
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a very far-reaching amendment of the present Act) because most of the sub- 
units proposed in the section such as rate regulation and standard policies 
units, for example, will deal with matters which are not covered under the 
Act now. The possibility of new legislation being passed will, in turn, 
depend upon the willingness of the industry to be subjected to more stringent 
regulations -a very remote possibility as we shall discuss soon. Thus any 
improvement in the controller's capacity to regulate would have to be 
sanctioned first by the regulated. 
2. The Power of the Sudanese Insurance Industry 
The structure of the Sudanese insurance industry offers a classic 
example of an unequal distribution of power and political influence within 
one socio-economic setting. In terms of the wealth it commands the industry 
is, perhaps, the most single powerful industry in the country. All the shares 
of the biggest companies i. e. the General, the Sudanese and the Blue Nile, 
are owned by 88 shareholders only, and the African is owned by 36 shareholders. 
The foreign shares in the Sudanese and the Blue Nile were bought by, and 
distributed among, the national shareholders to maintain the interest of miniscule 
ethnic groups when the threat of public participation in the ownership of 
insurance companies became imminent. Nor has the recent expansion of industry 
been anything than a vertical one which is not paralleled by an expansion in 
the base of shareholding. All the companies own shares in N. R. C. for instance, 
which, in turn, owns 14 per cent of the Regional, while the General -a large 
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shareholder in N. R. C. - owns 35 per cent of the Regional. 
On the political plane, the industry is not lacking in influence or 
power. The Chairman of the Sudanese Insurance Association (S. I. A. ) was, 
until recently, the Public Relations Officer of the People's Assembly (and 
a Minister ex officio) and was, indeed, a Cabinet Minister in the early 70s. 
At present he is the Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of Party MPs and 
has represented the People's Assembly in some international occasions. 
) The 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of United Insurance is the Minister of 
Education, and most of the chairmen of the boards of directors of other 
companies are active participants in the national capitalist panel of S. S. U. 
The industry's influence is readily reflected on national policies 
concerning insurance (as company representatives now discharge the functions 
of the I. A. C. ), and upon the quality of regulation. This will appear from 
the examination below of the economics of insurance in the Sudan, and the role 
of- regulation in economic development. But some examples may be given here. 
One such example concerns the method by which public sector risks are placed 
with the companies. In the early 70s the government policy was to invite 
tenders for the supply of the appropriate covers by the national companies 
with the result that the premiums charged were generally low and competition 
was said to have pushed the prices down every year. 
2 In 1977, the Financial 
and Accounting Procedures Act, 1977, codified the supply of tenders practice 
as a means of insuring public sector risks. S. 80(l) of the Act provides that: 
1. Al-Sahafa (Daily) Newspaper, 15.9.1980. 
2. Reply by the African to questionnaire addressed to Sudanese insurance 
companies, April-May, 1979. 
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The controller of insurance shall obtain for the 
public sector units the best insurance cover possible by inviting tenders [for that purpose]. 
The same Act, however, empowers the controller to adopt other means if he 
deems fit. S. 80(3) of the Act provides that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1) 
above, the controller may obtain such insurances 
through limited tenders, direct negotiations, or 
according to practice. 
Apparently, soon after the Act was passed in 1977, the co-insurance 
system which operates in the Sudan now (and which is discussed below) was 
devised by the companies and automatically became the chief 'practice', 
within the meaning of S. 80(3) of the above Act, -according to which public 
sector risks are distributed among the companies. The controller and the 
companies agreed that direct negotiations and limited tenders with certain 
insurers might entail injustice to the rest of the companies. A fairer 
solution was, therefore, necessary. This was the co-insurance scheme which 
has been adhered to for some years now. Under the scheme each company is 
assured of its share of government risks either on rotational or non-rotational 
basis, depending upon the nature of the particular risk. 
1 The idea was to do 
away with competition. In fact in 1977, apparently the year when the scheme 
started, total gross premiums (which largely derive from government units) 
nearly doubled compared with 1974 as we will see later. 
2 Undoubtedly, 
inflationary conditions might have had a role to play in the sudden rise of 
1. This question is examined thoroughly in part two. 
2. See Table 3 below. 
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premium income, but the writer was assured during the time of research 
in Khartoum that 'the co-insurance scheme was the principal factor behind 
the increase of premium income because it ended competition and encouraged 
the companies to push their rates up collectiveZy. '1 
Another aspect of the industry's influence upon government policy 
in insurance finds expression in the organized resistence exerted upon the 
government to abandon its plans for participation in the ownership of the 
industry. A state insurance corporation which has been suggested since the 
mid 1960s2 will probably never be established as it is seen as a direct threat 
to private insurance interests. The failure of the nationalized industries 
in the early 70s3 is often invoked to inflate the dangers which might befell 
the proposed corporation. And sometimes it is argued4 that it is futile for 
the public sector to insure itself'. An example of the industry's influence 
upon the regulation agency is the disappearance of the T. A. C. despite the 
fact that it was a statutory body. The I. A. C. was neither outlawed nor was 
it cancelled, but it simply committed suicide. And although its composition 
had allowed for an insurance lobby within it, 
5 the council could have provided 
a stimulus for a more active state participation in the regulation of the 
industry - if only by virtue of the government's over representation in it. 
The functions of the council are now exclusively discharged by industry men 
as we have discussed above. 
1. Interview with the Deputy General Manager of the African, Khartoum, 
May, 1979. 
2. Controller of Insurance, "unclassified records". 
3. Interview with Ahmed M. E. Osman, Supra. 
4. E1-Ayiam (Daily) Newspaper, 28.7.1977. 
5. S. 6(2). 
-132- 
There are yet other methods by which the industry has become an active 
participant in the regulation process. 
' These are common to markets dominated 
by private insurers and generally centre around making the regulation 
bureaucracy feel 'a privileged and personal part of the social milieu of the 
industry rather than a part of the public, thereby negating the motivation to 
make the agency function ...... in the interest of the people. '2 A far-reaching 
method which makes the regulation bureaucracy more neutral and complaisant is 
the informal promise of positions in the industry, or what Nader and Serber 
call 'the delayed bribe. '3 Several top officials have been recruited into 
the companies4 after the insurance section had trained them abroad, at the 
tax-payers' expense, to discharge regulation functions. Indeed, in the eyes of 
the bureaucracy the insurance section is no more than a springboard to the 
industry. 
1. In many jurisdictions regulators have been fully co-opted by the 
industries which they were supposed to regulate. Of 11 regulatory 
agencies born during the 1930s in the U. S. only 2 were imposed by the 
public on the industry in question. The other 'were engineered by the 
industries or other affected interests themselves. ' The industries had 
nothing to lose by setting up regulation bureaucracies upon which they 
had the advantage of being 'better equipped for battle in the low- 
visibility areas determine[d] how a regulatory statute [was] to be applied. ' 
See Simon Lazarus, "Halfway Up Liberalism: Regulation and Corporate Power 
in R. Nader and Mark J. Green (eds. ), Corporate Power in America, or 
"The Nader Report, " (New York, Grossman u ishers, 1973), pp. 216-7 and 
p. 229. 
2. Nader & Serber, "Law and the Distribution of Power, " Supra. p. 283. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The General Manager of the African, the Deputy General Managers of 
Khartoum and the General, and at least one top official in the Islamic 
Co. have all been recruited from the insurance section. 
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But by far the most blatant form of industry involvement in the 
regulation business is its participation in the drafting of an insurance 
bill1 - which practice is becoming a sort of tradition in the Sudan. The 
bill which proposes an increase of paid up capital, rate regulation, inspection 
of policy terms, the establishment of security deposits etc., was due for 
discussion by the people's Assembly in 1972, but was removed from the agenda 
of the Assembly 'rather mysteriously' (so the write was told) and has been 
suspended ever since. 
1. The bill was proposed in 1970 by the controller of the 
Attorney-General. 
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PART TWO : INSURANCE BUSINESS, INSURANCE REGULATION AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUDAN 
The main question examined in this part of the chapter is the manner 
in which insurance is regulated under the Act in the interest of economic 
development. It may be recalled from Chapter One that apart from ensuring 
an adequate protection to policyholders an insurance industry could be 
regulated to enhance the process of capital formation in a country, to 
enlarge the scope of investments in socially desirable areas, and to play 
as positive a role as possible in the country's balance of payments. We 
will, therefore, examine the extent to which insurance has been regulated 
to serve these purposes in the Sudan. It was also indicated earlier that 
in countries like the Sudan where the industry is privately owned the role 
of the state in its regulation tends to be confined to the enactment of 
legal measures to that effect and, therefore, the degree to which insurance 
could aid economic development tends to depend upon the efficiency of 
legal measurers, the capacity to regulate the industry, and the degree to 
which the industry conforms to the legal measures. We have examined the 
quality of regulation in the Sudan in part one of this chapter. We have 
seen the extent to which the capacity of the controller to regulate the 
industry could be limited by factors such as the political influence of the 
industry and the numerical strength of the regulators vis-a-vis the regulated. 
No reference is made to the quality of regulation in this part of the 
chapter but undoubtedly the success or failure of a country in controlling 
its industry is ultimately determined by several factors which include the 
capacity of the state agency to discharge its functions and the quality of 
its performance. Thus it is in the light of the problems which afflict 
the regulation machinery, among other things discussed below, that this 
part of the chapter must be understood. 
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I. Insurance and Capital Formation in the Sudan 
The structure of ownership of the insurance concerns in the Sudan, 
as discussed above, leaves no room for doubt that insurance funds in the 
Sudan are formed in the interest of miniscule ethnic groups and that the 
institution (like other institutions in the country) reinforces the unequal 
distribution of wealth within the Sudanese society. What remains to be 
examined is the volume of capital formed, the sources of insurance capital, 
and the avenues open for the state to influence this process of capital 
formation through regulation. These areas are dealt with below. 
(A) The Volume of Insurance Capital Formed : 1970 : 1977 
The Sudanization of the industry, resulting as it did in the transfer 
of the portfolios of foreign agencies to Sudanese insurers, has had a 
ý 
profound effect upon the volume of capital accumulated by the latter. 
Fire insurance premiums alone increased by 44.5 per cent between 1969 and 
1970/71, while marine and miscellaneous (_including motor insurance) increased 
by 36.6 per cent, and 10 per cent respectively. 
' In the seven year period 
ending in 1977, total gross premiums for non-life business amounted to 
nearly, £S40 m. (see Table 3 below). NRC which commenced business in 1974, 
has also been significant as a capital market institution. Its gross 
reinsurance premiums have increased from nearly £S100.000 in 1974, to nearly 
£S2.7 m by 1977, recording gross reinsurance premiums, in the four year 
period2, of about £S 8m. It may be recalled that NRC is a joint venture 
1. Figures collected from the Insurance Section (Khartoum) 
2. Annual Reports of NRC, 1974-1977. 
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between the public sector and the private sector. The government owns 
51 per cent of its share capital, and the amount of insurance capital 
which benefits the public sector (in Northern Sudan) is confined to this 
portion of the corporation's income. In the Southern Region the Regional 
Development Corporation (RDC) owns 51 per cent of the share capital of 
the Regional Insurance Co., and likewise the share of the Regional govern- 
ment in insurance capital formed in the gion is confined to this portion 
of the company's income. At the time of research the Regional had not 
submitted its annual returns and it was difficult to estimate the con- 
tribution of the company to capital formation in the Region. 
As to life insurance business, the life portfolios seemed to have 
experienced a low rate of growth. Their increase between 1969-1977 was 
only 16 per cent compared with the marine branch, for example, the increase 
of which during the same period was in the vici. nity of 360 per cent (see 
Table 3 above). By June 1973, there were only 4.465 life policies in the 
country (compared with 27,277 in Tanzania) and the annual number of life 
policies issued had actually decreased from 957 in 1971, to 919 in 1973, 
with a parallel increase in the rate of cancellation from 7.5 per cent in 
1970 to 10 per cent by1 1973. The extended family system2 in the Sudan and 
the religious beliefs concerning the legality of life insurance3, are, 
undoubtedly, two important factors which influence life insurance business. 
1. From a memo. by the controller of insurance to the Minister of 
Finance (undated), Ins. 9/11/2/82. 
op" cit. 2. Siddik E. El-Mardi, "Insurance Industry in the Sudan°" 
3. Burham M. Attalla, "Insurance and Sharia Law" Supra,. 
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Changes in the level of money incomes and the prices for consumer goods 
also have a tremendous effect upon savings which could be poured into life 
insurance. 
Parallel to the increase of gross premium income, there has also been 
a rise in the ratio of non-life insurance claims, but the figures are 
rather unreliable. NRC (which keeps proper accounts) paid a total of 
£S1.2m. as net claims' during the seven year period2 (1970-1977), but as 
with non-life insurance it is difficult to estimate net claims, and the 
fluctuations of gross claims cast many doubts on their accuracy. 
The capacity of insurers to accumulate capital has been influenced 
a great deal by some developments in the first half of the 1970s. Fire 
and miscellaneous branches, for example, boomed after the Minister of 
Economics and Trade directed in 1979 that the show-rooms in the capital, 
industrial enterprises and warehouses in industrial areas all over the 
country should be insured against fire and allied perils. 
3 Warehouses in 
Port-Sudan, markets and enclosures for collection, sale and storage of 
crops such as cotton seeds, gum arabic, dura (-sorghum) etc are all to be 
insured, and the Ministry of Local Governments would refuse a licence or a 
renewal of licence for a trading firm unless the appropriate insurance is 
1. Annual Reports of NRC, 1975-1977. 
2. Controller of Insurance, General Records, Annual Returns of 
Insurance Companies. 
3. Siddik E. El-Mardi, "Insurance Industry in the Sudan" op. cit. p. 169. 
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obtained. 
' In 1973, theMinister of Finance issued an order which specified 
that all Sudanese importers should obtain a local cover for their imports 
with the insurance companies i. e. imports shall be purchased C&F rather 
than on c. i. f. basis. 
2 This requirement is relaxed in the case of 
government units which have 'reasons'3 to import c. i. f; and where the 
'national interest' demands that insurance contracts be effected abroad 
approval will be given. These regulations had a great impact on the growth 
of marine insurance as its premiums increased by 31 per cent in 1973, and 
by 116 per cent in 1974 compared to 1972 (see Table 3 above). 
(B) Who is the Principal Policyholder in the Sudan? 
Notwithstanding the contribution made by the private sector to the 
growth of insurance as a result of the above regulations, the public sector 
is the principal policyholder in the Sudan, and the non-life portfolio of 
each insurer consists substantially of public sector risks covered from one 
year to the other. Unfortunately, the subject. is surrounded by secrecy in 
the Sudan and information pertaining to government insurance was withheld 
by the companies in the belief that the present research was a feasibility 
study for the proposed state Insurance Corporation! However, the information 
Ibid., also letter by the Minister of Economics & Trade to the 
Miý' ster of Local Governments, dated 23, May 1972, also letter by 
controller to Minister of Finance dated 17.10.1972. 
2. Circular letter No. MNE/Ins. /82/2/15, dated 9th April, 1973. 
3. It is not known what sort of reasons could be invoked by a unit 
to obtain an approval for importing c. i. f. 
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available indicates that about 108 government units obtain an insurance 
cover of some sort, and that in the case of some risks, the scope of 
coverage is enormous. 
1 
The property insurance effected by the Gezira 
scheme, for example, covers: 
2 
all cotton grown under the management of the Sudan Gezira Board during the season.., of picking, in the field at Gezira, Mangil 
and Guneid, during transit to the ginning compounds, while 
awaiting being ginned, during and after ginning, while in 
transit to Port-Sudan or elsewhere in the Sudan for shipment 
or storage, while in store in the open or in transit until 
free on board the ship, or until sold, or until the liability 
of the Sudan Gezira Board towards it ceases or passes to another 
party. 
Insurance at Gezira also covers cotton seeds for sowing from the time of 
produce or setting aside, during transit in the Sudan, and until distributed 
to tenants, and wheat, rice, and groundnuts are-also insured against damage 
in the course of transit and storage, and the. cover effected often extends 
to two consecutive years. 
3 The sum insured in respect of these risks amounted 
to £S114m. since 1976.4 
1. A list prepared by Dr. Siddik E. El-Mardi of the Economic and Social 
Research Council (Khartoum, August, 1979). I'm indebted to Dr. Siddik 
for providing me with valuable information in this area. 
2. Siddik E. El-Mardi, "Insurance of Public Sector Corporations in the 
Sudan". Economic and Social Research Council, (Khartoum, 1980), p. 39. 
3. Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
4. Ibid., p. 40. 
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And all major industrial risks, vessels, aircraft, refineries, and 
all development schemes are insured, either wholly or in part with the 
companies. Also government imports are insured and are a source of 
enormous profits exceeding 50 per cent of the premiums paid, especially 
during 1972-1974, and this is likely to have increased relatively and 
absolutely as a result of the increase in imports by the various public 
enterprises in recent years. 
1 
Thus the capital formed by insurers in the 
Sudan is rather significant and increasing, but it appears to be drawn 
substantially from public sector units. 
2 In the following section we 
shall examine the sort of problems which public sector insurances cause 
to the sector and to the country as a whole. 
C. The Problems of Public Sector Insurances in the Sudan 
It was mentioned earlier that when competition between the companies 
pushed the prices for insurance down to uneconomic levels, a co-insurance 
scheme was devised by the companies in order to share public sector risks 
between them. Under the scheme as it operates now some risks are rotational 
and are managed each year by adifferent company. Rotational risks are, 
generally, of the type reinsured on facultative basis. In 1979, these 
included major risks such as: Sudan Airways (hull and liability), Sudan 
Shipping Line (hull and liability), the General Corporation for Agricultural 
Production (cotton), Sudan Gezira Board (cotton), and the Port-Sudan-Khartoum 
Pipeline. Some risks are non-rotational. Since the scheme operated, each 
1. Memo. by the controller of insurance to the Minister of Finance, 
dated 18.8.1971. 
2. El -Ayiam (Daily) Newspaper, 
29.7.1977, also 22.9.1977. 
-142- 
company has acquired a certain number of such risks, charged 2.5 per cent 
as management expenses and distributed the surplus between other companies 
according to each company's retention capacity. Thus each company in the 
scheme (there are seven companies altogether) acquires a regular share 
of all risks insured under this category. Non-rotational risks are of the 
type reinsured on quota-share and surplus basis. It was also agreed that 
risks insured for the first time should be made subject to lottery in the 
first year. The winning company retains management of the risk regularly, 
charges the agreed management expenses, and distributes the surplus according 
to each company's retention capacity. 
1 This is, of course, if the new risk 
is of the type reinsured on surplus or quota-share basis. If it is of the 
facultative type it will rotate between the companies. Perhaps the reason 
for rotating facultative risks between the companies is that facultative 
business, as discussed in Chapter One, is less-attractive as a source of 
commissions, and it appears that no Sudanese insurer is willing to be saddled 
with the management of this brand of business. On the other hand, and as 
each company retains its share of quota-share and surplus risks, each is 
assured of regular and handsome commissions which characterize these types 
of treaties as we have seen earlier. 
The object of the co-insurance scheme was to form a cartel or pressure 
group to dictate terms and prices2 to the government. And as discussed 
below, the government could only suffer additional problems in the field of 
1. Siddik E. El-Mardi, "Insurance of Public Sector Corporations in the 
Sudan", Supra., pp. 46-7, also Yahya Mutwali, "Co-insurance in the 
Sudan", a paper written for the Insurance Section (Khartoum, Sept. 
1979), also "Treaty Limits of Sudanese Comapnies" prepared by 
Sudanese Insurance Association in 1978. 
2. Siddik E. El-Mardi, "Insurance of Public Sector Corporation... " op. cit. 
p. 47. 
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insurance under the scheme which is designed in the interest of the 
companies first and foremost. The following problems, in particular, may 
be considered: firstly, the scheme did not seem to have increased the 
capacity of the market to retain risks inside the Sudan - as perhaps it 
was expected - to any remarkable degree, and as will appear later all the 
companies, except the General, have failed to increase their capital to the 
level envisaged by the government. Thus the distribution of giant risks between 
insurers with inadequate capacities could only result in increased 
reinsurance. Of course, it is no doubt surprising that a unit such as 
Sudan Airways, for example, could seek the economic protection of an 
insurer (, any one) whose assets are only a fraction of the value of one 
aircraft, or some other major risk. One, however, is reminded in the 
literature on risk management that the process by which dwarfs could 
protect giants 'astoundslaymen but not professionals. 'I No professional 
knowledge of insurance is claimed here, but, undoubtedly, a weak insurer 
who accepts a giant disproportionate risk has no option but to seek the 
economic protection of a professional reinsurer in whose favour the law 
of average operates on a world scale. Thus the acceptance of big government 
risks reduces the companies into de facto reinsurance brokers who only 
pass their risks away in return for commissions. For co-insurance is never 
a substitute for reinsurance2, and as the case of the Sudan shows reinsurance 
was, in fact, made the criterion according to which public sector risks are 
1. J. Sousselier, "Some Technical Aspects of Reinsurance Balance of 
Results", The Review, November, 15,1968, pp. 1337-43. 
2. Ibid. 
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distributed between the companies. It is argued1, however, that a co- 
insurance scheme of this kind could counteract the flow of reinsurance 
abroad because the increased capacity of the companies (theoretically, 
of course, capacity should increase due to the distribution of risks 
between the companies) will result in less facultative reinsurance and 
more resort to treaty reinsurance which secures maximum commissions to 
ceding companies, in contrast to the former, and hence reduces reinsurance 
outflows. It was discussed above that the scheme did not seem to have 
increased the capacity of the market to any noticeable degree with the 
result that the outgoing reinsurance business is still quite substantial 
(this will be discussed later). And as we have seen in the first chapter, 
treaty reinsurance is unlikely to have any positive effect on the balance 
of payments of a country (an underdeveloped one), because the greater 
commissions it secures actually lead insurers to resort to it excessively 
even at the expense of undermining their own retention capacity. Thus 
whatever commissions flow into the country, the initial flow in the opposite 
direction will always be greater. As to the country from which such capital 
flows it should make no difference whether it is done under this category 
of reinsurance or the other since such flows are increasing in volume. And 
at any rate, of course, the commissions, great or small only go into the 
companies own coffers. 
1. UNCTAD Secretariat, "Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries", 
op. cit. p. 30. 
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Secondly, and as was discussed earlier, there has been an increase 
in premium rates charged for government risks after the scheme was devised. 
This rise was due to the absence of competition consequent upon the equal 
sharing of risks between companies. But this has meant that premium rates 
charged for public sector risks are becoming much more exaggerated and 
divorced from the actual need for insurance as indicated by the amount and 
cost of claims. Total premiums by 15 public corporations in the industrial 
sector, for example, stood at £S49,120 a year on average, but average claims 
ratio for the same period (1975/19.76 and 1978/1979) was either zero or 
negligible. 
1 In the services sector, total premiums paid by some selected 
corporations stood at ES106,560 for the period 1975/76 and 1978/79, but the 
claims incurred were only £S11,970 during the whole period. 
2 
The highest 
average claims ratio by public corporations across all sectors has been in 
respect of motor insurance and not the high technology risks or other 
industrial hazards maturing in the production process to justify the 
transfer of risks to insurers in the first place. And even motor insurance 
claims have not exceeded 12.3 per cent on average at any one year during 
the period 1975/76 and 1978/79 (see Table 4 below). Thus insurance by the 
public sector in the Sudan does not seem to derive from any genuine need 
for protection as the claims experience indicates. 
I 
1. Siddik E. El-Mardi, "Insurance of Public Sector Corporations... " 
op. cit. p. 42. 
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Thirdly, before the scheme operated the controller of insurance 
could use government tenders for the supply of insurance as a means of 
threat against companies with particularly bad records with respect to 
public sector claims. He was under no obligation to accept the lowest 
tender and his options were fairly wide. 
1 
He could choose an insurer 
with a good record, reasonable premium rates, sound financial position, 
proper management etc.. This power to choose among competiting insurers2 
must have also reinforced his capacity to bring the unruly among them 
under his control. Under the scheme as it operates now he no longer enjoys 
this advantage, and willy-nilly the government has to accept whichever 
company accepts its risks, for the question of who should be the insurer 
for a particular public sector unit is decided by the companies, not the 
unit seeking insurance. 
Fourthly, the argument that 'under the scheme the market unites to 
provide the government with the security of all insurance carriers 
collectively'3 is simply erroneous. For in law, the liability of co-insurers 
is several and not joint, and the policyholder (in our case the government), 
will alone have to bear the consequences of a company becoming insolvent 
(and as will appear later some of them might well be insolvent now) as 
other companies in the scheme will be liable only to the extent of their 
1. Interview with the Controller of Insurance, May, 1979 (Khartoum). 
2. It is not suggested here that a competitive market is a solution 
to the problems of Public Sector risks. 
Interview with the controller of insurance, May, 1979, also 'Co-Insurance: 
Why? ', a memo. submitted by the representatives of 
insurance companies to 
the controller, undated, p. 3, Ins. 82/2/5/15 Gen. 
respective shares in the risk. 
' 
And if a dispute arises between the 
government and the companies with respect to any one risk, the government 
will have to initiate proceedings against each insurer (and incur extra 
costs) should it wish to resort to court, unless the leading company in 
the scheme undertakes to act on behalf of all companies2 which does not 
appear to be the practice in the Sudan. 
In the remaining part of this section an attempt is made to show the 
extent to which the state, represented in the controller of insurance, 
could influence the process of capital accumulation by insurers (having 
seen how capital is accumulated and in whose interest it is accumulated) 
with regard to the amount of capital accumulated, and one aspect of disposal 
of insurance funds: management expenses and commissions (which have a direct 
bearing on the volume of capital made). Insurance investments will be dealt 
with separately later. 
D. Regulations Related to Capital Formation 
1. Rate Regulation 
Rates of premiums are most closely related to the volume of capital 
formed, the amount of funds available for investment and to the insurer's 
ability to honour its obligations to policyholders. 
3 Premium rates are not 
1. "Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries", op. cit. p. 30. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Spencer L. Kimball, "The Purpose of Insurance Regulation : An Inquiry 
in the Theory of Insurance Law", 45. Minn. L. Review, (1961), pp. 471- 
525. 
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regulated in the Sudan. The Interdepartmental Committee which considered 
the drafting of the bill purposely ignored the question of rate regulation 
after its Chairman, Mr. Glassborrow, had come to know that the only Indian 
company in the market, the New India Insurance Co., was compaigning to form 
a tariff association which was much opposed by the British Companies. 
1 
Also, the Committee rejected a proposal for a stamp duty on insurance policies 
for the benefit of the treasurary. 
In the absence of state intervention the companies have had the utmost 
freedom in fixing their own rates without the least resistance from the 
controller. In 1973, for example, when the Bank of Sudan imposed a 15 per 
cent transfer tax on reinsurance premiums, all insurers increased their 
rates by more than the tax imposed with the result that the burden of tax 
was simply transferred to the public. By 1977, a surplus of nearly half a 
million pounds was made and only then could the controller, with the consent 
of the companies, adjust the rates proportionately to the surplus made. 
2 
2. Management Expenses 
The expenses incurred by an insurer in managing the insurance fund, 
and the commissions paid to intermediaries for procuring business, directly 
erode the accumulated fund and affect the insurer's capacity to honour its 
commitments. Both have a direct bearing on the capital accumulated by 
insurers every year. 
1. Memo. by Mr. Glassborrow dated 28, June, 1958. 
2. "Insurance cover for Sudan Shipping Line", Undated memo. by 
the controller of insurance to the Minister of Finance & 
National Economy. 
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In the Sudan insurers are free to evaluate their own costs in 
managing their own funds. Of the net premium income of £S8.7m. between 
1972-1976, the expenses of management by all insurers claimed a sum of 
£S2.4m. 
1 The salaries and wages in the industry are believed to be 
among the highest in the country, and insurance personnel are entitled to 
various lavish rewards and fringe benefits. 
2 Commissions also eat up 
a large part of the accumulated funds, but insurers are also free to 
fix their own commission rates. Commissions for life insurance amount 
to 50 per cent of the annual premium in the first year, and fire insurance 
commissions amount to 35 per cent of the premium. For marine cargo, motor 
and miscellaneous, commission rates range between 20 - 27.5 per cent. 
3 
Before we proceed to examine insurance investments in the Sudan 
a summary of the arguments advanced in this part of the chapter is necessary. 
What has been said so far suggests that: (a) a -large amount of money is 
formed every year by Sudanese insurance companies, (b) the state contributes 
substantially to capital. accumulation by insurers through its insurances and 
also through regulations aimed at increasing the national portfolio, (c) 
insurance by the government does not appear to derive from any genuine need 
for protection as the claims experience suggests and (d) that the state 
has no control over the process of capital formation through rate regulation 
although it is the principal policyholder, and the manner in which part of 
the fund is disposed of for expenses is also beyond the reach of regulation. 
In the following section we attempt to examine the role of insurance invest- 
ment in the development of the Sudan. 
1. Tables prepared by NRC, 1977. 
2. El-Ayiam (Daily) Newspaper, 22, September, 197 
3. M. Sadiq, "Final Report to the Government of the Democratic Republic 
of the Sudan", Supra. p. 9. 
(, 0" 
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II. Investment of Insurance Funds 
Insurance funds are generally invested in real estate, Post Office 
Saving Banks(P. O. S. Blgovernment bonds, deposits in banks, shares, loans 
on policies etc., T he volume invested in all these fields during 1970-1977 
was in the neighbourhood of £S25.3m. (See Table 5 below). Insurance funds 
appear to have been substantially deposited in commercial banks until 1976. 
Savings in the P. 0, S. B are i ncl uded in these deposits, but itis unlikely that 
the share earmarked for the Post Office (. see below) constitutes any 
significant portion of total deposits. The runaway inflation and the 
occasional devaluations of the Sudanese pound during 1978-1980 have 
resulted in low confidence in the currency and a consequential shift away 
from money as a store value to investment in real estate, and a parallel 
decrease in the volume of deposits in banks and loans on policies. Most 
of the old insurance companies own one or two buildings (the building which 
houses the insurance regulation section is owned by the General) or are 
planning to do so. 
1 Investment in shares is minimal and appears to be 
losing to other areas of investment. Most insurers, however, own shares 
in other companies both-locally and abroad. 
2 The share of funds going into 
government bonds is appallingly low and is decreasing rapidly. It has not 
1. The General owns 3 buildings in Khartoum, the Blue Nile and Khartoum 
own two buildings each, while the Sudanese has recently bought a 
piece of land on which a building is planned, see Ahmed Adam Hassan, 
'The Role of Insurance in the Development of Sudanese Economy", a 
dissertation presented in partial fulfilment for the degree of 
B. Sc. Part II (University of Khartoum, Faculty of Economics and 
Social Studies, 1979), p. 52. 
2. The Sudanese, for example, is a shareholder in the Union Insurance Co. 
(Gulf) in Dubi, Abu Dhabi and Um alquin, see Sada Libnan (in Arabic), 
March, 1979, p. 10. 
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been possible to estimate the annual returns of insurance investment, but 
these are believed to be the third highest in the country (at least in 
the early 70s) being exceeded only by publishing and mining interests. 
' 
The volume of returns is increasing with-the increase in premium income, 
and for N. R. C. alone, dring 1975-1977, the annual increase in the volume 
of investment returns was 67.8 per cent on average. 
2 
In the following part we will see how the government in the Sudan 
could control or regulate insurance investment under the Act. 
Regulation of Investment 
When the Insurers (Control) Bill was being drafted, the British 
Insurance Offices in the Sudan insisted that it 'should embody the principles 
of our own law which do not call for the setting up of deposits or lodging 
of technical reserves; but allows insurers to invest their funds in such 
a manner and such locations as they think appropriate to their... interests. '3 
The bill, however, empowered the Minister of Finance - in a last minute 
amendment - vaguely, to pass regulations on insurance investment, 
4 but he 
was quickly warned by the foreign agencies to exercise his powers 'wisely 
and moderately'5 under-the threat of their withdrawal from the market. As 
6 the Fire Offices Committee has put it: 
1. "Report of the Economic. Committee on the Insurance Sector", A Report 
submitted to the Minister of Finance, 1970, the rates of returns were 
as follows: 27 per cent for publishing firms, 21 per cent for mining 
and 19 per cent for insurance. 
2. Annual Reports of NRC, 1975-77. 
3. From a memo. by the Joint Committee of the British Insurance Offices 
in the Sudan op. cit. 
4. S. 22 of the Act. 
5. Letter by Mr. G. C. Porteous, Chairman of the Foreign Fire Offices to 
the Minister of Finance, dated 18th June, 1960. 
6. Ibid. 
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The companies have no doubt that in the immediate application 
of the law they could rely on the powers vested in the Minister being exercised wisely and moderately. It is ... the business of insurers to take a long view and they regard their operations in any particular territory as activities which they hope will 
continue indefinitely. It will be readily understood that 
from this point of view the existence on the statute book of 
provisions under which they could at any time in the future be required by administative action to invest in the Sudan ... would be most disturbing to the companies. 
Accordingly, no regulations were passed until 1964 when the Act was 
amended1 to provide for the establishment of technical reserves and for 
their investment, for the first time in the Sudan. 
1. Establishment of Technical Reserves 
The term `technical reserves' applies to the liabilities incurred by 
insurers towards their policyholders. From the point of view of the 
insurance company these liabilities stand as a debit item in the balance 
sheet in the same way in which bank deposits stand as a liability to a bank 
and constitute a debit item in its balance sheet. 
2 
In non-life insurance 
these reserves comprise: reserves for unexpired premiums and reserves for 
outstanding claims; and in life insurance they consist of mathematical 
reserves only. 
3 
The establishment of these reserves was not a subject of regulation 
in the Sudan until 1964 when the Act was amended to provide that: 
4 
1. Act No. 4 1965. 
2. A. L. May erson, Introduction to Insurance, (New York, 1962), p. 338. 
3. See generally, UNCTAD Scretariat, Investment of Technical Reserves of 
Insurance Concerns in the Country where the Premium Income Arises". 
TD/ß/C. 3/87, (U. N., New York, 1971), pp. 3-5. 
4. S. 15. 
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(1) Every insurer carrying on general insurance business 
shall set up and maintain in the Sudan a fund (.... 
called 'the General Insurance Fund') in respect of his general insurance business; and all sums received 
in respect thereof shall be entered in a separate 
account and credited to that fund. 
Long term insurers were to meet similar requirements: ' 
(2) 
... Every insurer carrying on long term insurance business (whether alone or in conjunction with general 
insurance business) shall set up and maintain in the 
Sudan a fund (_... called 'the Long Term Insurance 
Fund) in respect of his long term insurance business; 
and all sums received in respect thereof shall be 
entrusted in a separate account and credited to that 
fund. 
The general insurance fund. and the long term insurance fund are no 
more than the technical reserves which insurers usually establish. The 
method of establishing these funds or reserves was a subject of two 
Ministerial circulars. In 1964, the first of these circulars2 provided 
that the general insurance fund shall be formed of 40 per cent of the net 
premiums for fire and accident insurance, and 85 per cent of 'net premiums' 
in the case of marine insurance. The general fund was to consist of the 
reserves for unexpired premiums only, and insurers were left free to fix 
their own reserves for outstanding claims. Also, mathematical reserves 
were to be established according to each company's practice. In 1969, 
however, a second circular3 amended the former substantially with regard 
to the general fund, but the long term fund was left intact. The manner 
of establishing reserves according to the second circular, which is now the 
practice in the'Sudan, may be summarized as follows: 
1. S. 15(2) (a) 
2. Circular Letter No. MET/82-2-15/C, dated 8th, September, 1964. 
3. Circular Letter No. MT/Ins. /82-2-15/C, dated 6th August, 1969. 
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(1) the general insurance fund (which, as we have seen above, consists of 
reserves for unexpired premiums only) must be formed of 40 per cent of 
'gross's rather than net premiums for fire and accident, and 55 per cent 
of 'gross' premiums in the case of marine insurance. 
(2) Mathematical reserves in life insurance and reserves for outstanding 
claims in non-life insurance are to be fixed according to each company's 
practice. 
2. Investment of Technical Reserves 
For the wider economy the value of technical reserves lies in their 
investment rather than their mere establishment. Insurers were, therefore, 
made subject to investment regulations concerning the established reserves. 
Section 22 of the Act was amended2 to provide that: 
(1) Every insurer shall invest and keep invested in the 
Sudan such part of moneys standing to the credit of 
his General and Long Term Insurance Funds as the 
Minister may from time to time... require in respect 
of all insurers. [emphasis in text] 
(2) The Minister may similarly ... direct the manner 
in 
which the money referred to in [(1) above] may be 
invested. 
1. When the fund is formed of 'net premiums' the share of premiums going 
into reinsurance is excluded, but when the estimate is made on 'gross' 
basis reinsurance is not considered. 
1 
2. Act, No. 4,1965. 
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The first circular mentioned above (. passed under S. 22(2) which, 
as above, empowers the Minister to pass investment regulations) required 
further that: (a) every insurer transacting general insurance business shall 
deposit in the P. 0^S. B. 60 per cent of his general insurance fund, and 30 per 
cent of the same fund either in that Bank or in government securities, (b) 
every insurer transacting long term insurance business shall invest 90 per 
cent of his long term insurance fund either in government securities, 
P. O. S. B., or both. Insurers were free to invest the balance, i. e. 10 per 
cent, as they pleased. The second circular did not affect this method of 
investment, but as we have seen, reserves for outstanding claims were not 
required to be established and to this effect the regulations have limited 
the amount of insurance funds which could go into government securities 
and P. O. S. B. 
Thus in a bid to utilize insurance investments, insurance companies 
and agencies were called upon to set up their reserves and to make a sub- 
stantial part of such reserves available for government borrowing. The total 
reserves of all insurers increased from only £S 15,079 in 19641 to over £S2.5m. 
by 1973 (see Table 6'-below). But unfortunately no sizeable funds or reserves 
are available for government borrowing because the investment regulations are 
rarely observed by the companies. In 1972, for example, the volume of. reserves 
invested in government paper and in the P. O. S. B. recorded a deficit2 of £S753,868. 
And when the funds earmarked to cover reserves are invested in real estate 
the companies are often exempted from complying with the regulations. 
3 As a 
1. Controller of Insurance - Unclassified Records, Ins. 82/2/5 Gen. 
2. Memo. by the controller of insurance to the Deputy Minister of Finance, 




Technical Reserves of Insurers in the Sudan 
(_1971-1973) £S. 000 
Type of Reserves 1971 1972 1973 
(1) Reserves for out- 
standing claims 221.3 384.3 491.1 
(2) Reserves for un- 
, expired risks 
301.1 331.7 460.1 
(3) Mathematical 
reserves 984.1 996.2 1,584.3 
Total 1,506.5 1,712.2 2,535.5 
Source: Dr. Siddik Et-Tijani El-Mardi, "Insurance Funds 
and their Investment in the Sudan" Unpublished 
Paper, undated, p. 6. 
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matter of fact, it was argued by the controller of insurance himself that 
investment in commercial banks and policyloans should be preferred to 
investments prescribed by regulations in view of the facilities which 
the banks offer, and the high returns on policy loans. 
' On the other 
hand, the encouragement of investment under the various investment Acts 
(discussed in the previous chapter) has offered the companies additional 
avenues for channelling their funds, and has taken them away from the 
P. O. S. B. and government securities as areas of investment. 
2 Consequently, 
the amount of funds pouring into government coffers as investment in 
securities declined from 6.1 per cent of total investment in 1973, to only 
0.9 per cent by June 1977 (see Table 5 above). And the share invested in 
the P. O. S. B. is often included in the 'cash at hand' category of investment 
in the companies' reports, and it is difficult to tell how much of it is 
invested in the P. O. S. B. Unfortunately, the Post Office records were 
confidential and information pertaining to the volume of insurance savings 
could not be obtained. It appears from the records of the controller, how- 
ever, that the Post Office has not made much use of insurance funds in the 
past. A company could withdraw all its deposits at once. The Blue Nile did 
that in 1971 (_it withdrew £S150.000 which were all its savings at the P. O. S. B) 
in order to provide a loan for Shell Co. (Sudan) at a6 per cent interest 
rate. The company was permitted to do so 'because the terms of the loan were 
extra-ordinarily attractive. '3 The practice of other companies appears to be 
to part with some of their liquid assets to the P. O. S . 'B ., but only to borrow 
1. Ibid. 
2. Questionnaire to Sudanese Companies, April-May, 1979. 
3. Letter by the Blue Nile Insurance Co. to the Controller of Insurance, 
dated 17, September, 1971 - Ins. 82/2/5/15 Gen. 
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from it a larger sum for investment elsewhere. In May 1975, for example, 
the Sudanese deposited a sum of £S5,000, but borrowed a larger sum of £S80,000 
in July to purchase a piece of land in Khartoum. ' At that time the company 
was indebted for the P. 0. S. B. for £S100.000 which was to be repaid in ten 
years! Thus far from contributing to the liquidity of the fund the companies 
actually borrow from it to invest in more lucrative areas. 
Nor has the so-called social investment of insurers (a favourite subject 
for insurance circles in the Sudan) been anything more than an investment 
for the promotion of the industry's own interests. The Sudanese Insurance 
Association (S. I. A. ) has contributed a sum of £S12,000 for the Fire Fighting 
Services of the Industrial Area of Khartoum North - the biggest industrial 
town in the Sudan in which substantial interests are insured against fire 
and allied perils. 
2 And at any rate the £S12,000 was part of the surplus 
made due to excessive rates after a transfer tax was imposed upon insurers 
by the Central Bank in 1973 as we have seen above. In other words the surplus 
was directly levied from the public. S. I. A. has also contributed toward the 
improvement of clearing facilities at Port-Sudan because owing to the con- 
gestion at the Port and the poor storage facilities, the marine departments 
had suffered great losses. 
1. Letter by the Sudanese Insurance to the Controller, May, 1975, 
also letter by the controller to the Minister dated 2.7.1975, 
and letter by the Minister to the controller dated 17.8.1975, 
Ins. B2/2/5/15 Gen. 
2. Letter by the controller to the Fire Brigade, dated 18.8.1973. 
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Ironically, the functions of the controller in law and practice, and his 
dual agency both for the government and for the companies require him to 
relax the investment regulations a great deal. It was mentioned earlier 
that the controller is required by law to place public sector risks with 
the companies. 
1 He secures the payment of premiums for the companies by 
regulating the manner in which the units should pay them., and he 
mediates to obtain compensation for a particular unit when its risk 
matures. 
3 
It was also mentioned that a very large number of public risks 
are insured by all the companies. In practice, the demands by the companies 
to have their premiums paid by the units, and the demands by the units to 
have their claims paid by the companies, take most of the working hours of 
the insurance section's personnel. And the section has recently been the 
subject of criticism by other government departments which have failed to 
obtain their claims from the companies. 
4 But as we have seen earlier, the 
co-insurance scheme has removed from the controller all his powers to use 
government insurances as means of pressure upon companies reputed to have 
bad records regarding government claims. Any insurer in the scheme (and all 
1. Letter by the controller to the Fire Brigade, dated 18.8.1973. 
2. S. 80(1), (2) of the Financial and Accounting Procedures Act, 1977. 
3. S. 81 of the Financial and Accounting Procedures Act, 1977. 
4. S. 82(1), (2) of the Financial and Accounting Procedures Act, 1977. 
5. Interview with Yahia Mutwal i of the Insurance Section, May, 1979. 
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insurers are) could now obtain a share of public risks irrespective of 
its record. In such circumstances the pressures upon the controller 
to assist the various government units could not but increase. Although 
the controller is aware of the profits which government insurances yield 
to the companies and could exercise some pressures upon a company on the 
basis of the benefits it has drawn from the government, no such pressure 
is exercised. In practice the controller simply refrains from 'pushing' 
the companies to invest in areas which do not secure adequate returns and 
liquidity (and the P., QS, B and government securities are alleged to be such 
ones) as he is under a legal duty to secure the payment of the sums insured 
to the units when claims are made. This is adhered to as a method of 
persuading companies to pay the claims which are due, and this is part- 
icularly true at times when sizeable claims are under consideration by 
the companies. And when the units delay the payment of premiums which 
are due (and this often happens), the controller refrains from demanding 
compliance with the investment regulations altogether. 
) 
The government 
in the Sudan appeared to have made its chances for utilizing insurance 
investments even slimmer by deciding to insure its own property. 
In the following section we examine the final area in which insurance 
regulation affects the economy of the country: the balance of payments. 
1. Interview with Ahmed M. E. Osman, former controller of insurance, 
now the Chairman of the Board of Directors and General Manager 
of NRC, Khartoum, September, 1979. 
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III. Insurance in the Balance of Payments of the Sudan 
The Act has not illegalized the placing of insurance with an insurer 
not licenced in the Sudan. 
' And immediately after it was passed the 
Exchange Control Authority made it clear that when an application to 
transfer insurance premiums abroad is made such transfer would be allowed 
if the premiums charged abroad are less than the local rates, because the 
bulk of premiums earned in the Sudan would be transferred abroad anyway. 
Thus insurance abroad was seen as a transaction which was likely to save 
foreign currency2 sometimes! Fortunately, the Minister of Finance soon 
instructed the Exchange Control Authorities not to allow the transfer 
abroad of premiums for a risk situated in the Sudan. 
3 But as will be seen 
later, multinational companies operating in the Sudan now are exempted from 
this rule in certain cases. On the other hand, the various contracts for 
construction works and supply of capital goods under the Ten Year Plan 
(1961-1971) were awarded to foreign firms which placed their insurances 
abroad, and the volume of these transactions in 1961 alone4 was estimated 
at nearly £S400.000. And generally all capital and consumer goods were 
1. Letter by Mr. J. S. R. Cole of the Ministry of Justice to the 
controller of insurance, dated 6th June, 1962. 
2. Letter by Mamoun Behari, Governor of the Bank of Sudan to the 
-controller of insurance, dated 22. Dec. 1961. 
3. Letter by the Minister of Finance to the Governor of the Bank of 
Sudan, dated 17, Jan. 1962. 
4. UNCTAD Proceedings, E/CONE, 46/5, Appendix IV, 'Sudan', Supra., p. 9. 
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imported on c. i. f. basis until 1973, and the insurance cost of these 
transactions has been lost to the Sudan for ever. Even worse, Sudanese 
companies resorted to excessive reinsurance abroad in the 60s and 
the amount ceded often exceeded 90 per cent of their gross premiums. 
1 
This was due to their relative lack of experience, meagre reserves, and 
shaky financial positions - most of which factors still persist as will 
be seen later. Foreign agencies had also transferred all their incomes 
abroad, and the net physical flows of insurance in the early 60s was 
estimated at £SYm. a year. 
2 
At present the Islamic Company, which is exempted from government 
regulation, exchange control regulations, business profit, and all other 
forms of taxes, 
3 is acting, inter alias as an agent for a Gulf-based 
insurer. Under its agency, the Islamic Co. has recently invited the public 
to purchase bonds of a type known as 'the Islamic Alternative to Life 
Assurance' of $20,000 value payable in 20 years i. e. $1000 a year, and 
readily transferable to the Gulf. 
4 The scheme is spiritually appealing 
to many Sudanese previously inhibited from buying life insurance by the 
doubtful position of life insurance under Sharia law. The conformity of 
the company's transactions to Sharia law was dealt with earlier, suffice it 
to say here that the legality of these transactions (if it exists) under Sharia 
I. Mohmed Sadi, q, "Final Report etc. ", op. cit., p. 17. 
2. UNCTAD Proceedings, E/CONF, 46/5, Appendix IV, 'Sudan', op"cit. p. 21. 
3. Faisal Islamic Bank Act, 1977, ss. 6(b), 7(1), (2), and s. 8. The Bank 
(which owns the company) is exempted from all laws governing employment, 
from the Auditor General's Act, 1970, ss. 42,44 and 45 of the Bank of 
Sudan Act, 1959, and from nationalization and confiscation. 
4. A1-Sahafa (Daily) Newspaper, 3.9.1979. 
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is no comfort as far as the balance of payments is concerned. On the 
other hand, multinational companies operating in the Sudan now could 
also place their insurances outside the Sudan if a policy had been issued 
before the commencement of business in the Sudan. 1 
The scope of currency transfers by the Islamic Co. and other multi- 
nationals in the Sudan is difficult to estimate with any accuracy. As to 
transfers of reinsurance premiums by Sudanese companies it is evident 
that any increase in premiums earned in the Sudan is readily reflected 
in massive transfers abroad. A study which has estimated the gross 
premium income for non-life business between 1971-1976 at £S 31.3m. (but 
see Table 3 above which gives an estimate of £S28.3m. ), indicated that 
£S 23. m. of that i. e. 73.4 per cent, was ceded to reinsurers. 
2 For all 
branches of business the ratio of reinsurance to gross premiums amounted 
to 70.3 per cent on average between 1971-1976, "a'lthough average reinsurance 
inflows i. e. losses plus commissions, during the same period did not exceed 
53.7 per cent (see Table 7 below). And although some risks are now ceded 
to N. R. C. a large portion of these is retroceded by the latter to western 
reinsurers. Between 1975-1977, for example, a total of £S3.29m. was 
retroceded by the corporation and that stood at 46.6 per cent of its 
premium income. 
3 N. R. C. has also failed, so far, to attract retrocessions 
or reinsurances from abroad. Nor has the Sudanese Insurance and Reinsurance Co. 
1. Letter by the Sudanese-Kuwaiti Road Transport Co. Ltd. to the controller 
of insurance (for permission to transfer premiums abroad for three years 
in respect of a policy which had taken out in Kuwait) dated 23 Nov. 1974. 
2. "Reinsurance Statistics", prepared by N. R. C. 
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been of much value to the country in this respect, and in fact, its 
agreements with professional reinsurers sometimes reduce its role to 
that of a satellite reinsurer in return for training services and other 
facilities. 1 
The asymmetry of reinsurance and retrocession outward flows and 
the flow back of claims and commissions is indicative of the cost of 
insurance transactions in the balance of payments of the Sudan. This 
cost has been a persistent phenomenon ever since the country was incorporated 
into the world system, and is likely to increase with the country's increasing 
dependency on world-imperialist institutions. But the are specific 
factors which ultimately determine the cost of annual reinsurance bills 
which a country like the Sudan is bound to meet. The degree to which 
the regulatory agency can investigate the country's reinsurance treaties 
or pass regulations fixing minimum retentions in the country is directly 
related to the volume of reinsurance leaving the country. The share 
capital of a concern and the amount of reserves established ultimately 
affect the country's retention capacity and, hence, its need for reinsurance. 
The number of companies in a particular market and the existence of local 
reinsurers also have a direct relevance in so far as the national portfolio 
is either centralized or fragmented, and in so far as reinsurance is either 
available at home or sought after from abroad. These are matters of 
structure and regulations in each market and (at the cost of some inevitable 
repetition of earlier points) are examined below with reference to the 
Sudan. 
1. One such agreement was concluded with A. I. U. (American International 
Underwriters), see, Journal of Insurance, 31, Jan. 1979. 
-168- 
Regulations Affecting the Volume of Reinsurance Ceded Abroad: 
A. Reinsurance Arrangements: 
A memorandum submitted by Lloyd's to the Chairman of the Inter- 
departmental Committee in 1955 argued that reinsurance should be 
excluded from any form of control because of its international 
character. 
1 Accordingly, the Act was silent as to reinsurance. At 
present, N. R. C., the reinsurance branch of the Sudanese Insurance and 
Reinsurance Co. and the reinsurance arrangements between Sudanese 
companies and world reinsurers are not subject to any form of regulation 
by the controller of insurance. Not only that, but the companies are 
under no legal duty whatsoever to cede any part of their business to 
N. R. C. The General Manager of N. R. C., however, secures an annual share 
from the market not exceeding 20 per cent, only on the basis of personal 
relations with the industry. 
2 And when he proposed that the companies 
be compelled to cede a compulsory share to the corporation his proposal 
was vehemently opposed by the controller who gave no reasons for his 
opposition. 
3 Although nearly all companies own share in the corporation, 
the fear that 'the corporation might incur heavy losses in its early 
1. Memo. by Lloyds to Mr. Glassborrow, dated 3rd Nov. 1955. 
2. Interview with the General Manager of N. R. C. Supra, 
3. Memo. by the controller of insurance to the Minister of Finance, 
(undated) - General Records - File No. 2. 
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years', 
1 did not encourage them to cede substantial shares to the 
corporation for sheer prudence. It was also argued2 that international 
reinsurers offer far better facilities than the corporation, especially 
in the field of training and risk appraisal. 
When the corporation was being established it was envisaged that 
it would serve the following purposes: (a) making available the 
reinsurance cover required by domestic companies with the promptness and 
urgency appropriate to the needs of these companies, (b) making quick 
settlement of claims which would assist ceding companies to honour their 
commitments, (c) assisting the direct insurers by exploring new fields 
of activities after the appropriate reinsurance cover is made. 
3 A 
corporation of this kind could also increase the national retention 
capacity, secure a wider distribution of risks. among national companies, 
and enhance a country's bargaining power v s-c --vtis international 
reinsurers. 
4 
It is submitted that none of these objectives could possibly 
1. Answer by Khartoum Insurance Co. to questionnaire addressed in 
April/May, 1979. 
2. Interview with the Deputy General Manager of United Insurance Co., 
April, 1979. 
3. Memo. by Ahmed Suliman (Minister of Finance) to the Council of 
Minister dated 4.4.1970, op. cit. 
4. UNCTAD, "Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing 
Countries", Supra., p. 16. 
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be achieved in the Sudan unless N. R. C. is strengthened through compulsory 
cessions from the companies as is the practice in some countries in 
Africa where local reinsurers exist. 
1 It is scarcely necessary to 
mention that the controller has no power to ensure that a regional 
reinsurance institution is reinforced through Sudanese cessions, nor 
has the insurance section the competence to judge the adequacy or other- 
wise of reinsurance treaties between Sudanese companies and the outside 
world (through a reinsurance expert for example) even if it had powers 
to do so. But the exemption of reinsurance from regulation altogether, 
is certainly the most unfortunate part of the insurance regulation 
syndrome in the Sudan. 
1. S. 18(1) of The State Reinsurance Corporation of Kenya Act, 1970 
(Act No. 20 of 1970 Cap. 485) reads: 
Every insurer shall reinsure with the [Kenya 
Reinsurance] Corporation such proportion as 
the Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, 
prescribed of each policy .... issued or 
renewed in Kenya by the insurer. 
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B. Capital Requirements 
The paid up capital of an insurance company and the amount of free 
reserves, or capital reserves, are directly related to its capacity to 
retain risks. 
1 Where the paid up capital and the capital reserves are low, 
reliance on reinsurance to augment underwriting capacity becomes imperative. 
Before the Act was amended in 1970, an insurer, whether foreign or 
national, wishing to transact business in the Sudan was required to have 
a paid up capital of £S50,000.2 As mentioned earlier, the 'equal' treatment 
of insurers had actually entailed more discrimination against national 
companies. In 1970, the Minister was empowered to merge all insurers into 
fewer companies which were to have an enormous share capital. Section 
39A(2) provided that: 
[T]he Minister .... may merge all existing Sudanese insurance companies into two or more 
companies ...... provided that 
the new companies 
so formed shall be public companies whose shares 
shall always be owned by Sudanese nationals and 
whose authorized capital and paid up capital 
shall not be less than three hundred and fifty 
thousand Sudanese pounds and two hundred thousand 
Sudanese pounds respectively. 
The Minister was also empowered to fix a time limit not exceeding two 
years within which the companies so merged shall comply with the above 
requirements. 
3 But as we will see later, no mergers took place, and as 
1. UNCTAD. "Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing Countries. " 
Op. cit. pp. 45-8. 
2. S. 7(l), (a), (b) of the Act. 
3. S. 39A(3). 
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a result the provision relating to increased capital never came into 
effect, though one company did in fact increase its capital. This 
was the General, the biggest indigenous insurer, whose capital was increased 
from £S110,000 to £S250,000.1 The capital of other companies remained as 
low as it was before and it is as follows: the Blue Nile, £S74,000; the 
Regional £Sl00,000; the African £S50,000; the Sudanese £S51,755; United 
Insurance, £S60,000; and Khartoum Insurance Co., £S109,000.2 it is 
unlikely that any of these companies would increase its capital as it is 
often argued3 that the increased share capital was only intended to apply 
to amalgamated companies to be created by mergers, and that this has ceased 
to be an objective of regulation. It is also interesting to note that the 
foreign share capital in the Blue Nile and the Sudanese was simply bought 
by other shareholders in the two companies (as mentioned earlier), although 
the former was already heavily dominated by one family, and the latter by 
an influential ethnic group. 
The Act is silent about the establishment of reserves i. e. free 
reserves, which are extremely necessary both as a means of protection for 
the public, and as a means of increasing the capacity of'an insurer to 
retain risks. 
4 Only one company5 - most likely the General - was said to 
have built up free reserves of £S12,000 in 1972, and these are likely to 
have increased in recent Years. 
1. "Performance of Insurance Companies", the Annual Report of the Controller, 
1977, p. 1. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Questionnaire addressed to Sudanese companies, April-May, 1979 (this 
particular argument was made by the Deputy General Manager of United 
Insurance). 
4. UNCTAD. "Insurance Legislation and Supervision etc. " Op. cit. p. 11. 
5. Memo. by the controller to the Minister of Finance concerning "Investment 
of Insurance Companies" dated 17.10.1972. 
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As long as the share capital of the Sudanese companies remains low, 
and as long as the establishment of free reserves is not mandatory, and the 
savings earmarked for technical reserves are readily withdrawn from the P. O. S. B., 
the need for reinsurance will persist, its costs to the Sudan will increase 
annually, and the companies will remain, effectively, reinsurance agencies 
ceding away their premiums in return for commissions. 
C. Concentration of the Market 
The retention capacity of an insurer increases as the number of insured 
risks i. e. the size of the portfolio, increases, because the larger the 
number of risks, the more regular the results will be, the less reinsurance 
will be needed and, hence, the greater the retention capacity will become. 
' 
It follows that the larger the number of companies in a particular market, 
the more divided the national portfolio will be and the more reinsurance will 
be needed by each company (if the capacity is low) and the greater the cost 
of reinsurance will be for the particular country. 
In order to reduce the flow of insurance funds abroad, to tighten the 
market for more effective regulation, and to undermine the ethnic composition 
of the industry the government decided in 1970, to concentrate the market 
into fewer companies. Concentration was justified in these words: 
2 
In view of the i nadequacy and smallness of the 
capital in most of the domestic companies and 
the scarcity of technical know-how and experience, 
1. UNCTAD. Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries, op. cit. p. 26. 
2. Memo. by Ahmed Suliman (Minister of Finance) to the Council of Ministers, 
op. cit. 
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it becomes necessary to pool the available 
resources in a limited number of sound bigger 
establishments which are optimum to satisfy the 
needs of the market. This will increase their 
potential to absorb more of the risks written, 
retain more of the business, increase their scope of 
operations, improve the standard of services and 
ability, and finally, encourage specialization. It 
is equally important to transform the insurance 
institutions formed into public companies to offset 
monopoly and to attract a higher margin of solvency 
which is compatible with the declared economic policy. 
Accordingly, the Act was amended to empower the Minister of Finance to 
enforce these measures i. e. merging companies into fewer public companies. 
It was then decided that there should be three companies only in the Sudan 
one of which was to transact life insurance and the other two were to transact 
general or non-life business. It was hoped that the merger would fill the 
gaps created by the liquidation of foreign shareholding in the Blue Nile and 
the Sudanese, would increase public participation in the two companies 
(especially in the case of the former which is a family company), and would 
increase the capital of the companies to the amount required by the Act. 
2 
Mergers were to be decided upon by the Minister 'alone'. Section 39A(2) 
provided that: 
No person connected with the management of 
any existing Sudanese insurers which is being 
merged and no shareholder or creditor of such 
insurer shall object to the merger as ordered 
by the Minister. 
1. Taha and Saeed. op. cit. p. 16. The Blue Nile was to transact life insurance 
after the life portfolios of other companies were transferred to it. The 
General was to carry out non-life insurance on its own, and the Sudanese, 
Khartoum Insurance, United Insurance and the African were all to merge into 
one general insurance Co. 
2. Memo by the Insurance Companies to the Minister of Finance, dated 23 September, 
in-7 1 
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Also, mergers were to be completed within two years. S. 39A(3) of the 
Act provided that: 
The Minister may prescribe a period 
not exceeding two years from the date 
of formation of a new company under the 
preceding sub-section, within which the 
new companies shall comply with the 
requirements of this section. 
However, a cabinet reshuffle in the aftermath of the abortive Communist 
coup dletat and the relinquishment of former socialist policies changed 
the course of events a great deal. The new sinister of Finance refrained 
from invoking his powers under the Act to complete the task of market 
reformation and delegated the matter of concentration to the companies to 
decide upon by themselves. With their destiny in their own hands the 
companies demanded a period of grace of three months to submit their 
proposals. This was extended to a year1 during which one merger only took 
place between the African Insurance (already insolvent) and the Sudanese. 
Other companies decided not to merge, or rather, refused to merge or to 
transfer their portfolios to other insurers. Accordingly, it was decided in 
1973 that there should be five companies instead of three. 
2 Later, despite 
the Act and the Ministerial Order issued under it in 1973, the African Insurance 
Company was relicenced to do business on its own, and three other insurers 
emerged to transact various forms of insurance business. The threat of 
1. Memo. by the Insurance Companies to the Minister of Finance, dated 
23 September, 1971 - General Records. 
2. Ministerial Circular by S. Hassan Balil, State Minister of Commerce, 
dated 26.9.1973. 
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concentration was no longer in the air. The ethnic composition of the 
companies, 
1 
anyway, was far too strong for reforms to undermine or to 
penetrate. Any merger would, in essence, be a merger of tribal centres of 
power and influence - something only a change in the social structures (but 
not the letter of the law) could hope to achieve. It was hardly surprising, 
for example, that the merger of the Shygiyya dominated-African Insurance 
with the Sudanese Insurance Co., a DanaquZa2 stronghold, was not successful 
and the former, despite its insolvency, was later relicenced separately. 
As no company merged with another, no company went public as the reforms 
had sought to achieve. The shareholders in no company, except Khartoum 
Insurance, exceed 37. The share capital of Khartoum Insurance was subscribed 
by 800 Shareholders, but this was due to an accident of history rather than 
a desire to implement the reforms. The company was originally the Kordofan 
Lorry Owners' Association (mentioned in the first part of this chapter) which 
was required to confine its business to its members only should it wish to 
transact business and compete with the British Agencies. Hence the enlarged 
participation in the company's sharecapitalo 
Of all the 1970 measures, the only one that has been complied with is the 
one which required the shares of companies to be owned by Sudanese. But as the 
foreign shares were acquired by Sudanese shareholders in the same companies, the 
Act has actually reinforced rather than undermined the ethnic composition of the 
1. This is a predominant feature of the seven insurance companies referred 
to in this chapter. The management of each company and the majority of 
shareholders tend to belong to one ethnic group. 
2. Shy iyyaýand Danaqula are powerful tribes in northern Sudan. 
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companies. And as this ethnic structure is a hard nut to crack new companies 
will have to appear to compete in the market because their prospective 
promoters may not be accommodated within the existing companies. Indeed, 
three new companies) are planned for 1981° It will, of course, take years 
before the new companies could establish worthwhile reserves (if they wish 
to do so as they are not required by law to establish them) during which time 
they will merely increase the flow of reinsurance premiums abroad. Thus the 
opportunity for the concentration of the market which the early 70s brought 
appears to have been lost, perhaps, for a number of years to come. And when 
the new companies emerge the chances for concentration will become even 
slimmer. 
What has been said so far suggests that the Sudan has failed to utilize 
its insurance industry to promote its economic development,. in any meaningful 
sense. Insurance capital is accumulated at the expense of the public sector 
to a large extent. Insurance premiums paid by government units represent a 
reduction in the amount of capital available for these units for investment, 
and hence, to economic development, but all premiums pour into the coffers of 
the companies and reinforce the unequal distribution of wealth (given the 
structure for ownership of the companies) which plagues the neo-colonial 
society of the Sudan. It may be argued that these premiums are the price of 
protection offered the various units which could now venture into hitherto 
unexplored fields of activity with the security of insurance to fall back on. 
1. The new companies are proposed by three very influential families in 
the Sudan: Robi and Bros., Malik and Bros., and Mustafa Al-Amin & Sons. 
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It was shown that these premiums are highly exaggerated in relation to the 
amount and cost of claims, and that, as a whole, insurance by the public 
sector in the Sudan does not seem to derive from any genuine need for 
protection judging by the claims experience. On the other hand, and for 
all units across the economy, the highest claims ratio is in respect of 
motor insurance and not the high technology risks, fires or explosions which 
might have justified the taking out of insurance in the first place. But 
has the government in the Sudan made use of insurance investments? Does 
the controller of insurance enjoy adequate powers to influence the level of 
insurance investments in the Sudan or the areas in which funds should be 
invested? For all practical purposes the answer to both questions appears 
to be in the negative. Whereas before 1970 i. e. before the market was 
liberated from foreign hegemony, all insurers foreign and national were 
regulated, now a foreign insurer and the biggest in the market (£Slm. in 
share capital) is exempted from regulation. And the government's failure to 
utilize insurance investments is, ironically, due, in part, to its practice 
of insuring its own property with the companies. Nor have the powers of the 
Minister to reform the market been used for the purpose. It is not in the 
interest of the companies to merge, increase their capital, or even cede a 
larger portionof their portfolios to NRCO If the reforms had been imposed 
the flow of reinsurance abroad would have been reduced. Things as they are 
now the extraction of insurance surplus from the Sudan by the centre still 
continues even though it has assumed different forms. And at a more fundamental 
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level the indulgent stance of the government vis-a-vis the private sector 
seems to have lent itself to a desire to contribute to the growth of the 
insurance sector irrespective of the costs involved. The regulation policy 
seems to be geared towards this end. This is the hey-day of private 
entrepreneurs foreign and national. Indeed, operational controls upon the 
entire private sector appear to be of the positive type1 only. Negative 
controls2 which, like the former, are essential to the direction of 
development toward plan fulfilment, appear to be unknown to the insurance 
sector. Positive controls which have benefited the private sector include 
the various pieces of legislation and regulations passed to increase the 
volume of business underwritten in the country, the enactment of generous 
investment laws, and the relaxation, and final abolition of exchange control 
regulations which, among other things, encourage massive transfers of 
reinsurance funds abroad. These were not paralleled by an attempt to 
incorporate the sector into the economic plans of the country. 
In the section following we will examine the measures available for the 
protection of policyholders under the Act to end our analysis of the contribution 
of insurance to economic and social transformation in the Sudan. 
1. Positive controls 'are aimed at stimulating, encouraging, facilitating, 
and inducing production or consumption, generally or in a special sector'. 
See Gunmar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry in to the Poverty of Nations, 
(New York: Pantheon, 196 , p. 03. 
2. Negative controls are measures taken to prevent or limit production through 
'administrative restrictions on capital issues, investment, and production, 
the denial of foreign exchange ......... the imposition of excise duties, or 
raising various costs by other means. ' Ibid. 
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IV. Protection of Policyholders Under the Act 
A. Tie standard of solvency 
One of the objectives of insurance regulation in the Sudan was to 
'protect the insured public against weak companies which are unlikely 
to be able to meet their liabilities towards their policyholders. '1 In the 
Sudan and elsewhere, insurers administer funds which they do not in principle 
own. In order to protect the rights owed to the public insurance regulation 
seeks to impose certain standards of financial strength on the part of the 
companies. In the British administrative practice (copied by the Act), this 
financial strength is called 'solvency' and the extent to which it is required 
under insurance laws is know as 'the margin of solvency. '2 
When the insurance bill was being drafted the British agencies in Khartoum 
insisted that the type of legislation to be introduced should be 'based on a 
test of solvency in relation to the world-wide operations of a company. '3 Thus, 
foreign insurers were not required to be specifically solvent with regard to 
their operations in the Sudan, and the solvency on global results sufficed for 
the purposes of regulation. Under the Act, the degree of solvency required 
varied according to the nature of insurance business in question. In the case 
of an insurer carrying on general insurance business such an insurer 
is solvent 
if: ý 
1. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee, July, 1957, Supra 
2. Murray Pickering, "The Control of Insurance Business in Great Britain, " 
Supra., also S. 39 the Assurance Companies Act (G. B. ) 1948; S. 
13 and S. 14 
of the Insurance Companies Act (G. B. ) 1958; and the 
Insurance Companies 
Act (G. B. ), 1974, S. 4. 
3. Memo. by the Joint Committee of British Insurance Offices to Mr. Glassborrow, 
op. cit. 
4. S. 18(3)(b)(i). 
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[T]he value of its assets exceeds the amount 
of its liabilities by £50,000 ...... or by one tenth of the premium income in the last financial 
year (other than premium income received in 
respect of long term insurance business) whichever is the greater...... 
In the case of an insurer carrying on long term insurance all that is 
required to establish its solvency is that: 
1 
[T]he liabilities in respect of the long term 
insurance business do not exceed the amount of 
the Long Term Insurance Fund .... and all other liabilities in respect of long 
term insurance as shown in [its] ...... last balance sheet. 
The margin of solvency in the Sudan, low as it is, does not appear to 
be adequate as a safety cushion (and as will appear later it has not been 
met, anyway). A company which is actually a financial wreck might possess 
assets well above a low margin of solvency and remain beyond suspicion. At 
any rate, a test based on a mere excess of assets over liabilities has in 
many jurisdictions failed to prevent company failures. 
2 Other tests which 
are of significance include a company's investment policy, its proper 
I. S. 18(3)(b)(ii). 
2. The story of nine American companies which collapsed in the 1960s 
substantiates this point clearly, see A. L. Mayerson, 'Insuring the 
Solvency of Property and Liability Insurance Companies', in S. L. Kimball 
and H. S. Denenberg (eds. ), Insurance Government and Social Policy, Supra., 
pp. 152-4. 
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management, reinsurance planning etc., - all of which combine to provide 
more stringent test of solvency lasting long enough into the future for any 
dangerous development to be detected and the surplus drain resulting from 
it stopped. '1 
B. The Valuation of Assets and Liabilities 
Unfortunately, the Act is silent as to the manner in which assets and 
liabilities should be valued. All is required is that: 
2 
In assessing the amount of liabilities of an 
insurer all contingent and prospective liabilities 
should be taken into account, but not liabilities 
in respect of the share capital; and the premium 
income shall be taken to be the net amount received 
after deduction of any premiums paid by the insurer 
for reinsurance. 
The excess of assets so defined includes the amount of share capital 
plus the amount of technical reserves. These reserves will depend upon the 
volume of business written from one year to the other. As we have seen 
earlier, technical reserves apply to the liabilities incurred by an insurer 
to his policyholders, and the amount of reserves established is, therefore, 
a guide to the volume of liabilities. But it was also mentioned that the 
method of establishing reserves for outstanding claims in non-life insurance 
and mathematical reserves in life insurance was left to the companies to 
1 Kimball and Denenberg (eds. ), op. cit. p. 64. 
2. S. 18(3)c of the Act, 
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decide upon according to their practices. It follows from this that the 
adequacy of technical reserves in relation to the amount of liabilities is 
a matter to be decided upon by each insurer and does not follow any uniform 
rules. On the other hand, as the amount of reserves adds to the share- 
capital to form the assets of an insurer the manner in which assets are 
established also depends upon the practice of each insurer and follows no 
rules. The abuse of this freedom to value assets and liabilities by 
Sudanese insurers was not discovered until 1971. In the bid to create fewer 
and sounder insurance companies in 1970 the Act was amended to empower the 
Minister to form committees 'to evaluate the assets and liabilities of .... 
insurers who are merged into new companies. '1 The records of a committee 
formed by the Minister reveal that two companies were investigated. The 
investigation revealed that in the absence of uniform regulations on the 
valuation of assets the companies seemed to have enjoyed a great deal of 
freedom in the matter and, more often than not 'assets were grossly overvalued 
to conceal underwriting losses. '2 A building owned by a company, for example, 
which the committee estimated to be worth £S264,000, was valued at £S482,000 
in the company's book value. But as will follow later the result of the 
investigation indicated that the Committee's task was to find ways and means 
of rescuing the companies rather than to lay down a set of coherent rules to 
be followed by insurers in the future. 
1. S. 39A(2). 
2. "Report of the Ministerial Committee for the Evaluation of the Assets 
of Sudanese Insurers", June/July, 1973 - Ins. 82/2/5/15 Gen. 
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Not only are insurers free to value their assets and liabilities, but 
the controller has no means of detecting the solvency of insurers other than 
on the basis of information furnished by insurers themselves as discussed in 
the following section. 
C. Detecting Insurers' Solvency 
1. Information pertaining to the solvency of insurers 
It may be recalled that the regulations concerning the deposit 
of reserves in the RO, S, B. are seldom observed by the companies. And as these 
reserves represent a guide to an insurer's liabilities and add up to its 
assets, the controller in the Sudan is not always in a position to know about 
the solvency of insurers. He is not informed as to which insurer incurred 
what liabilities or where the reserves, or other- assets which cover such 
liabilities, are kept so that they could be drawn on at times of difficulty. 
His only source of information is the insurance company itself which is 
required to submit to him, once a year, 'a certificate of solvency in the 
appropriate form. '1 The certificate must stipulate that the value of the 
assets of the insurer exceeds the amount of liabilities in accordance with 
the requirements of the Act. 
2 A certificate is produced by the insurer and 
must be signed by two officers of such insurer. 
3 It is, of course, doubtful 
if an insurer could, willingly, sign a certificate testifying to its own 
insolvency; but as will follow later, the controller is unlikely to invoke 
1. S. 18(l). 
2. See forms of certificate of solvency in the Schedule to the Act. 
3. S. 18(2) and S. 16(2). 
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legal sanctions against an insurer even when the insolvency of such insurer 
becomes known to him. Occasionally, the intervention of an actuary is sought 
as a means of providing information as to solvency. Indeed, an insurer 
transacting long term insurance must cause an investigation to be made by 
an actuary into its financial conditions, at least once every five years. 
S. 20(l) reads: 
Every insurer who carries on long term insurance 
business shall, at least once in every five years, 
cause an investigation to be made by an actuary 
into the financial conditions of the insurers' long 
term insurance fund, including a valuation of its 
assets and liabilities. 
However, the provisions of the Act apart, in practice actuarial examinations. 
are not conducted and, to the knowledge of the writer, there is no certified 
'actuary' in the Sudan within the meaning of the Act. 
l The only investigation 
of insurers' conditions, in memory, was the one conducted in 1971, as mentioned 
earlier. Thus just as in the case of non-life insurers the controller's means 
of detecting the solvency of a life insurer are confined to the insurer's own 
certificate of solvency with which the controller is furnished annually. 
2. Other Information 
Adequate information about the activities of insurance companies 
is indispensable for proper regulation of insurance business. When information 
is required to be conveyed by the companies themselves to the agency, it involves 
1 S. 2 of the Act defines an actuary as a person 'who is a Fellow of the 
Institute of Actuaries of England, a Fellow of the Faculty of Actuaries 
of Scotland, a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries of America, or such 
other 
_person 
having adequate knowledge of actuarial science as the Minister 
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the least cost from the point of view of the latter, and may supplement its 
lack of expertise and saves a great deal of time. Needless to say, 
through adequate information the controller can easily detect a dangerous 
development and provide the necessary advice. But in the Sudan insurers do 
not appear to be under pressure to provide the controller with detailed 
information, but undoubtedly he is much more informed about the market now 
than he was before 1970. At present insurers need only inform him of the 
following matters: 
I (a) any change in the amount of paid-up capital, (b) 
any change in the classes of business transacted, and (c) any change in 
the principal officers of the company. 
3. Business Returns 
In addition to the certificates of solvency, at the end of every 
financial year insurers are required to submit the following documents: 
(a) a revenue account for the year in the form or forms from time to time pre- 
scribed by the Minister and applicable to the class or classes of 
business carried 
on by the insurer, 
2 (b) a profit and loss account in the form or forms from 
time prescribed by the Minister, 
3 
and (c) a balance sheet in the form or 
I 
forms prescribed by the Miniser. 
4 Every revenue account, balance sheet, and 
profit and loss account required to be submitted as above 'shall be signed and 
1. S. 8(3) and S. 13. 
2. S. 16(1)(a). 
3. S. 16(1)(b). 
4. S. 16(1)(c). 
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certified as correct by two principal officers of the insurer, '' and shall 
be audited - by an approved auditor who is not an employee, manager or 
director of the insurer. '2 The auditor shall then 'sign a certificate 
stating whether the accounts have been properly prepared in accordance 
with the books and records of the business and whether the information 
contained in such books and records and supplied to him by the insurer are 
in his opinion adequate for the purposes of his audit. '3 
The insurance section encounters two kinds of problems with regard to 
these returns: firstly, there is no certified accountant in the section who 
can verify, judge or analyse an insuer's financial conditions merely by 
examining its returns, and sometimes the returns are submitted without having 
been examined by an approved auditor as required by Law. The accounts 
themselves are not complete (for certain companies) and the returns of Sudanese 
branches in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have neverbeen submitted for investigation. 
4 
Secondly, the returns could be deposited at any time within 6 months after the 
close of each financial year, and this may be extended further. S. 19 of the 
Act provides that: 
A certified copy of every account, balance 
sheet and certificate referred to in sections 
16,17 and 18, together with four extra copies of 
each document, shall be deposited by the insurer 
with the controller within six months after the 
close of the period which such account, balance 
sheet or certificate relates: 
1. S. 16(2). 
2. S. 17(1). 
3. S. 17(2). 
4. Miss S. M. El-Amin "Insurance Regulation in the Sudan: An Inside view", 
a paper written during the time of research in Khartoum, May, 1979. 
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Provided that, if in any case it is made to appear to the controller that a longer 
period than six months should be allowed, the controller may extend that period by [a] period not exceeding three months ...... 
Thus the returns could be submitted 9 months after the close of the 
financial year. And if this period was not enough to enable an insurer to 
submit his returns, it appears that he could write to the Minister who may 
extend the period even further. S. 37 of the Act reads: 
Where any time is specified in this Act, 
the Minister or, the controller with the 
consent of the Minister may extend the 
period of time either in relation to a 
particular insurer or any class of insurers. 
Where the time is extended twice (and this has happened) the returns, 
when finally submitted, may not be representative of an insurer's financial 
position at the time. At any rate as a study by an officer of the section 
concluded 'it is extremely difficult to protect the public .... through 
a requirement which, in essence, makes the section a mere depository of 
complicated documents. ') 
D. Consequences of Insurers' Insolvency 
If the examination of the annual certificates of solvency and the 
returns of an insurer reveal a state of insolvency the controller of insurance 
shall report the matter to the Minister who shall, in turn, notify the insurer 
of the alleged insolvency and of his [the Minister's] intention to revoke 
1. Ibid. 
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the licence at the end of 45 days from the date of such notification unless 
the insurer within these 45 days satisfies the Minister as to its solvency. 
' 
If the insurer fails to satisfy the Minister the 1 atter may revoke its. 1icence. 
2 
If the insurer carries on more than one class of business and the solvency 
concerns only one class the revocation of licence shall not affect other 
classes. 
3 If a licence to carry on general insurance business is revoked 
the insurer shall pay out of the General Insurance Fund to the policyholders 
'the whole or such proportion of their premiums as the Minister may direct. '4 
And if a licence to carry on long insurance business is revoked the Long : Term 
Insurance Fund 'shall be transferred to some other insurer approved by the 
Minister, who is able and willing to assume, in whole or in part, the 
obligations and liabilities of the insolvent insurer; and in default of 
such transfer, shall be as soon as practicable distributed by such last 
mentioned insurer to the long term insurance business policyholders in 
accordance with a scheme to be drawn up by an Actuary and approved by the 
Province Court. '5 
These measures do not confer adequate protection on the policyholders 
of an insolvent insurer. In the first place it is not known how an insolvent 
insurer could make-up for its solvency within 45 days after the investigation 
of its financial conditions proves its insolvency (assuming that the controller 
is able to reveal such insolvency). The provision, no doubt, encourages 
1. S. 26(c). 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. S. 36(3)(a)(i). 
5. S. 36(3)(b)(i). 
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insurers to inject capital funds into their coffers every time their 
financial situation becomes shaky instead of containing underwriting within 
the safe bounds of the financial resources available. This could have grave 
consequences on the solvency of an insurer as the case of the Vehicle and 
General in Britain has shown. 
1 Secondly, how could an insolvent insurer 
pay to the policyholders the whole of their premiums? If it could do so it 
wouldn't be insolvent, and at any rate, as we have seen, the reserves from 
which such premiums could be paid out are not always kept where the state 
could exercise some control upon them. The transfer of a life portfolio to 
another insurer appears to be fairly adequate as a measure of protection and 
has been successfully applied in the past as we will see shortly. But where 
no other insurer is willing to accept the liabilities of an insolvent insurer 
(a possibility which the Act itself anticipates) and the fund is distributed, 
the policyholders might have to accept whatever little comes because the method 
of fixing or establishing mathematical reserves (or the long term fund) depends 
upon the practice of each insurer and is not governed by regulation as we have 
seen. Where the amount earmarked for such reserves is low the share of 
policyholders is bound to be low. 
The question examined in this part of the chapter is no exception to the 
fact that the law is not invoked by the authorities when the opportunity arises. 
The committee established in 1971 to investigate the conditions of insurers was 
mentioned in more than one place above. This investigation proved that one 
foreign company (which was in the process of compulsory liquidation) and two 
1-See, Ronald Beale, After the V. & G. Crash, Supra , passim. 
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national companies were insolvent. The life portfolio of the foreign 
company (the Arab Insurance Co. ) was transferred to the General Insurance 
Co. The African Insurance Co. (one of the two insolvent Sudanese companies) 
was merged with the Sudanese Insurance and the law was not applied to it. 
Nor was the Blue Nile (the second insolvent Sudanese company) affected or 
ordered to transfer its life portfolio as it ought to have been ordered to 
do. Instead it was decided that the company (the Blue Nile) was to remain 
insolvent until 1980 when, it was hoped, the company would regain solvency! 
No action was taken against the company on the assumption that 'the interest 
of the Sudanese insurance market require d that such insolvency should not 
be revealed, and the measures laid down by the Act not to be invoked. '1 
Thus it does not appear to be a serious matter for a Sudanese insurer to 
become insolvent. Indeed the committee took pains to keep the company on 
the market at all costs as the records indicate. The insolvency of the 
company related both to its life and non-life portfolio. The factor which 
had concealed the company's insolvency was the over-valuation of its assets. 
It was mentioned before that a building owned by the company was estimated 
by the committee to be worth £S264,000, but the value of the same was £S482,000 
in the company's books. There was, therefore, an over-valuation of assets 
by £S218,000. The share of the life portfolio's deficit in this sum was 
£S64,211 as life assets stood at £S582,504 and liabilities were £S646,715. The 
company, however, suggested that its insolvency be met within 5 years and, 
therefore, the valuation of assets should be based on the value of the building 
at the end of the five year period, and not on the value of the same at 
the time 
1. "Valuation of Insurance Companies' Real Estate Assets", memo. by the 
controller to the Minister of Finance, dated 15.8.1973, 
Ins. 82/2/5/15 Gen. 
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of investigation. This was accepted and the company's valuation of the 
building stood at £S398,000, this time, and the committee's estimation of 
the same came down to £S225,000. The deficit in the company's assets, thus, 
fell from £S218,000 i. e. £S482,000-£5264-, 000, to £S173,000 only i. e. 
£S398,000-£ 5225,000. The change in the method of valuation was made so that 
the company could 'benefit by a high depreciation rate .... . '1 It was 
thought that a sum of £S68,000 to be deposited in the-company's reserves 
would be enough to meet the deficit in the life fund. The deficit of the 
general insurance fund, thus, stood at £S105,000 i. e. £S173,000 (total 
deficit) minus £S68,000 (life deficit). The deficit of £S105,000 was to be 
met within the five years agreed i. e. £S21,000 a year; but the period was 
later extended to seven years and the annual deficit to be met was fixed at 
£S17,000 instead of £S21,000. The extension was justified on the basis of 
'the adverse effects, of the commitment to meet the deficit within a short 
period, upon the policyholders of the company and its relations with the 
reinsurers. '2 
The procedures followed lend themselves to two obvious criticisms: 
firstly, and as mentioned earlier, the injection of liquid assets to meet 
0 
solvency, is a reversal of the normal procedure of containing underwriting 
within the bounds of the company's resources rather than seeking fresh doses 
from outside to offset the deficit. Secondly, it is not known why the deficit 




future and not the time of valuation. For a state of insolvency necessarily 
implies that at a certain point in time, the assets of an insurer do not 
exceed its liabilities. The test of solvency should then be the value of 
assets at that particular time and should not be replaced by a test which 
makes decisive the idiosyncrasy of individual insurers. 
The arguments advanced in this section may be summarized in the following 
points: (a) that the margin of solvency required by the Act does not appear 
to be adequate as a safety cushion, nor does it provide sufficient protection 
in isolation from other factors, (b) that the valuation of assets and 
liabilities follows no rules and appears to be left to each company to decide 
upon according to its practice, (c) that the controller has no means of 
obtaining information about the solvency of insurers other than from insurers 
themselves, (d) that the controller is not able to detect solvency merely 
by examining annual returns, and (e) that the law is unlikely to be invoked 
against actually, or potentially insolvent companies. 
In the following section we will examine the degree to which marketing 
practices are regulated in the interest of insurance consumers. 
E. Regulation of Insurance Marketing 
1. Regulation of Intermediaries: 
Before 1970 the following categories of insurance intermediaries 







4 Principal representatives were 
1. S. 8(3)(e)(i). 
2. S. 28. 
3. See Insurance Form No. 3, Insurers (Control) Regulations, 1962. 
4. See Insurance Form No. 4, Insurers (Control) Regulations, 1962. 
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in fact brokers, not agents, since they represented more than one 
metropolitan-based insurer. 
' At present, and although strictly speaking 
all categories of intermediaries are recognized except for principal 
representatives, only agents exist. 'Agents' in the Sudan includes both 
ordinary agents and brokers, but for the purpose of regulation only an 
agent's licence could be obtained from the controller of insurance. The 
licence must be renewed annually. 
2 But neither agents nor brokers are required 
to possess any qualifications for soliciting business, and any Sudanese over 
21 years of age who has not been convicted for fraud qualifies for an agent's 
licence. 3 And despite the legal requirement to renew a licence every year 
in practice some of the most unscrupulous agents could do business without 
such renewal for as long as five years before action is taken against them. 
4 
Understandably, the controller neither has the time nor the capacity to 
1. Brokers 'are persons who, acting with complete freedom as to their choice 
of undertaking, bring together, with a view to the insurance or reinsurance 
of risks, persons seeking insurance and reinsurance and insurance and 
reinsurance undertakings, carry out work preparatory to the conclusion of the 
contracts of insurance and reinsurance, and where appropriate, assist in 
the administration and performance of such contracts, in particular in 
the event of claim. ' "Insurance Intermediaries", 
a paper presented to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Trade, 
January 1977, (HMSO, London, 1977), p. 8. 
2. S. 30. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Letters by the controller of insurance to the Commissioner of the Police, 
dated 11.3.1975 - Ins. 28/2/2/11/9. 
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supervise the country's sales force effectively so as to ensure adequate 
protection for insurance consumers. Even less has protection been forthcoming 
from the courts. Following English common law, 
l 
and for the purpose of the 
formation of insurance contracts, insurance intermediaries were regarded by 
Sudanese courts as agents of the public and not of the companies which employ 
them even if they had erred or been negligent in filling proposal forms. 
2 
2. Performance of Insurers and Policyholders Complaints 
Unfortunately, the most important aspects of insurance marketing are 
not regulated. The controller has no power to investigate policy terms, 
policyholders' complaints, or any power to intervene to settle a claim 
against an insurer before legal action is resorted to. If he mediates it is 
to the extent desired by the parties and his decisions have no legal effect. 
3 
But as will be seen later, not all companies have been a source of dissatisfaction. 
Most complaints against the companies during the time of research related to 
marine insurance and compulsory Third Party insurance, but with regard to both 
categories the controller was unable to act as would have been the case in 
other branches. Although the C&F regulations have resulted in enormous 
profits to the companies, some companies (well known to the controller) often 
terminate their marine covers on the arrival of imported goods at Port-Sudan 
on the Red Sea even when the goods are insured on 'warehouse to warehouse' 
1. See e. g. Newsholme Bros. V. Road Transport and General Insurance Co. 
[1920 2 K. B. 356. 
2. lassan Musa V. Phoenix Assurance [1964] . S. L. S. R. p. 54. 
3. Siddik E. El-Mardi 'Insurance Industry in the Sudan", op. cit. p. 178. 
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basisl and are covered to the terminal at Khartoum. Another company refuses 
to pay any claim whatsoever with respect to third party insurance although 
very few claims are made upon the company due to the fact that Sudanese shy 
away from claiming compensation for an injured or dead fellow. The few claims 
made upon the company are not settled promptly (or at all, as it appears) as 
the policy of the company is to resort to legal settlement through courts in 
order 'to discourage the public and prosper in the process. '2 When the company 
applied for an authorization to do business in 1954 (it was then the Lorry 
Owners' Association) and was warned against heavy claims which might endanger 
its solvency, and of the need to establish safety deposits, the company bluntly 
replied to the authorities that it did not expect to pay for beneficiaries 
of compulsory motor insurance. A statement to this effect deserves repeating 
at length: 
3 
[I]n the Sudan the situation is very different 
[from other countries] as many accidents occur 
here, but the relatives of a deceased or injured 
person do not bother to-claim compensation. Indeed, 
it is considered ....... a grave social stigma to do so. But there is no reason why we should not 
1. Letter by the Financial Officer of the Sudanese Tractors Corporation to 
the controller dated 12.5.1975 - Ins. 28/2/211/9. 
2. "Re-organization of the Sudanese Insurance Market". A memo. by the 
controller of insurance to the Minister, dated 27.11.1971. Legal action 
against an insurer in the Sudan could take as long as seven years before a 
claim is finally settled. In Robert Kel elaris V. Sudanese Motor Insurance 
Co. [1960] S. L. J. R. p. 88, a case against the same company; the case was 
decided seven years after the accident which had given rise to the claim. 
3. From a letter by the National Trading Company (later the Sudanese Motor 
Insurance Co., and now Khartoum Insurance Co. ) to the Minister of Finance 
and Commerce, dated 25 May, 1954 - Council of Ministers' Records. 
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benefit by this state of affairs ... 'nature has decreed that when some suffer; others 
prosper' ... And, at any rate, most accidental deaths and injuries occur to pedestrians in that class 
of society for whose members compensation would be 
minimal. We can also assure you that we have discussed 
the matter with one of the biggest insurance agencies. This agency confirmed to us the popular conviction that, 
so far, it has hardly paid a sizeable claim in respect 
compulsory motor insurance. Therefore, we beg that the 
matter [of our authorization] be kindly considered, and 
formalities [i. e. security deposits] be disregarded in 
the supreme interests of our nation' [sic] 
The company still operates under the management of the old Lorry Owners' 
Association (incidentally, the controller has no powers under the Act to 
ensure the proper management of insurance funds under proper and qualified 
management. Nor could he ensure the integrity of funds through sound insurance 
practices). After it had been in the market for 17 years, the controller could 
still complain that the company 'exploits the public, is blatantly unscrupulous 
..... and its shareholders might receive little or no dividends at all if the 
company decided to honour its commitments to the public. '1 Fortunately there 
are other companies in the market (not more than two) which have fairly good 
claims records. One company in particular - the General - has not been the 
source of dissatisfaction from the public and to the knowledge of the writer 
very few complaints have been lodged against it. Its management is efficient 
and responsible and its financial strength almost beyond doubt. It has increased 
its share capital to above the minimum which was prescribed in 1970 for 
companies which were to be merged i. e. £S 2000,000, and has also established 
free reserves without being required to do so. Both measures were taken in 
"Re-Organization of the Sudanese Insurance Market", a memo. by"the 
controller to the Minister of Finance", Supra. 
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the early 70s., perhaps to guard against any possibility of merger. On the 
other hand the increase in the share capital was not paralleled by an increase 
in the membership of the company. It was a purely vertical increase. But the 
fact remains that the company is fairly solvent and financially strong. 
However, this is only one company out of seven. 
Perhaps the non-existence of measures for the protection of the public 
was thought to have been compensated for by the fact that the Sudanese 
regulation system is, in the British Tradition of insurance regulation, one 
of 'freedom with publicity'1 under which the public could investigate any 
document deposited by insurers at the insurance section. S. 39 of the Act 
provides that: 
Any person, may on. payment of--the relevant fee 
prescribed from time to time by the Minister: 
(a) inspect at the office of the [c]ontroller 
any document which is required by this Act to 
be deposited with him, and 
(b) obtain a certified copy or extract from any 
such document. 
We have seen above that the documents(when deposited)are hardly intelligible 
to the personnel of the section who are absolutely unable to interpret them 
into useful facts. For ordinary policyholders it should not be expected that 
a document could be of any value as a guide to the financial position of an 
insurer with which they are insured. And it is doubtful if more than very 
few Sudanese know about the existence of this provision in the regulation code 
1 See e. g. M. Pickering. "The Control of Insurance Business in Great 
Britain, " op. cit., also UNCTAD Secretariat, "Insurance Legislation and 
Supervision in Developing Countries", op. cit., p. 31. This system of 
regulation which merely requires insurers to register, and which 
substitutes publicity for strict control 'is incompatible with the 
requirements of a harmonious growth of insurance', Ibid., p. 76. 
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as no member of the public has consulted a document at the insurance section 
since the section was established some 20 years ago. 
l 
V. The Goals of Insurance Regulation: What Has Been Achieved? 
As the foregoing suggests the Sudan has not had a happy experience of 
insurance regulation and has nothing to offer to other underdeveloped countries 
by way of example. It may be recalled that in 1955 the intervention of the 
State in the business of insurance was justified on the basis of certain 
objectives which the State envisaged to achieve. These were: (a) the 
Sudanization of the industry, (b) the protection of the public, (c) the 
promotion of sound insurance principles and (d) the utilization of insurance 
funds for economic development. The second move by the state in the field of 
insurance in 1970 had a set of more radical objectives to achieve. These 
included the liberation of insurance from foreign hegemony and the minimization 
of the flight of insurance capital abroad through the implementation of reforms 
such as mergers, increase of underwriting and retention capacities, 
enhancement of services etc... . These reforms were carried out, albeit 
partly, at a time when the entire process of development along capitalist 
lines was challenged. It is within the context of these objectives that 
insurance regulation in the Sudan should be viewed. Its success or failure 
should, then, be judged by the extent to which the objectives have been achieved. 
It need not be repeated that the liberation of the market from foreign 
dominance had no effect on the dependency of indigenous insurers upon 
metropolitan reinsurers. This was due to the fact that the reforms were 
I. Interview with A. M. E. Osman, Khartoum, September 1979. 
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not completely carried out. It is difficult to tell exactly how different 
the conditions of the market could have been had these measures been implemented. 
Undoubtedly, however, the concentration of the market would have resulted in 
fewer companies much sounder in financial terms, and a lot easier to regulate. 
But when the bubble of reform died away, the flow of money abroad was 
intensified even more through massive government insurance. This flow is 
aggravated by the fragmented national portfolio. Although the existence of 
the giant NRC (iS500,000 in share capital) is the last reminder of the 
opening years of the 70s, the corporation's potential has not been fully 
utilized as no insurer is bound to cede any part of its portfolio to it. 
As to the 1955 objectives (which are still a broad framework of 
reference for official goals of regulation) it is, indeed, really surprising 
that some of those objectives were sought to be achieved under the Act before 
its amendment in 1970. The Sudanization of the industry (which was the primary 
objective), for example, was rendered a utopian goal by the Act itself which 
imposed more restrictions (in relative terms) upon indigenous companies while 
foreign companies were let loose. The fact that the industry was Sudanized 
in 
1970 was not 'a virtue explicit or implicit of the Act', 
1 but was rather the 
result of the political upheaval of 1969. 
Few funds were left behind for investment in the country before 
1970, and 
now the companies enjoy ample freedom with respect to their 
investments. There 
is no disagreement about the fact that insurance funds are 
invested, but these 
are invested in areas which hold more benefits for the companies 
than for the 
1 Siddik E. El-Mardi, "Insurance Industry in the Sudan" 92. Sit. p. 179. 
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country. The portion which goes into the banking system is no doubt 
available for government borrowing, but when it is repaid it is claimed 
by its owners (a substantial difference between a market dominated by 
private companies and state owned companies as we will see later). And, 
anyhow, the funds deposited in banks are decreasing in volume owing to the 
occasional devaluations and the drop in the value of money as a store value. 
And although inflation and the drop in value of money are due to the 
government's failure to control the money supply, the companies are also 
partly to blame for deserting government bills and deposits in the P. O. S. B. 
as avenues for investment. The companies, as we have seen above, could 
withdraw their funds from the Post Office any time they wish and they are 
in fact subsidized by the P. O. S. B. sometimes, rather than the reverse. And the 
large portion going away for reinsurers directly erodes the amount of funds 
left behind for investment. 
Nor could the Act stimulate sound insurance practices through the 
regulation machinery because the controller had no adequate powers to achieve 
that purpose. Not all technical reserves need be set up, no powers exist to 
supervise the integrity-of the funds or their proper management, nor is it 
possible for the controller to investigate reinsurance arrangements, investment 
plans, or underwriting practices. Fortunately the training of personnel 
is 
gathering momentum now, 
l but, of course, the Act has in no way contributed to 
1. Sudanese companies are beginning to train their own personnel 
(on their 
own initiative, of course), see the Sudanese Insurance and Reinsurance 
Co.. 
10th Year Book, (Khartoum, Khartoum University Press, 1977), p. 15, also 
Siddik E. El-Mardi, "Insurance Industry in the Sudan". Op. cit., also 




this. Also no adequate protection for policyholders is possible, given 
the controller's lack of power to regulate intermediaries effectively, to 
obtain adequate information about the market, to investigate policy terms, 
or his reluctance to deal with insolvent insurers according to his powers 
under the Act. 
The Act is certainly not an adequate instrument to use if the Sudan 
seriously considers the utilization of its insurance institution to contribute 
to its socio-economic transformation. The objectives of regulation set in 
1955 could not, and would not, be achieved under the Act because their rhetoric 
was very much divorced from the provisions of the Act. The reforms which were 
to be implemented in 1970 and after will probably remain in the statute book, 
but no Minister of Finance is likely to enforce them. Recent developments 
in the market, such as the licencing of new companies for 1981/82, indicate 
that implementing reforms is now a more difficult task than it ever was. 
Thus if by the accident of history the objectives of regulation, old or new, 
were to be fully achieved one day, then neither the Act, nor the regulations 
passed under it, could justifiably claim credit for that. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TANZANIA 
'Ten years after the Arusha Declaration Tanzania is 
certainly neither socialist, nor self-reliant' 
Julius K. Nyerere, "the Arusha Declaration 
Ten Years After", in Andrew Coulson (ed), 
African Socialism in Practice (Nottingham, 
Spokesman, 1979). p. 43. 
Introduction 
Chapters Four and Five examine the experience of Tanzania with 
respect to its attempt at economic and social transformation and with 
respect to the role of the insurance industry in this process of trans- 
formation. This chapter generally examines underdevelopment in Tanzania 
in its historical origin and analysis the steps taken to propel the 
country's economic development. This task was made relatively easier by 
previous chapters. It is no longer necessary, for example, to justify 
the need to outline the economic and political characteristics of a 
country before a particular institution in that country is studied. Nor is 
it necessary to reproduce the hypotheses which, as we have seen in Chapter 
Two, are now accepted as common to the experiences of most underdeveloped 
countries. As a matter of fact, the hypotheses may not apply 'perfectly' 
in the Tanzanian context, In many ways Tanzania is different from most of 
independent black Africa. It proclaims itself to be socialist. Its socialism was 
not the result of any social upheaval, and despite the worker-peasant rhetoric 
of the Tanzanian 'ideology' neither workers nor peasants had anything to do 
with the promalgation of the socialist policies. But the state in Tanzania 
now plays a dominant role in the economy and consequently, although it is 
possible to speak of certain 'interest groups' within Tanzania it is doubtful 
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if well-defined classes exist. It was possible to speak of a 'bourgeoisie' 
in the Sudan; the same may not be true in the case of Tanzania. Thus the 
case of Tanzania could be studied as an 'experience' in its own right without 
seeking to apply common hypotheses to it, although, undoubtedly, some of 
these hypotheses also apply to it in certain respects. 
In this chapter we will examine the causes for the socialist policies 
in Tanzania and the factors which permit or prevent the socialist trans- 
formation. The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part 
examines the pre-colonial and colonial economy and society, the second part 
analyses the neo-colonial state and the economic and social conditions which 
led to the formulation of the socialist goals. It examines the Arusha 
Declaration, Tanzania's first socialist manifesto, and two other major 
developments: rural strategy formulated before and after the Declaration; 
and workers participation in the management of the economy. The third part 
deals with the Tanzanian bureaucracy which spearheads the socialist trans- 
formation. We will examine some aspects of the management of the economy by 
the bureaucracy, the bureaucratic implementation of rural development policy 
and workers participation. This part is most relevant to the following 
chapter which deals with the manner in which Tanzania's insurance industry 
is managed by the bureaucracy and the degree to which the institution 
serves Tanzania's goals of socialism and self-reliance. In part four we 
will attempt a brief assessment of the socialist experience of the country. 
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I. The Pre-colonial and Colonial Economy and Society 
Like most pre-colonial African societies Tanganyikan1 society was 
characterized by the existence of independent producers involved in a pre- 
capitalist mode of production. The techniques of production were highly 
land-intensive, there was no wage labour, and the purpose of work was not 
the accumulation of wealth; but rather the maintenance of the producer's 
family. 2 This mode of production had not developed the mechanisms of the 
alienation of producers from the means of production. 
3 
There was a con- 
tinual process of intermingling, association and creation of new groups with 
rather different modem of economies from the dominant mode. Change was taking 
place progressively, the population was increasing slowly and the occasional 
movement of groups diffused simple techniques and new ideas and customs from 
one place to another. 
4 In that society with its plentiful supply of land 
there was little pressure for social differentiation. 
5 
1. Tanganyika no longer exists as a political entity. The name is used 
to describe the mainland of modern Tanzania during the colonial period 
and after, until the emergence of the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. 
2. See e. g., Julius K. Nyerere, Uhuru na Umoja or Freedom and Unity, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1966 [reprinted 19691, pp. 1 -. 64 
3. See generally, K. Marx, Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, Supra., 
pp. 67-8. 
4. Andrew D. Roberts, "The Pre-colonial History of Tanzania", in Knud E. Svendsen 
and Merete Teisen (eds. ), Self-Reliant Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
Publishing House, 1969), pp. 3 -4. 
5. Justinian Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania, 
(Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 1-9. 
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The productivity of that economy had, however, been seriously 
undermined by the slave trade which had drained the human resources in 
addition to causing the established traditions of patriarchal democracy 
to disintegrate as the numerous communities were slowly developing into 
warrior monarchies to face increasing hostilities encouraged by slave 
mongers. 
1 Slaves from Tanganyika were herded for sale to European traders 
and for domestic use in Zanzibar which began to develop as a colony of Arab 
planters around 1840.2 With the introduction of clove farming in Zanzibar 
slave hunting in the interior was intensified because of the high labour 
requirement of the crop although slave labour was also required for the 
transport of ivory to-the Island. Thus the small communities of Tanganyika 
were incredibly ravaged by hunters of men and elephants. 
t 
Amid this social disruption the European scramble for Africa began - 
the lack of united native resistance because of -the limited nature of political 
organization, making the colonial conquest an easy task. The Germans were 
the first Europeans to intervene in Tanganyika through the activities of 
German businessmen and missionaries in the nineteenth century. 
3 On the eve 
of the conquest the German East African Company was formed to dispatch 
expeditions inland in order to make treaties with local chiefs. Other sub- 
companies like the East African Plantation Company and the German Planters 
1. Ibid., p. 9. 
2. Allan G. B. Fisher of J. H. Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa 
(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1971), p. 25 and p. 4 . 
3. John Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule, (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), a so G. C. K. Gwassa, "The German Intervention and African 
Resistance in Tanzania" in Kimambo and A. J. Temu (eds. ) A History of 
Tanzania, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), pp. 6 -12 , at 
pp. 89----J0. of) 
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Company were established in coastal areas, and by 1888, thirty small 
companies were exporting tobacco and other products to Germany. 1 In 1891, 
Germany took over the administration of Tanganyika. 2 
In a bid to exploit the wealth. of the colony the German administration 
embarked on vast plantation schemes and encouraged European settlers to farm 
in the high lands. Africans were forced to grow cash crops dictated by the 
needs of the German market rather than by the objective resource conditions 
of the colony. Coffee was introduced in Usambara, Kilimanjaro and in other 
places sisal was preferred. Rubber was most lucrative between 1908-1912 and 
cotton was introduced in Usukuma, Morogoro and around Dar es Salaam. 
3 
European settlements were established in Usambara, Meru and Kilimanjaro 
and by 1913 there were over five thousand Europeans in German East Africa. 
4 
At the end of the First World War in which Germany was defeated and its 
colonies taken over by other powers, Tanganyika was mandated to Britain by 
the League of Nations. In 1919 a British administrator was appointed to 
the colony. 
5 However, the conditions. of the colony were appalling. Its 
1. Ibid., p. 101. 
2. Ibid.,. pp. 102-3. 
3. Lionel Cliffe and John Saul (eds), Socialism in Tanza nia, 'Vol. I., 
(Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 19/2), pp. 8-17. 
4. Ibid. 
.: 5. W. E. Ward and L. W. White, East Africa :A Centur of Change 
1870-1970, (London: Allen and Unwin, 9711, pp. -l. 
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infrastructure was ravaged by war and the population had been reduced by 
war and famine. But to those Tanganyikans who survived the holocaust 
the change of colonial masters must have passed almost unnoticed. The 
attempt by the British to create a viable white community was not success- 
ful. Tanganyika unlike neighbouring Kenya and Uganda, had been a battle- 
field and had suffered massive destruction of physical assets the recon- 
struction of which has influenced the speed of settlement. Also, sisal - 
Tanganyika's most important cash crop - was grown in dry areas which were 
not suitable for small-scale pattern of settlements prevailing in Kenya 
for example. Finally, in contrast to Kenya and Uganda, the British had 
a weaker title to Tanganyika (being a mandated territory) and had always 
feared a German recapture -a fact which inhibited the growth of British 
settlements and justified the minimal investments in the colony which was 
the least 'developed' in East Africa. 1 In fact, there was a conscious 
process of colonial `undevelopment' in Tanganyika. The combined railway 
and general accounts for the colony recorded a deficit throughout the 
depression period - the total revenue being £14m. while the deficit stood 
at £1.4m. 
2 The colonial bureaucracy was reduced to the most senior jobs, 
schools were closed, road maintenance suspended, and the meagre investments 
in irrigation and survey came to a halt. 
3 But the economic exploitation 
1. E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, Supra., 
221-3, also Lionel Cliffe, "Underdevelopment or Socialism?: A comparative 
analysis of Kenya and Tanzania" in Richard Harris (ed. ). The Political 
, Econom of Africa 
(Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Co. Inc., 
p. 166. 
2. Brett, op. cit. p. 144 
3. Ibid., p. 136 & p. 145. 
-209- 
of the colony continued nevertheless, and the pattern of economic 
specialization created by the Germans was reinforced. The Chagga on 
Kilimanjaro were encouraged to grow coffee in areas where no European 
settlements existed. The railway line was extended from Tabora to Mwanza 
on Lake Victoria to stimulate cotton production. 
) Sisal production 
increased from 17 tons between 1923-1925, to 91 tons between 1936-38; 
cotton bales produced during the same period increased from only 17 to 58, 
while coffee production increased by two and a half times. 
2 Co-operatives 
were encouraged as a useful instrument to incorporate subsistence farmers 
into the money economy and to promote 'a healthy, prosperous yeoman farmers 
class, firmly established in the land... '3. In 1932, the Co-operative 
Societies Ordinance was passed to stimulate the growth of a co-operative 
sector although some co-operatives such as the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative 
Union (KNCU) had existed since 1925.4 In the pbst-World War II period the 
number of registered societies rose from only 62 in 1948 to 579 in 1960 with 
a corresponding increase of membership, and cotton co-operatives were 
encouraged in Sukumaland where 300 cotton growers associations were established 
by 1959.5 
1. Ibid., pp. 224-230. 
2. Ibid., p. 288 
3. Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Supra., pp. 50-1. 
4. Ole Molgaard Arderson, "The Co-operative Movement and its Growing 
Pains" in Svendsen and Teisen, Self-Reliant Tanzania, Supra., pp. 
286-9. 
5. Ibid., p. 288. 
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It was, of course, undesirable to promote industrial development in 
the colony which could prejudice British exports or labour employment in 
Britain, and until 1946 there were only a few industries, mostly in urban 
areas, half of which were geared towards exports. 
' 
The colonial policy 
was to ignore industrialization, but in some cases positive action was 
taken to discourage industrial developments. 2 One of the few industrial 
projects set up was a meat processing plant established to provide a 
market for the surplus stock which was considered a danger to soil fertility 
and, therefore, bore no relation to any desire to encourage industrialization, 
and was finally closed, anyway. 
3 
The shortages of materials in the-sterling 
area after World War II gave a stimulus to some industries such as chemicals, 
vegetable canning, dairy processing, milling etc.... The enterprises 
4 
which had carried on the few processing activities in Tanganyika, together 
with servicing and exchange, operated on a regional scale in the whole of 
East Africa through regional headquarters in Nairobi (currency was unified 
for the region and administered by the East African Currency Board from 
London). Railway links, inter-regional trade and customs (a customs union 
was established in 1927) all operated in the interest of the settler-dominated, 
temperate-climate and properly British Kenya colony (in terms of title ) at 
the expense of Uganda and Tanganyika. 
5 The adoption of a common external tariff 
1. J. Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania, 
Supra., p. 120-1. 
2. For instance when a Japanese company attempted to establish a factory 
for the manufacture of matches, the government insisted that an excise 
duty (which would be sufficient to discourage the company) be imposed 
with the result that the project was abandoned (Brett op. cit. pp. 268-70). 
Similarly, when the Tanganyika Cordage company set up factories to manu- 
facture binder twine for export it was threatened by a prohibitive duty 
on exports on the basis that its price competitiveness in the British 
market had jeopardized British interests (Brett op. cit. pp. 270-2). 
3. Brett, op_ cit., p. 268 
4. J. Rweyemamu, op. cit., pp. 120-1. 
5. Bret, "', op. cit. p. 127. 
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by Tanganyika was primarily a device to protect Kenya's industries, and 
the elimination of trade barriers served the same purpose, but deprived 
Tanganyika of sizeable revenues and forestalled her industrialization. 1 
Therefore, the assumption that 'the satellites experience their greatest 
economic development and especially their most classically industrial 
development if and when their ties to their metropolis are weakest' needs to 
be qualified in the case of Tanganyika whose neighbour Kenya had acted 
as a periphery-centre. 
2 
Also the colonial monetary system was designed for the syphoning off 
from the colony of as much as was possible. There was no exchange control 
of any kind (thanks to being in the sterling area), presumably to facilitate 
a two-way flow of currency, and to enable the colony to borrow cheaply in 
London. 3 But, of course, a lot more was loaned abroad and repatriated than 
the colony could have hoped to receive, and, in addition, the rate at which 
the colony loaned was remarkably less than the rate at which it was charged 
by foreign creditors. 
4 The Currency Board, the Post Office Saving Bank, 
pension and trust funds, were all required by law to hold sterling assets 
equivalent to their local holdings, Other financial institutions such as 
5 insurance companies, opted to invest in more familiar markets abroad. 
I. J. Rweyemamu, op. cit. p. 116. 
2. This assumption was one of Frank's hypotheses concerning underdeveloped 
countries, see A. G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, 
Supra., pp. 9-10, also J. Rweyemamu, op. cit. pp. 116-7. 
3. John Loxley, "Financial Planning and Control in Tanzania", in J. E. Rweyemamu 
et al, (eds. ), Towards Socialist Planning, (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
Publ ishing House, 1972), pp. 50-71. 
4. Ibid., pp. 51-2. 
5. Ibid., p. 52, for the insurance industry in Tanzania see Chapter Five. 
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The socio-political characteristics of Tanganyika also reflected 
the dominance of a colonial system par excellence. Tanganyikan society 
was compartmentalized into three racial groups: the Europeans, who occupied 
the most senior jobs in the bureaucracy and dominated the economic scene; 
the Asians, who formed a large 'middle class', engaged in small trade and 
retail business and occupied middle positions in the civil service and 
finally, the Africans who were largely involved in subsistence farming or 
small-scale farming, and only tenuously in the modern sector. This racial 
stratification was reinforced by political and economic policies: the 
institution of separate electoral communal representation, and the operation 
of a purely racial salary structure. 
) The racial salary policy was 
recommended by the Holmes Commission (1947-8) which inquired into the civil 
service structure in East Africa. The report of the Commission stipulated 
that: 2 
The European surpasses the Asian in such matters as sense 
of public service, judgement and readiness to take 
responsibility, and subject to individual exception, the 
African is at the present time markedly inferior to the 
Asian of the same educational qualifications, in such 
matters as sense of responsibility, judgement, application 
to duty and output of work. 
While white supremacy was to be accepted as an article of faith, the 
colonial authority encouraged racial hatred and competition between Asians 
1. Dharam Ghai and Yash Ghai, "Asians in Tanzania: Problems and Prospects" 
in Svendsen and Teisen (eds. ) o . cit., pp. 91-110, at p. 91. 
2. Quoted by J. Rweyemamu, op. cit., p. 31. 
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and Africans. In fact the pre-independence years in Tanganyika were 
clouded by suspicion and enmity between Africans and Asians, often 
expressed in racial terms, especially from the African side. On the one 
hand, the Asian community was alarmed by the rapid growth of African- 
dominated co-operatives which had achieved some sort of economic independence 
and had threatened Asian interests, especially after the enactment of the 
Co-operative Societies Ordinance 1932. In 1936, the Chamber of Commerce 
section of the Indian Association requested the Government '. to stop the 
advancement of the co-operative system [until]... the trading population 
which might be displaced by the co-operative institutions might be suitably 
absorbed in other spheres of economic fabric of the territory. '1 On the 
other hand, the independence battle which was gathering momentum was adopting 
overtly racialist, anti-Asian slogans. The movement had actually originated 
in the various local political and business associations, 
2 
all of which had 
viewed independence as, inter alias a vehicle for removing the'Asian class'. 
The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)3 which had led the colony to 
independence emphasised the need 'to further trading spirit among Africans 
with a view to ousting Indian traders'; and one of the aims of the party was 
to 'help establish an increasing share in the running and owning of business... 
4 
1. Quoted by Shivji op. cit., p. 67. 
2. For instance the Buhaya Union, the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, 
and the Pare Union, see M. H. Y. Kaniki, "Tanu, the Party of Independence 
and National Consolidation", in Gabriel Ruhumbika (ed. ) Towards Ujama, 
Twenty Years of Tanu Leadershi , 
(Dar es Salaam: East African Literature 
Bureau, 1974 , pp. 1-29, also A. J. Temu, 
"The Rise and Triumph of Nationalism" 
in IN Kimambo and A. J. Temu (eds. ), A History of Tanzania, Supra, pp. 189-213, 
also Shivji, op. cit. 
3. Tanu ceased to exist after the 5th of February 1977, when it merged with 
the Afro-Shirazi of Zanzibar to form the new single party Chama Cha 
Mapindusi (C. C. M. ) or 'The Party of the Revolution'. 
4. Quoted by Shivji, op. cit., p. 59. 
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It was against this background that the battle for uhuru (freedom) 
was waged and won when Tanganyika obtained flag independence in December 
1961. In common with the experience of many African countries the transfer 
of power was a peacful one, external rather than internal pressures playing 
a more active role. The pressure from the U. S., for example, upon Britain 
to open up her colonies for all imperialist powers on the one hand, and the 
Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, on the other hand, and the likelihood of its 
repetition in Tanganyika ultimately speeded up uhuru. 
1 But what distinguished 
Tanganyika from many other African countries was the lack of sectional or 
sectarian loyalties which had plagued the transfer of power in many parts 
of Africa. The success of national unity in Tanganyika owed something to geo- 
political factors reflected in the population density in a fraction of the 
country, the extremely diverse ethnic groups with no single dominant ethnic 
formation, and the intermediary of Swahili which acted as a lingua franca 
2 for the various ethnic factions. 
As the above indicates the development of the colonial economy and 
society in Tanganyika was a development of underdevelopment i. e. the creation 
of economic conditions which could continue to function 'properly' by 
continuing to accept dependency on dominant external powers. The pattern 
of distribution and utilization of the economic surplus, priorities in 
production, and the nature of the relations with the outside world are now 
1. J. Rweyemamu op. cit., pp. 31-2. 
2. W. H. Whiely, "Swahili: the National Language of Tanzania" in Svendsen and 
Teisen op. cit. pp. 130-42. 
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to be dictated by the needs of foreign powers. This 'development of 
underdevelopment' had also generated the usual patterns of regional 
inequality: there were the periphery centres which suffered most from 
the economic exploitation i. e. the towns and estates; and these were 
surrounded by peripheries which supplied them with food and services; 
and these in turn, were surrounded by sub-peripheries which supplied the 
centre with labour or simply stagnated. More importantly, as we will see 
shortly, colonialism had bequeathed to Tanganyika a tremendous legacy of 
ideological and cultural mysti fi cati ons which make the burden of the 
socialist transformation a particularly difficult one. In the following 
section we will see how underdevelopment persisted in the neo-colonial 
period and how the change of strategies came about to challenge this 
persistence of underdevelopment. We will examine the Arusha Declaration 
which put Tanzania on the socialist path of development and two other 
policy papers which supplied the peasant-worker rhetoric of Tanzanian 
socialism. 
II Uhuru and After 
After independence, the inherited political and economic structures 
still retained a strong colonial flavour, and the social stratification 
stimulated by the colonial system remained intact. The independence 
constitution was drawn up by the colonial office, the country gained 
statehood as a monarchy headed by the Queen as head of the Commonwealth; 
the government was to function on a 'Westminster' model, and in the British 
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tradition was to be subdivided into various ministries - the treasury 
being the most important. 
1 The civil service which had inherited the 
norms and ethics of the colonial bureaucracy was to spearhead development 
planning and the management of the economy as a whole. 
2 The colonial 
economic structures continued to exist. The dominant activity remained 
agriculture, which continued to account for the major share of total 
production; and other sectors such as commerce and transport depended 
on agriculture while exports consisted of unprocessed agricultural products. 
One year before independence, about half of the agricultural exports came 
from one per cent of the total land alienated for estates and owned by 
foreigners. And about three-quarters of the African-produced cash crops 
came from five cotton districts around Lake Victoria and a few other coffee- 
producing districts. 
3 The agricultural credit policy remained the same. 
The Agricultural Credit Agency, which was formed by the World Bank in 1962, 
took over the assets of the former Land Bank, and under the same bureaucracy 
and the same work principles, continued to advance loans to a handful of 
farmer-traders in the export sector. Its replacement by the National 
Development Credit Agency (N. D. C. A) in 1964, again sponsored by the World Bank, 
1. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, (Nairobi: East 
Africa Publishing House, 1967), pp. 55-94, also Lionel Cliffe, "From 
Independence to Self-Reliance" . in Kimanbo and Temu op. cit., p. 
241. 
2. Ibid., p. 241, also Bismark U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt (eds. ), Towards 
Socialism in Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1979 , 
p. 6. 
3. Lional Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance" op. cit., pp. 241-2. 
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was in essence a change of name rather than of substance. And while 
the dependency relations on foreign markets were retained through the 
export enclave, the domestic scene continued to reflect the country's 
satellite position vis-ä--vis international capitalism. The early post- 
independence industrial projects were both financed and established by 
foreign firms; and mineral production (diamonds) remained a monopoly of 
the South African firm Willamson Diamonds Ltd., through its subsidiaries 
Alamasi Mine Ltd., and Kahana Mines Ltd. 
2 
The World Bank and the Arthur 
D. Little report advised the government to create an environment attractive 
to foreign private investment. Accordingly, the major part of government 
investment in the three year plan 1961-64, was to be externally financed. 
3 
A waveof capitalist industrialization followed especially in textiles which 
witnessed a sudden cluster of investments. The same was also true of 
export-propelled industries such as pyrethrum extract, wattle extract, cashew 
nut processing, tea, coffee and diamonds. 
4 But most of these industries 
were set up to suit the interests of foreign markets rather than to 
stimulate domestic demand. Some were established to maintain a place in 
a falling market, to prevent other competitors from making a profit, and 
in some cases the raison d'etre was simply the desire to dispose of old 
machinery or to replace labour intensive techniques which rendered exports 
O 
uncompetitive even if this would result in massive unemployment. 
5 
1. L. A. Msambichaka of R. B. Mabele, "Agricultural Credit and the Development 
of Vjamaa Villages in Tanzania" in K. S. Kim, Mabele and Schulthesis (eds. ), 
Papers on The Political Economy of Tanzania, (London: Heinemann Books, 
1979), pp. 207-8. 
2. Samuel A. Ochola, Minerals in African Underdevelopment, (London: Bogle- 
L'overture, 1975), pp . 62-3 . 
3. J. Rweyemamu, op. cit., p. 39. 
4. Ibid., pp. 122-30 
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However, the monetary system was reformed through some radical 
measures. In 1965, Exchange Control Regulations were introduced to 
prevent capital outflows and the East African Currency Board was replaced 
by a Central Bank in 1966. The National Provident. Fund was established 
in 1964 to provide a steady flow of capital but also as a measure of social 
security. The National Co-operative Bank was established in 1962, and 
the National Development Corporation (NDC) took over large roles in crop 
financing. The National Bank of Commerce was set up to compete with 
foreign banks, and the National Insurance Corporation was formed as a joint 
venture to compete in the insurance market. 
1 
But social gaps in the country were widening rapidly. The newly 
established institutions employed bureaucrats who received enormous 
benefits, and the Africanization of the civil service had necessitated the 
promotion of many officials to senior civil service positions with 
responsibilities and corresponding rewards designed for European personnel 
before independence. There was also a rush into the central government 
service. This was due to the fact that the primary objective of the 
employment policy at the time was the creation of a miniscule, relatively 
well-rewarded bureaucracy instead of a large sector of low-paid employees. 
It was expected that the surplus population made redundant by this policy 
would be absorbed in the settlement schemes which had been recommended by 
the World Bank in 1960.2 Many people lost their jobs and a number of labour 
riots broke out due to worsening labour conditions and the disenchantment 
1. John Loxley, "Structural Change in the Monetary System of Tanzania" in 
Lionel Cliffe and J. Sand (eds. ) Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. 2, 
(Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 19/3). pp. 102-110, also 
Mwansasu andPratt (eds. ), Towards Socialism in Tanzania, Supra., pp. 72-91. 
2. J. Rweyemamu, oýcit., pp. 53-4. 
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of the workers with the slow process of Africanization in labour intensive 
fields such as the railways, harbours and sisal estates in contrast with 
civil service posts. 
1 
In a bid to curb union activities the government 
adopted a number of measures aimed at the containment of labour movements. 
These included: the passing of the Trade Disputes Act, 1962, which made 
strikes virtually illegal, the Security of Employment Act 1964, to regulate 
disputes, the banning of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) in 1964, 
and the establishment of the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) 
which came under the control of the government and was affiliated to Tanu. 
The final development was the setting up of a labour tribunal under the 
Permanent Labour Tribunal Act 1967 which also made strikes illegal. 
2 
The year 1964 was a notable one in the history of Tanganyika, and 
its eventful course altered many things in subsequent years: the United 
Republic of Tanzania came into existence in April 1964 as a merger between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar; and the liberation movements of South Africa, 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique were pledged unlimited support by the United Republic. 
Two battalions of the Tanzanian army mutinied , and the U. S. was publically 
denounced for attempting to overthrow the lawful government of Tanzania. 
3 
Relations with the West were worsening. Western capital was leaving the 
country because the political climate was becoming inhospitable. In 1964 
alone, there was a capital flight of shs. 290m., or half of the potential 
capital formation compared with 1963; also actual and potential aid was lost 
I. William Torodoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, Supra. , p. 142. 
2. Shivji, op. cit., p. 68 and pp. 128-9, also Cranford Pratt, The Critical 
Phase in Tanzania : 145-1968, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 
pp. 184-194. 
3. Ibid., pp. 134-56. 
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to the country by rejecting West German Assistance and breaking diplomatic 
relations with Britain over Rhodesia. 
1 The targets set by the First Five 
Year Plan (1964-1969) became difficult to achieve as 78 per cent of the 
capital requirements were to be financed from abroad. 
2 But the total 
external loans and grants fell from the 1961 figure of shs. 127.3m. to 
shs. 51-4 m. by 1964.3 Even worse, there was a remarkable fall in the 
prices of sisal in 1965, and the export prices of cotton and coffee fell 
below the 1961 prices -a trend which continued until 1967.4 
Against this background the slogans of 'socialism and self-reliance' 
which characterize Tanzanian politics until the present day emerged. The 
government was adopting an increasingly socialist rhetoric towards economic 
development, and Tanzania's relations with China, U. S. S. R. and the East 
European countries were to king on new dimensions. The move was towards a 
more egalitarian, just and socialist society. 
5 These policies culminated 
in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and the other policy papers6 which 
marked a new chapter in Tanzanian history. Some of these policies are 
examined below. 
1. Ibid., also Rweyemamu, oj. cit., pp. 43-4. 
2. Rweyemamu op. cit., p. 50 
3. Shivji, op. cit. 161, Rweyemamu p. 41 and p. 44, also GArri ghi and John 
Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa, (New York & London: 
Monthly Review Press, 1973). p. 260. 
4. C. Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania, Supra , p. 175 and p. 215 and 
Rweyemamu, op. cit. p. 44. 
5. This is a persistent rhetoric which underlies Nyerere's writings, see for 
example, Freedom and Unity, Su ra , also Freedom and 
Socialism, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1968 . 
6. These were "Education for Self-Reliance, 1967", and "Socialism and Rural 
Development 1967", both of which were issued in the aftermath of the 
Arusha Declaration. 
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A: The Arusha Declaration 
In 1967 Tanu adopted a policy paper known as the Arusha Declaration 
which committed Tanzania to the achievement of socialism and self-reliance. 
The Declaration stipulated that: 
' 
To build and maintain socialism i. t is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation 
arecontrolled and owned by the peasants through the 
machinery of their government and their co-operatives. 
Accordingly, in February 1967, and in a dramatic move to control the 
'commanding heights' of the economy, the government nationalized all 
commercial banks, the National Insurance Corporation, and eight export- 
import firms. Also eight milling firms with associated food manufacturing 
were nationalized and the government declared its intention of acquiring up 
to 60 per cent of the sharesof major industrial firms such. as Kilimanjaro 
Breweries, Bata Shoe Co. and 60 per cent of the sisal industry. 
2 But 
following the resentment of private business in the aftermath of the 
Declaration, Nyerere assured private interests that no more firms were to 
be taken over. 
3 And it was not until 1970 that another Presidential 
Directive ordered that all import and wholesale trade and all residential 
and commercial buildings (valued at shs. 100.000) be controlled by the 
state. 4 
1. The Arusha Declaration, Part II. 
2. Sunday News (Tanzania), February 1964, also AndrewCoulson, "Agri-cultural 
Policies in Mainland Tanzania", Review of African Political Economy, 
No. 10,1977, pp. 74-96, at p. 89, also Mwansasu an Pratt, op. cit. p. 12 
3. The Nationalist (the Party Newspaper, Tanzania), 14. February, 1967. 
4. Mwansasu and Pratt, op. cit., p. 12. 
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As the conditions leading to its adoption indicate the Arusha 
Declaration was in no way a logical outcome of a revolutionary social 
change within Tanzania. The general ease of the independence struggle 
did not aid in the development of a party which had the potential to 
build a socialist economy. And despite the worker-peasant rhetoric of 
the Declaration, neither workers nor peasants had played any immediate 
role in its formulation. On the morrow of uhuru migrant labourers faded 
back into their homesteads (. away from national politics) and due to the 
historical absence of advanced feudalism in Tanzania no class of landless 
peasantry had existed (as in Latin America). to bring the revolutionary 
potential of the peasantry to the political arena. On the other hand 
most wage-earning workers were, in 1967, first generation urban dwellers 
whose organization into a solid and enduring movement would have required 
a prolonged period of political maturity. 
l 
Nevertheless, no particular 
ethnic formation has provided a. sti. mul us to any condition or social force 
behind the move; and Tanzania was said to have lacked the racial conflicts 
which blur the consciousness of social classes, at least in contrast to 
Kenya. 2 But there can be no doubt that the Declaration was neither an 
attempt to extricate Tanzania from the international division of labour 
nor a step towards 'a new mode of production and fundamentally restructured 
social relations. '3 It came as a surprise to Western observers, but hardly 
caused any organized imperialist reaction. 
4 For all the nationalization laws 
1. Ibid., p. 7 
2. Lionel Cliffe, "Underdevelopment or Socialism? ". Supra., p. 170. 
3. John Loxley, "Monetary Institutions and Class Struggles in Tanzania", 
in Mwansasu and Pratt, op. cit., p. 79. 
4. Lionel Cliffe, "Underdevelopment or Socialism", op., p. 185. The Times 
of 13, February, 1967 quoted a Tobacco industria is Sir Ernest Vases y, a 
former Minister of Finance in Tanganyika and the director of Rothmans of 
Pall 
....... 1.. -- L- - -- -I ýJ-1 --iL T-- ---- . _- -iI. 
anrUnced programme of so&, al i st development'. 
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provided for the payment of compensation (in order, perhaps, to maintain 
the economy's link with western capitalist firms), and in the case of the 
industrial firms taken over for N. D. C, the previous owners agreed to lend 
the firms the amount of compensation due and this was to be repaid at 7.5 
per cent interest rate. Compensation for Smith Mackenzie, Daligety, 
Barclays Bank and Standard Bank was agreed at 98 per cent of the value of 
assets in 1967, and the total agreed compensation was in the vicinity of 
shs. 200m. 
1 On the other hand (-thanks to the Declaration) the nationalizations 
have brought the government in immediate partnership with the most famous 
firms of western imperialism. In the capital goods sector, for example, 
N. D. C's partners included: Ralli Bros., a London firm with 36 subsidiaries 
in different parts of the world, Motor Mart and Exchange Group, Portland 
Cement and the Metal B. ox Co.. In the consumer goods sector N. D. C. owned 
2 
interests in partnerships with Nestle, British American Tobacco, East 
African Breweries; and other f i. rms which entered into management agreements 
with the corporation included: L. -Rose & Co., Overseas Construction Co., and 
Trans World Atlantic. 
3 The same managements in the same firms were to be 
involved in the running of the economy of Socialist Tanzania! But at any 
rate Tanzania has not had any socialist business tradition, and the economy 
had always been controlled by private enterprise -a fact which made the 
numerous management agreements, technical assistance agreements etc a natural 
option. To be sure the spirit of private enterprise was also codified in the 
principal pieces of legislation which were to govern the newly established 
1. J. Rweyemamu pp-cit., p. 60 
2. I. G. Shivji, The Silent Class Struggle, Tanzania Studies No. 2 




corporations. Emphasis was laid on the best endeavours to secure the 
profi tabi lity of business (for example in the case of N. D. C. ), and the 
National Bank of Commerce and the National Insurance Corporation were 
to provide banking and insurance facilities in the 'normal and proper' 
banking and insurance business. The State Trading Corporation was also 
to conduct its business according to proper mercantile tradi. tions. 
' 
This 
private enterprise bias was also reinforced by Tanzania's membership in 
the East African Community (under which a common market between Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania was established) signed in 1967, emphasizing the 
need for the community's economy to be esentially a private enterprise 
economy based on competition, free trade and non-fixed or monetary 
discrimination by a member against the products of other members. 
2 
Before the practical economic and social implications of the Arusha 
Declaration are discussed the other twin objective of 'self-reliance' 
may be examined. It was mentioned earlier that the aims of the Arusha 
Declaration were the achievement of socialism and self-reliance. Indeed, 
the Declaration has associated the objective of self-reliance with real 
independence although external aid was not rejected altogether and was 
regarded as an extra bonus rather than the main determinant of economic 
development. The Declaration stipulated that: 
3 
1. Yash P. Ghai (ed. ), Law in the Political Economy of Public Enterprise, 
(Uppsala; S. I. A. S. an New York: international Legal Centre, 1977). 
p. 227. 
2. Ibid., p. 226 
3. The Arusha Declaration Part II, (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 
1967). 
-225 
Independence means self-reliance. Independence cannot be 
real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development. Even if there was a nation, or nations, 
prepared to give us all the money we need for our develop- 
ment, it would be improper for us to accept assistance 
without asking ourselves how this would affect our independence 
and our very survival as a nation. 
Also, by re-examining the pre-Arusha economic problems, notably the 
scarcity of capital, the Declaration pointed out the inadequacies of relying 
on money as a major instrument for development: 1 
It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of 
development when we know only too well that our country 
is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is even more 
stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of 
our poverty through foreign financial assistance rather 
than our own financial resources. 
However, immediately after the Declaration was issued, loan agreements 
were entered into between Tanzania and other capitalist countries - agreements 
which reinforced and buttressed the country's dependency on the capitalist 
centre. External loans and grants to Tanzania rose from shs. 84 m. in 1967/68 
to shs. 746.6 m. in 1972/73.2 In 1971 alone, the World Bank financed loans 
of shs. 65 m. for tobacco and shs. 73.5 m. for tea plantations, US aid loans 
of shs. 6.5 m. financed farms and heavy duty tractors and improved seeds 
while a Canadian loan of shs. 7 m. (initially) was to finance an automatic 
bakery in Dar es Salaam. 
3 Sweden has financed rural water supplies and 
1. Ibid. 
2. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, op . cit., p. 
161 
3. Arrighi and Saul, o_p. cit., p. 278 
-226- 
crop storage, West Germany is involved with developments in Tanga; and 
Tanzania is a major aid receiver from Denmark. ' By the mid-1970s, Tanzania 
was becoming one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in Africa - 
receiving 55 per cent of its development budget from the World Bank. 2 By 
June 1980 Tanzania became - in absolute dollar terms - one of the largest 
receivers of foreign aid in independent Africa. 3 
The worker-peasant rhetoric of Tanzanian socialism has provided a 
stimulus for two major development strategies concerned with the peasantry, 
and the workers. The one is Tanzania's rural development strategy, the 
other is the policy of workers participation in the management of the 
economy. To these we now turn. 
B: Rural Development Strategy: 
In September 1967 a major policy paper was-issued in Tanzania. This 
was 'Socialism and Rural Development'4 which is, perhaps, the most widely 
known rural development policy in free Africa. Although strongly emphasized 
after the Arusha Declaration, some fundamental aspects of the strategy had 
their origin in the recommendation of the World Bank mission in 1960 which 
1. Andrew Coulson, "Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania; 
Supra., pp. 95-6. 
2. Andrew Coulson (ed. ), African Socialism in Practice, Supra., p. 14, 
also Kim et al. (eds. ) op. cit., p. 180. 
3. The Financial Times, 2.7.1980. 
4. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Supra., pp. 337-66. 
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drew attention to the need to create improvements by modernizing Tanzania's 
agricultural system. This was to be achieved either through an improvement 
approach which, while leaving traditional agricultural methods intact, 
would introduce community development methods and agricultural extension 
services; or a transformation approach which, in heavily populated areas, 
would transform agricultural practices and socio-economic institutions. ' 
This was followed by Nyerere's paper 'Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism'2 
in 1962. And on the basis of 'Socialism and Rural Development', The President, 
the Party (Tana) and the government launched ujamaa vijijini (socialism in 
villages) in which people were to live together, and work together for the 
benefit of the community of producers. -While some aspects of the traditional 
family would be preserved, modern knowledge and techniques would be introduced 
and services such as health, education, clean water etc would be supplied. 
The paper addressed itself to the problem of c-lass formation stressing that 
the basic characteristic of Tanzanian society was not only differentiation but 
the emergence of antagonistic classes. By way of reform an alternative 
ujamaa mode of production could be a vehicle for social development of the 
community while avoiding the natural process of class formation. In view of 
this strategic importance ujamaa villages were to be promoted through dis- 
cretionary extension assistance to peasants who were willing to live together 
and own land communally. The policy was further stressed by the Five Year 
Plan 1969-74, and in a special Presidential Circular which stipulated that: 
3 
1. Adolphe Mascarenhos, "After Villagization - what? ' in Mwansasu and Pratt, 
op. cit., p. 148. 
2. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, op. cit., pp. 162-71. 
3. Presidential Circular No. 1,1969. 
BEST COPY 
AVAILABLE 
TEXT IN ORIGINAL IS 
CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF 
THE PAGE 
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It is to the building of ujamaa villages that government must 
turn its attention. We have to organize our party and govern- 
ment machinery to assist their establishment... No department 
of Tanu and no Ministry of government is exempt from the 
requirement to participate and to contribute to the success 
of this policy. 
By a Presidential Order now the Tanzanian bureaucracy was to implement 
the policy and ensure its success. 
C. Workers Participation in the Management of the Econom 
As a follow up to the Arusha Declaration and rural development policy, 
the third major socialist development in Tanzania was the provision for workers' 
participation in the management of the means of production and exchange. In 
1970, a Presidential Circular required the establishment of workers' councils 
in Tanzania to 'further industrial democracy in relation to the economic 
functions of the enterprise, and give workers a greater and more direct 
responsibility in production'. 
1 The function of the councils was to contribute 
to the general welfare of the country 'by helping the efficiency and 
effectiveness of [the] public enterprises. '2 Specifically, workers councils 
were under a duty to achieve the following functions: (a) to advise on the 
requirements of wages and incomes policy as announced by the government from 
time to time, (. b) to advise on the marketing of production, (c) to advise on 
matters of planning, (d) to advise on matters relating to the quality and 
quantity of production, (e) to advise on other aspects of productivity such 
as work and enterprise organization, technical knowledge etc and (f), to 
receive and discuss the balance sheet. 
3 All enterprises were required to 
form workers'' councils before the end of 1970. 
In the following pages an attempt is made to discuss the impact of 
the Arusha Declaration and the subsequent policy papers on the wider economic 
and social relations in Tanzania with reference to the positions of the 
different 
actors in the Tanzanian drama: the bureaucracy, the workers and the peasantry-4 
We will see how the bureaucracy (which appears to be the only beneficiary of 
the 
Declaration - but see below) controls the economy, and 
how it has implemented 
the socialist strategies of rural development and workers participation 
in the 
management of the economy. 
1. Presidential Circular No. 1,1970. "The Establishment of Workers' Councils, 
Executive Committees and Boards of Directors", para. 5. 
2. Ibid. 
3. 
4. It is not assumed here th t these 'categories' are firmly established social 
cl ass or that the i ntra-c fl 
i cts between them qualify as class conflicts. 
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III. The Bureaucracy, the Peasantry and the Workers 
A. The Bureaucracy and the Transition to Socialism 
The public corporations sector grew enormously after the Arusha 
Declaration although its structure was not 'the result of any well-thought- 
out comprehensive plan. '1 New corporations were set up to deal with the 
various interests taken. Some of the major corporations included: the 
National Bank of Commerce, (N. B. C. ), the State Trading Corporation (S. T. C. ), 
the National Milling Corporation (N. M. C. ), the Tanganyika Sisal Corporation 
(T. S. C. ), the National Insurance Corporation (N. I. C. ) and the National 
Development Corporation (N. D. C. ) to which most of the industrial firms 
taken over were assigned. By the end of 1973, there were 112 public 
corporations in Tanzania operating across most sectors of the economy. 
2 
The sector had absorbed (and continues to absorb) a great number of Tanzanians 
and foreign experts who are relatively well paid in comparison with the 
central government bureaucracy, and with much opportunity for promotion, 
more effective management of the economy and closer contacts with foreign 
interests. In fact, to some writerson Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration was 
no more than a practical necessity to advance a class of 'bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie'. This class elevated itself to the position of the commercial 
bourgeoisie after the latter had lost control of its economic interests. This 
I. Presidential Circular No. 2,1969, Para. 3. 
2. Yash P. Ghai (ed. ), Law in the Political Economy of the Public Enterprise, 
Supra , p. 212. 
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'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' now exercises political and physical control 
over property. 
' It is doubtful if the Declaration was specifically 
designed for that purpose. 
2 But undoubtedly, the emergent sector with 
its large bureaucracy (the number of employees in high-level manpower 
positions in Tanzania rose from 500 in 1961 to 5000 by 1971) remained 
fiarly autonomous and with minimal accountability to central authority. 
3 
This relative freedom of the bureaucracy owes its origin to Tanzania's 
colonial past. The British colonial bureaucracy - the immediate predecessor 
of the Tanzanian bureaucracy - had governed without benefit of theory and 
had shown a tendency for pragmatism and empiricism in the absence of defined 
ultimate goals. This led to a preference for decision-taking by those in 
the field 'who have first-hand acquaintance with the facts. '4 Thus the 
1. Michaela Von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial-State and its Tanzanian Version". 
Radical Science Journal, No. 8, Jan. /Feb. 1977, pp. 75-89, also I. G. Shivji, 
Class Struggle in Tanzania, op. cit. 
2. Shivji's classification of the bureaucrats who man the public corporations 
as a class of its own i. e. a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, attracted the 
criticism that 'the important point about the higher echelons of the 
state apparatus is less their class origins or ambitions than their 
specific function in relation to the ruling alliance of classes and class 
strata. Concentrating on the tendency of state officials to try to acquire 
property is apt to divert attention from this more important point. ' See 
R. H. Green, "Law, Laws and Public Enterprise Planning in Africa" in Yash 
Ghai (ed. ), Law in the Political Economy etc. - op. cit. As Yash Ghai 
argues, the bureaucracy 'can either promote capitalism, in which case it 
will become part of the bourgeoisie rather than an independent class, 
while if it fights against capitalistic relations of production, as well 
as against socialistic development, the outcome is complicated, but 
unlikely to be that of a self-perpetuating bureaucratic or managerial elite, ' 
see Yash Ghai (ed. ) Law in the Political Economy, op. cit p. 24. 
3. For example NDC, see Ian Parker, "Contradictions in the Transition to 
Socialism: the case of NDC" in Mwansasu & Pratt. op. cit., pp. 46-70. 
4. Brett, op. cit., p. 37. 
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colonial state became an administrative state par excellence, and the 
colonial bureaucracy was empowered with laws, regulations and vast 
administrative powers (all of which were inherited by the neo-colonial 
state) which had granted wide discretion, often with no parallel criteria 
for their use or implementation) The colonial legal system (which still 
operates in Tanzania) also helps to provide a framework of legality for 
the autonomy of the public sector. The legal rules in the British 
tradition are biased in favour of the free enterprise system, they 
recognize the priority of profitability, and entrust the management with 
ample freedom in discharging business duties. It is against this background 
that the vast public sector in Tanzania, and its bureaucracy, operate to put 
Tanzania's socialism into practice. 
Unfortunately, the bureaucracy is unlikely to achieve a transition 
to socialism. It is resentful of checks and controls from the centre. Its 
emphasis on rules, formal qualifications and hierarchial relations impede 
any radical change in the established order. Its intellectual baggage of 
the past i. e. conventional economic wisdom and business orthodoxy, only 
prevent the release of strategies which could bring about the socialist 
transformation, but do not assist social change. Little wonder, then, that 
immediately after the nationalizationsof 1967 many corporations went into 
unwise investments, constructed fabulous headquarters, but showed a poor 
record in co-ordination of the various enterprises under their control. 
2 
1. Yash P. Ghai, "Notes Towards A Theory of Law and Ideology: Tanzanian 
Perspectives, " African Law Studies, No. 13/1976, (U. C. L. A.: African 
Studies Centre, 1976. 
2. Yash Ghai (ed. ) op. cit. p. 215. 
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On the other hand, the Declaration's broad formulation of national goals 
did lend itself to some vagueness and provided the unruly bureaucracy with 
many crevices into which less progressive and unrevolutionary readings of 
the goals could be inserted. Sometimes the Party and, at times, the 
President had to veto investment decisions that were incompatible with 
Tanzania's aspirations. The Karadha's decision (this was a hire-purchase 
corporation owned by the National Bank of Commerce) to provide credit 
facilities for the purchase of motorcars was vetoed by the Party, and a 
decision by the Tanzania Tourist Corporation to invest shs. 300m. in the 
Tourist sector was rejected by the President as being inconsistent with 
Tanzania's goals. 
Thus the Arusha Declaration has created, among other things, an empire 
of public corporations whose functioning is somewhat beyond the reach of the 
centre and whose bureaucracy has the chance of imposing its soft options to 
neutralize Tanzanian socialism. In the following two sections we will see 
how the bureaucracy has turned out to be a Trojan horse in the transition to 
socialism with respect to the rural development strategy, and the participation 
of workers in the management of the economy. 
B. The Bureaucracy and the Peasantry 
With the advent of the Arusha Declaration and the rural development 
strategy which followed, the bureaucracy and the peasantry came closer 
together to implement the policy and to achieve its goals. At this stage it 
I. J. Rweyemamu et al. (eds. ), Towards Socialist Planning, Supra, p. 57 and 79. 
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could be argued that 'Ujamaa' was (from the start) flawed with theoretical 
and practical problems which made the achievement of those goals extremely 
unlikely. Firstly, the emphasis on the characteristics of traditional 
African societies viz: equality, classlessness communalism etc., were 
necessary conditions of a specific mode of production, as discussed earlier, 
which (the mode) had subsequently been incorporated into the world capitalist 
system for nearly a century. This makes a return to those conditions 
historically impossible. At any rate, it is difficult to understand why the 
goals of contemporary society should be based on the frail foundations of 
traditional Ujamaa rather than on the objective conditions of the modern 
world. 
1 Secondly, the involvement of the bureaucracy was unlikely to allow 
for any democratic process of consultation of the peasantry on its own 
destiny, since such consultation is unknown to the bureaucracy. 
All too often Ujamaa carried much of the characteristic) of the former 
settlement policies long suggested by the World Bank - being the only rural 
policy known to the bureaucracy - with over-emphasis on services, supervision 
and control of the peasants. There was no attempt to transform peasant 
economy or change peasants' relations to the wider society nor could the 
bureaucracy achieve unquantifiable socialist goals. 
2 Unable to distinguish 
between Ujamaa and the former settlement scheme, especially at the initial 
1. J. Rweyemamu, op. cit. pp. 70-1. 
2. Jannik Boesen, B. Storgard & Tony Moody, Ujamaa - Socialism from above, 
(Uppsala, : S. IA. S. , 1977), pp. 
166-8. 
-234- 
stages, the mass of the peasants moved away from their homes to districts 
where the policy had not been introduced. Shinyanga district, for example, 
received many peasant 'refugees' from Geita and Kwimba districts where 
the policy had been introduced. I In Nyara district and parts of Bugufi, 
most new settlers maintained their ties with the old homesteads and often 
paid more attention to cultivating their own lands in the old village sites 
than in the new settlements. 
2 In the west Lake Region, throughout the 
working seasons less than half the working force was engaged in communal 
production, and even then, for less than half the working days. 
3 Attendance 
in the villages fluctuated with the kind of communal production at hand 
but was nearly always subjected to the interests in private farms. 
4 
The period 1969-1973, was one of complete failure of Ujamaa as a policy 
for rural socialism. Food production in the villages either stagnated or 
decreased and cash crop production also decreased, sometimes to appalling 
levels. 5 The number of residents in the villages increased and villages 
swelled up when there was food scarcity in the area and famine relief was 
forthcoming, but people fled away after the relief mission had gone. 
6 And 
most benefits were claimed in villages where relatively well-off farmers 
had promoted their own Ujamaa enterprises in order to gain access to land, 
1. Andrew Coulson (ed. ) op. cit. pp. 117-8. 
2. J. Boesen, et. al ., Supra. pp. 64-5. 
3. J. Boesen "Tanzania: From Ujamma to Villagization" in Mwansasu & Pratt. 
op. cit. p. 131. 
4. Kim, et. al. op. cit. p. 204. 
5. The Economic Survey (Dares Salaam: Government Printer), 1973/74 
and 1974/75. 
6. Kim, et. al. op. cit. p. 204. 
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official aid and other benefits. ' The credit system in agriculture also 
secured to these villages enormous cash loans which were not available for 
ordinary poor-peasant dominated villages. The National Development Credit 
Agency had advanced only one loan to an Ujamaa village until its abolition, 
and the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) which succeeded the Agency 
also followed its policies, albeit with minor amendments. 
2 The T. R. D. B. 's 
facilities have largely been available to those Ujamaa villages which are 
registered as multi-purpose co-operative societies and which are in essence 
controlled by 'individualistic and capitalist-oriented farmers who are able to 
obtain loans because of their credit-worthiness. '3 
Meanwhile, the human dislocation produced by rural development policies 
was extending its impact to the whole economy. Although between 1964-1967 
national income had arisen by an average of 6.4 per cent a year, between 
1967-1975 the same only rose by 4.2 per cent. The post-Arusha period had 
generally witnessed a negligible improvement in the standard of living. 
4 
But the burden of this recession fell upon the peasantry more than any other 
social group in the country. Between 1961 and June 1974, urban minimum wages 
were raised by about 250 per cent in monetary terms and by 100 per cent in 
real purchasing power. However, average peasant incomes either declined 
1. J. Boesen, "Development and Class Structure in Smallholder Society and 
the Potential for Ujamaa" (1972), mimeo - Dares Salaam University, also, 
J. Sender, "Some Pre Binary Notes on the Political Economy of Rural 
Tanzania Based on a Case Study inW6 tern Usambaras", (mimeo)-Dar es 
Salaam University, 1974, also P. Raikes, "Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural 
Socialist Development", a paper presented at the Annual nference of 
East African Universities, 1973, p. 19, Dar es Salaam University (mimeo. ), 
and I. Oxaal, T. Barnett & David Booth (eds. ) Beyond the Sociology of 
Development (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1975). pp. 5-. 
2. Kim et a op. cit. pp. 207-8 and p. 210. 
3. Ibid., pp. ZT5- . The creditworthiness criterion requires the exchange of 
a mortgage for a loan. 
4. J. R. Nyerere, "the Arusha Declaration Tne Years After" in Andrew Coulson 
(ed. ) op. cit. 
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or remained static, and during this time only 30 per cent of all peasants 
had consuming power equal to the minimum wage. 
l 
However, the low production of Ujamaa villages, the oil price increases 
of 1973, the unfavourable weather conditions, and the increasing balance of 
payment crisis led the bureaucracy to sacrifice the Ujamaa policy altogether 
to the most pragmatic'villagization programme' in 1974. Under this programme 
the objective was simply to move peasants into villages, at any cost, and by 
former colonial methods of carrot and stick the peasants were to be 'encouraged' 
to increase agricultural output. Homes in the old villages were burnt, 
resistent people were detained, and at times, persuaded by officialrumours about 
modern services and famine relief supplies which could only be claimed by those 
who chose to settle. Movement from new settlementswas restricted and the 
provision of food, credit, and other services became conditional on reaching 
a production target. 
2 
Despite official claims to the contrary, the villagization programme was 
primarily a strategic step to increase production to meet, inter alia, the 
increasing cost of maintaining the bureaucracy, but not to provide services 
for the peasants. In the parastatal sector alone, the number of persons 
employed rose from 18,601 in 1966 to 72,094 by 1973, while their wages and 
3 
salaries rose from shs. 88,843,000 to shs. 581,345,000 during the same period. 
1. R. H. Green, "Tanzanian Political Economy Goods, Strategies and Results" 
in Mwansasu & Pratt. off.. cit. pp. 23-4. 
2. Robert Martin, "Human Rights in Tanzania", a lecture given at the Law 
School, Warwick University, 1980, see also D. McHenry, "A Report: Communal 
Agricultural Production in Ujamaa villages" 1976, Dar es Salaam University 
(mimeo. ), p. 13. 
3. Yash Ghai (ed. ) Law, in the Political Economy, op. cit. p. 213. 
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On the other hand, the provision of services was inefficient even before 
the villagization policy, and there was no reason for the government to 
increase its burden of providing services which, it must have known, could 
not be supplied. 
' The few services supplied were certainly the result, and 
not the reason for, villagization. But, undoubtedly, the official change 
of heart came both as a relief and success for the regional bureaucracy: 
no more 'embarrassing' communal production results to worry about and no 
unquantifiable successes to be sought. All is needed now is the enforced - 
if need be - movement of the peasants into homes in straight lines and with 
fields divided into individual plots in which the peasants could be told 
what to grow and at what time in the year. 
2 
Thus as with Ujamaa also in 'villagization' the freedom of the 
bureaucracy in the implementation of rural development has led to the 
reinterpretation of the policy into specific objectives that are within 
the administrative reach of the bureaucracy. It was not so much that the 
policies were defective, but the bureaucracy could read into them its own 
objectives and not those of society. But that is not the end of it. More 
significantly, the bureaucratic structure of rural development has permeated 
down to the level of the village with the result that the rhetoric of 
'participation' has been reduced from a strategic goal to a highsounding 
I. Andrew Coulson, "Agrictultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania" op. cit. 
p. 9 4. 
2. James R. Finucane, Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania: the 
Case Study of Mwanza Region, (Uppsala . S., 1974), also Boesen, if a (eds. ) op. cit. pp. 36-7. 
3. In 1968, President Nyerere argued that participation is inevitable for 
good leadership and encouraged leaders to discuss policymatters with 
people at all levels (see the Nationalist, 18 October, 1968). 
,3 
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nothing. Village leaders now attend district and regional meetings which 
brief them with directives to be passed to all village residents. Participation, 
then, has become a pre-emptive move to have a decision from the centre ratified 
at all levels and the Village Development Communities and Ward Communities 
have become extortion points and possible vehicles for the implementation of 
central directives rather than generators of policy from below. 
I 
That was how the bureaucracy handled the management of the economy- 
in an attempt to achieve socialism - and interpreted, and put to practice, 
Tanzania's rural development strategy. In the following part of this section 
we will examine the relations between the bureaucracy and the workers within 
the context of workers participation in the management of the economy. 
C. The Bureaucracy and the Workers 
The Presidential Circular of 1970 - mentioned earlier - which provided 
for the establishment of workers' councils, based the concept of workers 
participation on three fundamental principles: (a) given a proper work 
environment the majority of workers can become more creative and more 
productive, (b) workers should no longer be seen as 'factors of production'; 
but must be treated as the very purpose of production, and (c) that 
industrial discipline can only be meaningful when all the workers become 
aware of what they are doing and what their objective is. 
2 
There was, however, no attempt to relate workers participation to the 
more general forms of control in the social and political life of the country, 
I. J. R. Finucane, Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania, Supra , p. 172. 
2. Para 2,3 and 4. 
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nor was participation conceived of as a system of new social relations. 
l 
On the other hand, the arrangement whereby 'advisory' roles are assigned 
to workers and taking cognizance of workers attitudes - the two significant 
provisions of the circular - do not seem to be adequate alternatives for a 
more far-reaching and more meaningful participation by workers in the 
management of the means of production. There was no emphasis on discussion 
between workers and management on the modes of production, methods of work 
or any attempt at integrating the process of production with the 'ideology' ,2 
or any safeguards against bureaucratic containment of workers' councils. 
Quite the contrary, the bureaucratic dominance of the councils seems to be 
the objective of the circular'. The Councils are composed of (a) a Tanu 
Chairman of the branch established at the place of business, (b) the Manager 
or the General Manager of the firm, (c) all heads of departments or sections, 
(d) all members of the workers' committee, (e) workers' representatives 
elected in proportion to the number of workers in the different departments 
or sections, provided that the number of members of the workers' committee 
does not exceed three-quarters of the total membership of the permanent 
members, (f) co-opted member/s from outside the business as and when 
required. 
3 The Executive Committee of the Council (which is what really 
matters) consists of (a) the Manager/General Manager - as Chairman, (b) 
Heads of Departments, or sections, and (c) workers' representatives elected 
1. H. Mapolu, "The Organization and Participation of Workers in Tanzania" 
in Kim, et al. (eds) op. cit. p. 276. 
2. J. Rweyemamu, et al. (eds. ) op. cit. p. 83. 
3. Para. 7. 
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by the Council, provided their number is not more than one-third of the 
total membership of the Executive Committee. 
1 In effect, then the Executive 
Committee is no more than a 'meeting of the General Manager with his 
departmental heads. '2 
Given this state of affairs, it was not surprising that workers 
participation was interpreted by some managements as a concerted effort 
to educate the Tanzanian workers to exercise participation 'with discretion' .3 
Some public enterprises were extremely slow and reluctant to apply the 
circular, claiming that their workers were not 'educated and competent 
enough to assume the managerial role'; 
4 
and in joint venture and foreign 
enterprise no worker participation of any kind has been possible. 
5 The 
Western management systems in Tanzania - specially the ones set up by 
McKinsey (the management consultancy) are not in the least designed to 
tolerate the participation of the work force or to break down its alienation 
in order to allow for a role for workers in the management of the economy. 
And even if councils are set up in such firms, it is doubtful if they could 
be effective as a mechanism of power equalization or power shifting to the 
workers in view of the tradition of 'authoritarian work habits, hierarchial 
structure of authority, the conduct of business in a foreign language Land] 
the ambivalence of both the political and bureaucratic leaders to the notion 
of workers participation'. 
6 There is, certainly, a lot of truth in the 
1. Para 15. 
2. Shi vji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, op. cit. p. 132. 
3. John Lox ey an John Saul, the Political Economy of the Parastatals, ' 
E. A. L. R., vol. 5, No. 1&2,1972, p. 32. 
4. I.. J. Maseko, "Workers Participation in Management in Tanzania", (mimeo), 
Dar es Salaam University, 1972. 
5. John Loxley and John Saul, "the Political Economy of the Parastatals", 
E. A. L. R., above, pp. 32-3. 
6. Yash Ghai (ed. ) Law-in the Political Economy op. cit. p. 234. 
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argument that workers' councils are major incentives and better techniques 
of controlling workers, but not of securing their participation in management. 
' 
C. IV Towards A Socialist Tanzania 
Although it is well over a decade now since Tanzania declared her 
intention of building a socialist society, present Tanzania is neither 
socialist nor self-reliant. On all traditional criteria the economy still 
exhibits the usual characteristics of underdevelopment: an export-oriented 
sector, a narrow industrial sector, and a large services sector. 
2 The country's 
relations with international capitalism are well maintained through trade and 
foreign aid received from time to time. 
3 And in the Tanzanian literature 
there is often a tone of scepticism and of uncertainty about Tanzania's 
success in achieving her goals in the future. Bismark Mwansasu and Pratt, 
for example, two of Tanzania's sympathisers, have recently argued that: 
4 
It can hardly be denied that Tanzania is 
an unlikely country in which a transition 
to socialism could take place. It is poor, 
its per capita annual income does not exceed 
1200/= Tanzanian shillings ($150)........ 
The transition to socialism will be difficult 
for a further reason. Tanzania cannot expect 
the transition to be facilitated by rapid 
economic developments, there are few known 
natural endowments and there doesn't appear 
to be much likelihood that any major new resource 
will be discovered to transform the economy .... . 
1. H. Mapolu, "The Organization and Participation of Workers in Tanzania" 
op. cit. P. 277. 
2. See the Economic Survey, (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer), 1974,75,76, 
77,78 and 1979, see also I. G. Shivji, Class Strugglesin Tanzania, op. cit. 
pp. 149-157. However, Tanzania was a more diversified export base tin 
many African countries. Exports include: tea, coffee, cotton, sisal 
cashewnuts etc., see D. P. Ghai, "The Growth of Money Incomes in East 
Africa, 1946-1960" quoted in Kim, et al. (eds. ) op. cit. p. 171. 
3. Shi %. ji, C ass Struggl esýn Tanzania, op. cit. pp. 158-78. ý_.. 4. M. ansasu T ratt. oR. citý pp ý 
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At a more fundamental level, and to many critics, the Tanzanian state 
has reflected many of the flagrantly anti-socialist features of the neo- 
colonial state in Africa - especially in terms of applying its organized 
coercion to suppress domestic opposition. In many occasions, critics say, 
striking workers were dealt with by mass expulsion and detention. 
1 The 
students' opposition to MP's salary increases in 1978 was met with 'ruthless 
and concentrated police brutality' although the Field Force Unit (a para- 
military trouble-shooting wing of the police) was not called in2 as in 1972. 
And on the ideological plane Tanzania's socialism was not an outcome of 
a dialectical class analysis or understanding of society. Nor is its 
objective always in sight. And its approach to social transformation is one 
that awai is responses rather than initiates policies which could bring about 
such transformation. As Nyerere himself has put it. 
Our socialist practice has been the result 
much more of responding to a felt need than 
to an understanding and application of a socialist 
theory. 
What went wrong? How could remedial action be taken? Where is 
Tanzania heading now? Undoubtedly, the slow rate of socialization of the 
economy and society is a logical outcome of the operation of a progressive 
ideology in a society that had been incorporated into the world system for 
over a century. For colonialism had planted the seeds of underdevelopment 
and had bequeathed the spirit of capitalist initiative techniques which 
1. Shivji, op. cit. p. 139. 
2. Leaflet issued by Dar es Salaam University Union, 5 March 1978, see 
Review of African Political Economy, No. 10,1975, for a brief account 
of the 1972 student movement, see Arrighi & Saul, op. cit. footnote 138, 
n- 33 - -- 
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remained to plague the transition to socialism. It has bequeathed a 
legacy of ideological and cultural mystifications against which Tanzania's 
Ujamaa (or socialism) is left to fight for survival. It has bequeathed a 
bureaucracy which is resistent to change and which, as we have seen, is 
aborting the socialist experiment of the country. Indeed, the problem in 
Tanzania is not so much that the 'ideology' is not clear as that many bureaucrats 
are hostile to it and many of those who profess to follow it are not committed 
to it. I As Nyerere himself has bitterly complained: 
2 
[Wie have no large and disciplined army of 
socialist leaders who understand the objectives 
in all their complexity, and who have clear ideas 
about how to promote the movement towards them. 
It is what the late President Nkrumah called the 
problem of trying to build socialism without 
socialists. 
But in the African context Tanzania appears to have the most advanced 
and progressive rhetoric for the control of bureaucracy - which rhetoric 
could be invoked, at least in some situations, to arrest flagrantly anti- 
socialist behaviour. 
3 And when positive action has not been entrusted to 
the bureaucracy, the outcome has been very much consistent with Nyerere's 
progressive ideas and a clear evidence of Tanzania's seriousness of intentions. 
Tanzania's role in African and world politics substantiates this proposition 
4 And 
1. Yash P. Ghai, "Notes TowardsaTheory of Law and Ideology", op. cit. 
p. 47. and p. 82. 
2. Daily News (Tanzania), 10 April, 1974. 
3. See e. g., The Arusha Declaration (Part V) which provided for a code of 
conduct to be followed by Tanzanian leaders. 
4. Witness, for example, Tanzania's assistance to the freedom movements in 
South Africa (the Guardian 11.4.1981), Tanzania's role within the O. A. U., 
in ýJ-erere's role in the North and South debate. 
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there can be no mistaking the seriousness with which Tanzania is 
attempting to assault the status quo instead of squaring its goal to 
it as many African countries have opted to do. So far Tanzania's record 
is remarkable in contrast with many countries whose 'professed political 
principles and whose prospects for development with a minimum of social 
justice have long been sacrificed in return for short term and 'micro' 
level benefits, serving primarily the personal and 'unstated' interests 
of their [new masters]'. 
1 Unlike many countries in Africa, Tanzania is 
genuinely attempting to follow an independent trajectory for her 
development in the alternative system of poorer but non-capitalist countries, 
a role which promises less at the present but may achieve her goals in 
future. 
1. J. Rweyemamu et al. (eds. ) op. cit. p. 167. 
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CHAPTER FIVE : INSURANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAINLAND TANZANIA 
' [W]e have no large and disciplined army of socialist leaders who understand the objectives in all their 
complexity, and who have clear ideas about how to 
promote the movement towards them. It is what the 
Late President Nkrumah called the problem of trying 
to build socialism without socialists. ' 
J. K. Nyerere, The Daily News (Tanzania), 
10 April, 1974. 
Introduction 
If tentative conclusions are to be drawn from the discussion so far 
the following points will suggest themselves: (a) that the Sudan and 
Tanzania are underdeveloped countries which owe their underdevelopment to 
colonialism, (b) that the insurance institutions of the metropoles did 
have a role to play in the underdevelopment of the two countries (the case 
of Tanzania has not been examined yet, but generalization is possible from 
the survey made in chapter one), (c) that in a neo-colonial situation 
underdevelopment is either reinforced or resisted, as the case may be, 
depending upon the political and economic structures of a country, and 
consequently the development strategy which is followed, (d) judging by 
the case of Sudan, this resistence or reinforcement of underdevelopment is 
likely to be reflected in the insurance industry; and the manner in which 
the industry is used for economic development generally follows the socio- 
economic policies of the particular country. 
And what was said in Chapter Four suggested that Tanzania has embarked 
on a rather independent trajectory for development, and that along that path 
several breakthroughs - unknown to the rest of black Africa - were made. But 
there has been a slow rate of progress in Tanzania. As we have seen above, 
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this was due to (a) the roots of the capitalist past which remained to 
plague the transition to socialism, (b) the implementation of socialist 
ideas by the bureaucracy, which is hostile to socialism, has prevented 
(and continues to prevent) the socialist transformation from taking place. 
In this chapter we will examine these propositions in the case of Tanzania's 
insurance industry. The chapter is divided into seven parts. Part one 
examines the history of insurance in Tanzania and the changes which have 
occurred after Arusha. Part two deals with the raison d'etre of insurance 
regulation or control. Part three briefly examines the concentration of 
the bureaucracy at the National Insurance Corporation's head office; 
and part four discusses the control of the corporation by the state. In 
part five we will investigate the effects of the nationalization of 
insurance in the economy of Tanzania, and in part six the degree to which 
the objectives of nationalization have been achieved. Finally we attempt 
an assessment of the nationalization of insurance in Tanzania as a socialist 
exercise. 
I. Background 
Before the East'African countries (Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya) became 
independent in the early 1960's their insurance industries (like other 
industries) were almost exclusively the monopoly of foreign companies which 
transacted business there through agents and small branch offices. Similar 
conditions prevailed in the whole of Africa. 
1 In 1958, and out of 143 
1. For the history of insurance in Africa see, generally, M. Grossman, 
op. cit. 
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insurance companies operating in East Africa only 6 were registered in 
Kenya; 1 and at the time of independence in Tanganyika there were 90 
insurers transacting business and virtually all of them were foreign. 
2 
Almost all foreign companies had their regional head offices in Nairobi 
and business in Tanganyika was carried out as part and parcel of usual 
trade transactions such as transport, shipping and warehousing, and most 
business houses had covered their own risks. Tanganyikan branch offices 
were thus responsible merely for securing the business and, therefore, 
only few insurers had full-fledged branches with authority to issue 
policies and settle claims. 
3 The personnel who ran the branches were all 
foreign and only a few indigenous agents and brokers took part in the 
trade by soliciting business in urban areas. The clientele of insurance 
was almost entirely European or Asian, and Africans were by law prevented 
from taking out life insurance. 
4 
This was alleged to be a measure of 
protection for Africans; but in fact it was part of a policy aimed at 
restricting access to credit to non-Africans. 
5 Expatriate banks featured 
prominently in the denial of credit policy. The effect of this, however, 
1. Issa G. Shivji, "Insurance and Development", E. A. L. R. Vol. 3, (197! 0) pp. 143- 
173, at p. 161. - 
2. J. 0. I ru kwu , Insurance Management in Africa, Supra , p. 249. 
3. John Loxley, "Structured Change in the Monetary System of Tanzania", 
Supra , 102-110. 
4. Ibid., The Life Assurance (Control) Ordinance, 1945 (amended 1946) 
of ctively prevented Africans from taking out life insurance, see 
M. Grossan op. ci t. p. 399. Similarly, in Uganda, the Control of the 
Business of Life Assurance Ordinance 1945, prevented Ugandans from taking 
life policies, see John Loxley, "East African Stock Exchange", in Phil 
Thomas (ed. ), Private Enter rise and the East African Com an , 
(Dar es 
Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1969), -footnote 1, at p. 132. 
5. In Tanganyika the Credit to Natives Ordinance 1931, required Africans to 
obtain written permission from local administrators before entering into 
debt obligations with non-Africans. Kenya Colony implemented a similar 
piece of legislation in 1948, see ibid. 
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was only to make a de facto. situation de jure, for not many Africans had 
possessed assets which could have been acceptable as suitable collaterals 
for loans. 1 
The insurance companies of East Africa were the most important non- 
bank financial intermediaries. John Loxley2 has estimated their investments 
in local assets at £3.5 m. in 1964, alone which was largely held in bonds, 
mortgages, equities and real estate. Although only 55 per cent of East 
Africa's net premiums were generated in Kenya, 75 per cent of investments 
were held there. There was, therefore, a flow of insurance capital from 
Uganda and Tanganyika to Kenya. 
3 
But capital made in East Africa (including 
the returns of investments) was ultimately remitted abroad, and between 
1959-1962, this was to the tune of £4.5 m. (see Table 8 below). Between 
1960-1966, almost shs. 350 m. of insurance and shs. 140m. of reinsurance 
premiums were obtained and transferred from Kenya while Tanganyika recorded 
shs. 44 m. and shs. 15 m. respectively, between 1964-1966, all of which was 
remitted abroad. 
4 And until 1967 the business of insurance in Tanganyika 
was not subject to any form of regulation whatsoever by the government. We 
have seen in Chapter Four that insurance companies did not invest their 
assets in the country and often opted for more familiar markets abroad. 
1. John Loxley, "Financial Planning and Control in Tanzania", Supra p. 52. 
2. John Loxley, "Financial Intermediaries and their Role in East Africa", a 
paper presented to the University of East Africa Social Science Conference 
(Nairobi, 1966). 
3. Ibid. 
4. John Loxley, "The Monetary System of Tanzania since 1967: Progress, 
Problems and Prospects" in Kinu et al. (eds. ) op. cit. pp. 128-29, also 
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In addition to the extraction of insurance surplus from Tanganyika 
the existence of foreign insurers' head offices abroad had also hindered 
the development of an indigenous insurance industry. It was said earlier 
that insurance personnel who manned the branches were all foreign. 
Undoubtedly, they were most unwilling to train Tanganyikan nationals to 
handle the business. On the other hand, the payment of claims upon the 
maturity of policies, as one might think, must have been unnecessarily 
delayed pending the approval of Nairobi regional head offices. Thus as 
part of the colonial monetary system the colonial insurance industry 
in Tanganyika also had its role in the underdevelopment of the country. 
This has found expression in the subordination of the economy to the 
needs of the metropoles through the extraction of insurance surplus, and 
in the exclusion of indigenous Africans from the field of insurance 
altogether. 
As we have seen in the last chapter after independence virtually all 
colonial economic structures remained intact and that the monetary system 
was no exception to this. But at a time of massive capital flight from the 
country' the Tanganyikan government moved into the insurance field to 
minimize the flow of capital abroad and to liberate the trade from foreign 
control through state participation in the running of business. In October 
1963, through a joint venture, the Shirika La Bima La Taifa Tanganyika or 
the National Insurance Corporation2 of Tanganyika, 
3 
was registered as a 
See e. g., Gilbert L. Rutman, The Economy of Tanganyika (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 152. 
2. Hereinafter referred to as 'the corporation' or 'N. I. C. ' 
3. On the 24th of February 1965 the word 'Tanzania' in the corporation's 
title was substituted for Tanganyika (after the emergence of the United 
Republic) but the corporation's business is solely confined to mainland 
Tanzania. In Zanzibar another National Insurance Corporation operates 
but no reference to it is made in this chapter. 
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limited liability company under the Companies Ordinance, 1 1931. The paid 
up capital of the corporation was only shs. 2m. The government subscribed 
51 per cent of the share chapital and this was vested in the Treasury Registrar, 
a corporation sole with perpetual succession and powers of ownership of the 
stock, established under the Treasury Registrar Ordinance, 2 1959. The 
remaining part of the corporation's share capital (49 per cent) was subscribed 
by Indian, Swiss, German and British insurance and reinsurance companies. 
3 
The first half of the 60s was a time of greater state intervention in the 
economy as discussed earlier. By 1964, total assets of government-owned 
enterprises stood at shs. 610 m. 
4 This trend culminated in the Arusha 
Declaration which emphasized the need for the government to control the 
means of production and exchange including insurance. 
5 In February, 1967, the 
Insurance (Vesting of Interest and Regulation) Act, 
6 1967 was passed and 
under it N. I. C. was brought wholly under state ownership. S. 3 of the Act 
provided that: 
1. Cap. 212. 
2. Cap. 418 
3. Journal of World Trade Law, 1967, p. 236, also, see the Insurance Industry 
in Tanzania: 10th Year Independence Anniversay (Published by N. I. C. in 
1971), p. 15. 
4. W. Edmund Clark, Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania, 
1964-73, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 19-78)-, -pp. 100-1. 
5. The Arusha Declaration, Part III. 
6. Act No. 4 of 1967, referred to after as the `Insurance Act'. 
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All the shares in the corporation, other than those already vested in the Treasury Registrar, shall, by virtue of this section and without further assurance, vest, free of any trust, mortgage, lien, interest or other incumberance 
whatsoever, in the Treasury Registrar 
..... 
The corporation was also charged with an exclusive franchise to 
transact life insurance in Tanzania. S. 8(1) of the Insurance Act 
provided that: 
No person, other than the corporation, shall, on or after the effective data [12th of February, 1967] carry on life business in Tanganyika. 
Unlike in the Sudan, however, life insurers were not required to 
transfer their portfolios to the corporation. That was, undoubtedly, one 
of the serious defects of the nationalization measures in Tanzania. As a 
result a number of policies are still held by Tanzanian nationals and the 
agents who had solicited business for the agencies still collect the premiums 
for the Nairobi head offices. 
1 Non-life insurers on the other hand, were 
permitted to carry on business until the first of January 1968.2 Although 
the Insurance Act provided for the payment of 'full and fair compensation' 
by Tanganyika, 3 it was unlikely that any insurer, apart from the foreign 
shareholders in N. I. C, could have qualified for compensation because, in 
insurance, the creation of a state monopoly, without more, is not aground for 
1. The effect of these transactions on Tanzania's balance of payment is 
discussed later. 
2. S. 13(1) of the Insurance Act provided that'[n]o person other than the 
the corporation shall,, on or. after the first of January, 1968_ carry on 
insurance business in Tanganyika'. 




Foreign agencies, anyway, showed no interest in pursuing 
compensation claims and most of them closed down their offices immediately 
after the Act was passed despite the offer made them to transact non-life 
business throughout 1967. Some agencies chose to do selective business, 
and otherscancelled their policies but refused to allow a proportionate 
refund for policyholders. 
2 
Thus the political developments of 1967 have had the most profound 
effect upon Tanzania's insurance industry which, for the first time, was 
brought under state control and was set to operate under conditions of state 
monopoly. Indeed, it was only in insurance that there was an outright 
nationalization of foreign interests coupled with the creation of state 
monopoly. 
3 But was that, by itself, enough to ensure the success of the 
insurance industry in the post-Arusha period? In other words was the state 
take-over-all that the insurance industry needed to contribute to the 
achievement of socialism and self-reliance? This is what we hope to answer 
in the rest of this chapter. 
II Raison d'etre of Insurance Regulation. 
As the foregoing suggests the insurance industry in Tanzania was the 
subject of far-reaching reforms in 1967. The insurance market was completely 
liberated from foreign (, direct) insurers and the state assumed full control 
and ownership of the only insurer which remained to transact business i. e. N. I. C. 
1. A. W. Bradley, 'Legal Aspects of Nationalization in Tanzania', E. A. L. R., 
1967, Vol. 3, pp. 149-176, also D. D. Nsereko, 'The Tanzanian Nationalization 
Laws'. E. A. L. R. Vols. 3&4,1970-71, pp. 1-23. 
2. The Insurance Industry in Tanzania: 10th Year Independence Anniversay, 
Supra , p. 20. 
3. A. W. Bradley, 'The Nationalization of Companies in Tanzania' in Phil 
Thomas (ed. ), Private Enterprise and the East African Com an , Supra 
pp. 207-28, at p. 212. 
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The success or failure of the post-Arusha insurance industry must, however, 
be seen in the light of the Arusha Declaration itself, - which was a turning 
point in Tanzania's political history - in the circumstances leading to it, 
and in the nature of the political and social forces upon which the implem- 
entation of the social goals is dependent. The opinion ventured in the last 
chapter was that the politico-economic developments which followed the 
Declaration seem to suggest that the Declaration itself was no more than a 
manifestation of a desire by the government to function more efficiently, 
within Tanzania's inherited economic and social structures, by allowing 
itself access to new sources of finance. The strong socialist rhetoric of 
the Declaration did not find its way into the legal instruments which created 
various institutions to carry out the task of economic development. The 
Insurance Act, for example, required the corporation to do no more than (a) 
provide, in accordance with the conditions appropriate in the normal and 
proper conduct of insurance business, adequate and proper insurance services 
and facilities throughout Tanganyika, (b) conduct its business without 
discrimination, excepting upon such groundsas are essential in the normal 
and proper conduct of insurance business. 
1 Thus, by law the corporation was 
to continue to function along its pre-Arusha lines which were recognized as 
'the normal and proper' norms of insurance business. What was to change after 
Arusha was not the manner of conducting insurance business, but rather the 
juridicial nature of the ownership of the insurance institution. And, there- 
fore, who was to transact insurance rather than how, seemed to have been the 
prime consideration. 
1. S. 7(a), (b) of the Insurance Act. 
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But four years after Arusha the management of the corporation under- 
took the responsibility of achieving certain objectives which are now widely 
recognized as the major objectives of the nationalization of the insurance 
industry in Tanzania. These were': (a) to make available quick and efficient 
insurance service to each and everyone who is in need of insurance throughout 
the length and breadth of the country, (b) to enable each and every policy- 
holder to obtain a fair deal and a fair value for his or her money (c) to 
channel people's savings for the purposes of financing the development plans 
of the country and the economic uplift of the entire population, (d) to 
carry out insurance business, not with a view to make profits, but as an 
essential service to the population which, while being completely self- 
supporting and offering a reasonable surplus on its turnover, would be 
run with the ideal of service first. Unfortunately, as we will see later, 
these objectives are contradictory to each. other, to the objectives set out 
in the Insurance Act, and are not adhered to in practi-ce. 
III The Head Office Bureaucracy: 
The body responsible for the admi: ni strat_on of the corporation is its 
board of directors. The composition of the board is not regulated by statute 
2 
but by the corporation's articles of association. The board consists of 5-9 
members3 (-it consisted of 8 memb-ers in 1979). The Chairman of the board is 
1. The Insurance Industry in Tanzania: 10th Year Independence Anniversary, 
op. ci t. P. 19. 
2. Article 15 of the corporation's articles of association. 
3. Article 15(b), ibid. 
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appointed by the President1 (see below), and other members are appointed 
by the Minister of Finance 
2 
who is the official charged with the control 
of the corporation. The internal structure of the corporation's bureaucracy 
consists of the General Manager at the top, followed by lower level directors 
in charge of six directorates comprising: finance and planning, administration, 
reinsurance, general insurance, life insurance and marketing and research. 
Each directorate consists of a director at the top and a number of managers 
in different grades i. e. from grade one to grade three. The number of 
managers varies from one directorate to the other, the largest being the 
general insurance and life insurance directorates which have four managers 
each. The number of high level managers at the corporation's head office 
is 16. There are also various regional and district managers in various 
parts of the country. In the whole of mainland Tanzania more than 1000 
persons are employed by the corporation and most of them are Tanzanian 
nationals. 
3 As will appear later, the concentration by such high level 
bureaucrats in the corporation was not without effect upon the volume of 
revenue accruing to the corporation and upon the nature of investment and, 
hence, the corporation's efficiency as a captial forming institution and 
one upon which the task of the socialist transformation is, in part, 
dependent. 
1. Article 15 (ibid) provides that 'there shall be a Board of Directors, 
which shall consist of (a) a chairman who shall be appointed by the 
Minister' 
2. Article 15(b), ibid. 
3. Annual Reports of N. I. C., also 'Desk Diary of N. I. C', and interview 
with Mrs. T. M. Mshuza, editor of Ngao (the corporation's quarterly 
magazine), Dar es Salaam, July, 1-9737. 
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IV. The Machinery For State Control and Supervision of N. I. C. 
The vast expansion of the public sector in Tanzania, which was the 
result of the Arusha Declaration, set in motion a process of greater state 
intervention in the affairs of public enterprises. Intervention was justified 
by the desire to achieve the socialist transformation of the economy and 
society. The state was to ensure that public enterprises adhere to policies 
and goals which could bring about the soci. o-economic change. In this section 
the various forms of state control upon enterprises are examined with special 
reference to N. I. C. 
State control of an enterprise in Tanzania varies in degree and intensity 
according to the particular legal form of the enterprise. The most common 
forms of public enterprises are corporations and companies although the 
departmental form also exists. While corporations are bodies set up under 
or through an Act of Parliament, 
) 
companies are bodies incorporated in 
Tanzania under the Companies ordinance, 1931. Though both. categories of 
enterprises share certain features and are subject to uniform controls - as 
will appear later - companies alone are subject to the provisions of the 
Companies ordinance, and the body of rules applicable to them (not necessarily 
related to control) is much larger in comparison to public corporations. 
`lash Ghai summari. ses2 the features common to Tanzania's companies and 
corporations, and the essential differences in the degree of control brought 
about by dissimilar legal forms as follows (a) the feature that the corporation 
and company share is their distance from the government. They are distinct 
1. Yash Ghai (. ed. ), Law in the Political Economy etc., op. cit. p. 206. 
2. Ibid. 2 p. 217.. 
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legal categories and are not subject to the rules which govern the 
administration. They are therefore, much more able to operate in a 
businesslike manner. (b) The differences between them is that the 
company is, almost exclusively, governed by what is essentially a 
regime of private law which regulates its establishment, management 
and dissolution. The corporation on the other' hand, is subject to 
some of the rules of administrative bodies. 
As mentioned earlier, N. I. C. was a company registered under 
the Companies Ordiance 1931 (a piece of legislation largely framed 
on the lines of the Imperial Companies Act, (G. B. ) 1929). In fact, 
N. I. C. stands as one of the few enterprises in Tanzania which are 
companies wholly owned by the government directly i. e. not being 
subsidiaries owned by other corporations or companies. 
) Nationali- 
zation had no effect on its corporate character. The share capital 
owned by foreign companies (49 per cent of the share capital) was 
taken over by the state and vested in the Treasury Registrar which 
is a corporation sole as mentioned earlier. In the light of summary 
given above of the features of companies. and corporations, it becomes 
clear to us that N. I. C. is subject to a much wider body of rules than most 
enterprises - being subject to the provisions of the Public Corporations Act, 
19692, and the Companies Ordinance. The Companies Ordinance, however had provided 
1. James and Ligunya mention other companies such as Tanesco and Workers 
Development Corporations established by Nuta, see R. W. James and S. 
Ligunya, "Organizational Relationship and the Control of Paras tatal s 
in Tanzania", E. A. L. R. Vol. 5, No. 1 & 2,1972, p. 45. 
2. Act No. 17 of 1969. 
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for some consequences which were to follow a reduction in the number of 
members of a company below two shareholders: firstly, such reduction 
constituted a ground for winding up a company by court. 
' Secondly, under 
the Companies Ordinance, when such a reduction occurs and a company carries 
on business for more than six months, then every person who is a member 
of the company during the time that it so carries business after those six 
months is severally liable for the payment of the whole debts of the 
company contracted during that time. 
2 
These provisions were taken care of 
by the Insurance Act which provided that: 
3 
Every provision in any written law or in the Articles of 
Association of the corporation providing for an act or 
thing to be done, or entitling any person to do any act 
or thing or take any action whatsoever as a result of a 
reduction in the number of members of the corporation 
below a certain number, shall be of no effect in relation 
to the corporation. 
But although amended, and as will follow later, rendered in-operative 
in some substantial areas, the Companies Ordinance is an important 
instrument for the control of N. I. C. It derives this importance from the 
fact that the Insurance Act has fallen short of providing a comprehensive 
and detailed set of regulations over the corporation. -In fact it is 
difficult to see how the Insurance Act is relevant to the corporation now 
as most of its provisions were so phrased as to deal with the conditions of 
I. S. 167(_D) of the Comapnies Ordinance 
2. S. 29 of the Companies Ordinance 
3. S. 4 of the Companies Ordinance 
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the market pending the cessation of the foreign insures' business in the 
country. A careful reading of the Act suggests this conclusion. The Act 
speaks of two categories of insurers (a) The corporation, and (b) 'an insurer... 
or person who, in the case of life insurance,... was an insurer prior to the 
effective date. '1 The corporation is defined as the National Insurance 
Corporation 2 to which reference is made only in provisions dealing with 
the transfer of shares to the Treasury Registrar, 
3 
with the cancellation of 
the effect of some provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 
4 the duties of the 
corporation after nationalization, 
5 
and the creation of a monopoly for N. I. C. 
with respect to li fe6 and non-life insurance business 
7 in the country. An 
insurer on the other hand, is defined as 'a person, firm, company or 
association of brokers carrying on insurance business. '8 These were the 
insurers permitted to compete with the corporation in respect of non-life 
business until the first of January 1968. 
1. S. 16(1) and S. 17(1) of the Insurance Act. Section 18(1) which deals 
with the power of the Minister to appoint a receiver, 'speaks of 'an 
insurer or former insurer' and S. 19, which provides for a penalty for 
the contravention of the Act, speaks of a 'company, co-operative society 
or other body of persons corporate or unincorporate'. 
2. S. 2 
3.5.3. 
4. S. 4 
5. S. 7 
6. S. 8 
7. S. 13 
8. S. 2. 
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Under the Insurance Act these were subject to some degree of control by 
the Minister of Finance who had powers under the Act to demand information, ' 
to require the deposit of securities, 
2 
and to appoint a receiver of the 
assets and liabilities of an insurer. 
3 
The provisions empowering the 
Minister so to act do not refer to the corporation. As far as the 
corporation was concerned the only purpose of the Act was to make it the 
sole insurer in mainland Tanzania. 
4 
Thus unlike in the Sudan, insurance regulation in Tanzania is not based 
on a code upon which the state control of the industry is solely dependent. 
This situation is not unique to Tanzania. In countries where insurance is 
nationalized, insurance concerns are set up directly under the control of 
the Ministry of Finance or Treasury, as the case may be, which directs the 
affairs of the concerns through directives and other regulations without 
an intermediary regulation code. Nationalization has created-in such 
markets 'a situation necessitating legislation different from that for the 
supervision of private concerns'. 
5 This is, as in the case of Tanzania, 
1. S. 16(1) 
2. S. 17(1) 
3. S. 18(1) 
4. Interview with Mr. K. Makani of N. I. C., Dar es Salaam, August, 1979. 
5. UNCTAD Secretariat, 'Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing 
Countries', op. cit. p. 79. 
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often an instrument bringing the industry under state control without 
necessarily providing for detailed regulations to govern the conduct of 
business carried by the state-owned insurer. 1 And in some countries 
where the industry was nationalized insurance concerns were not made 
subject to the insurance supervisory authority which had existed before 
nationalization. 
2 
Insurance regulation statutes conventionally promulgated 
in free enterprise markets to regulate the industry do not seem to have the 
same degree of importance in nationalized markets. 
3 In the Tanzanian case, 
the body of rules applicable to N. I. C. and designed to bring it under control 
should, therefore, be sought elsewhere than within the confines of the 
Insurance Act which, as we have seen above, was no more than an interim 
instrument the primary function of which was to regulate the market in the 
transitional period before N. I. C. became the sole insurer in mainland Tanzania. 
This confirms the importance of the Companies Ordinance as a means of 
control over N. I. C. However, much of the Ordinance appears to have no 
practical relevance to the corporation now. Regulations related to the 
allotment of shares, 
4 
commissions in respect of subscription of shares, 
5 
1. Ibid., pp. 79-84. 
2. For example, in Ceylon, ibid. p. 83 
3. S. A. Fonkam, State Supervision of Insurance Companies in Cameroun: 
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (London, 1980), pp. 334-46. 
4. SS. 40-43 
5. SS. 44-45. 
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issue of shares, transfer of shares and debentures2 and regulations 
related to the number of directors, 3 were all made superflows consequent 
upon the acquisition of the corporation's share capital by the state. 
And although the shares are now wholly vested in the Treasury Registrar, 
the state in Tanzania seldom invokes the Treasury Registrar Ordinance 
(under which it could exercise powers as a shareholder) to control public 
enterprises. 
4 But, in a sense, the government assumes the function of 
the general meeting by appointing N. I. C. 's board members and dismissing 
them. The power to appoint a corporation's management and to issue 
directives to it (see below) constitute some of the most important 
aspects of state control over an enterprise. The Chief Executive of 
the Corporation is appointed by the President who has powers under the 
Public Corporations Act, 1969 to do so. 
6 Other members of the 
1. S. 49 
2. SS. 63-79 
3. SS. 140-48 
4. Yash Ghai (ed. ) Law in the Political Economy, op. cit. p. 216. 
5. Yash Ghai, "Fishery Parastatals in Developing Countries", a mimeo, 
1981. 
6. S. 5(1) of the Act provides that 'the president shall, by order 
published in the Gazette, provide for the management of every 
public corporation established under the provisions of this Act'. 
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board of directors are appointed by the Minister as was seen above. 
Also, under the Public Corporations Act, the Presi dent'may give to the 
Board of Directors of any public corporation, or any other person 
entrusted with the management of the corporation, directions of a 
general or specific character as to the exercise and performance by 
such Board or such person of their or his functions, and such Board or 
person shall give effect to any such directions'. 
1 This power may 
be delegated to any person chosen by the President 
29 
and in practice 
the Minister of Finance issues directives on a very wide range of 
matters. 
3 Ministerial directives are addressed to the Chief Executive 
of the Corporation (and not to the Board of Directors) and are immediately 
implemented. 4 
1. S. 6 
2. S. 11(1) of the Act reads 'The President shall not delegate any of 
his powers under this Act to any person in accordance with the 
provisions of this section. 
3. A. W. Bradley, "The Nationalization of companies in Tanzania", 
supra. p. 217. 
4. Interview with Mr. K. Makani, of N. I. C., Dar es Salaam, August, 
1979. 
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Increasingly, a body of rules applicable to all public enterprises, 
whether companies or corporations, is emerging and with the progress of time 
legal barriers are eroded in order to make control by the planning machinery, 
the Party, Parliament and other sources of control, more far-reaching in 
scope. One of the earliest developments which necessitated the harmonization 
of the various institutional forms of enterprises for the purposes of 
uniform control was the establishment of the standing Committee on Parastatal 
Organization 1 (SCOPO) in 1967. The committee was established administratively 
by the President and its functions were to eliminate salary differentials 
in the public sector (salary disparities existed between the government sector 
and the parastatal sector), to establish procedures for the transfer of staff 
from one corporation to another, and to ensure proper training programmes 
for the needs of the public sector. 
2 For the guidance of the committee, a 
parastatal organization was defined as 'an institution, organization or 
1. Referred to after as 'the committee' 
2. Yash Ghai (ed. ) Law in the Political Economy, op. cit. p. 249. 
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agency which is wholly or mainly financed or owned and controlled by the 
Government. The criterion of such public enterprise would be ownership by 
the Government of 50 per cent or more of the capital shares, or other forms 
of governmental participation and effective influence in all the main 
aspects of management of the enterprise: 
' 
The committee has, so far, 
issued several directives to a large number of enterprises - N. I. C. included - 
a task which was made easier by the harmonization of the various instititutional 
forms of enterprises. In 1973, the entire parastatal sector was brought more 
under the grip of the state by the establishment of the Inspectorate for Control 
and Supervision of Parastratal Fund under the Parastatal Organisation (Financial 
Supervision and Control) Act2,1975. The Inspectorate was empowered to3: 
(a) examine the expenditure of parastatal funds by the various parastatal 
organizations and their employees, (b) to investigate the conduct and the 
performance of their functions by the officers having control of or access 
to the funds of parastatal organizations, (c) to review financial regulations 
of parastatal organizations and submit proposals to the Minister of Finance 
for ways and means of minimizing unproductive expenditure of parastatal funds, 
of efficient allocation of funds, and of averting loss by negligence or 
carelessness, and finally, to undertake such other enquiry and perform such 
function as the Ministry of Finance may direct. 
1. R. W. Jamesand S. Ligunya, "Organizational Relationships and Control of 
Parastatals in Tanzania", Supra., p. 44. 
2. Act No. 16 of 1975 
3. S. 3(4) of the Parastatal Organization Act, 1975. 
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Some degree of control over the parastatal sector is also possible 
through the provision of professional services such as legal advice and 
audit services. Legal advice is furnished to the parastatals through 
the Tanzania Legal Corporation. This Corporation. is under the Control of the 
Attorney-General who has powers to give general directives to the personnel 
of the corporation who deal with parastatal problems. These directives are 
likely to reinforce a 'tendency towards compliance with the law and official 
guide lines'1 by the entire public sector which seeks legal services. Audit 
services are also available to parastatals2 through the Tanzania Audit 
Corporation, established under the Tanzania Audit Corporation Act, 
3 1968. 
The main function of the corporation is to provide 'audit services and services 
ancillary or incidental thereto, including advisory and accounting services. 
4 
The corporation is under the direction of the Controller' and Auditor-General 
who may, 'after consultation with the Board {of" the coroprationh, give to 
the Board directions as to the exercise and performance of the functions of 
the corporation'5 and the Board shall 'give effect to any such directions'. 
6 
The centralization of audit services can help 'towards a better use of service 
resources as well as the imposition of uniform standards:? 
1. Yash Ghai (ed. ), o . cit. p. 246. 
These are specified in the First Schedule to the Act which covers 24 
corporations, and in the Second Schedule which covers 21 companies. 
3. Act No. 1 of 1968 
4. The Tanzania Audit Corporation Act, 1968, S. 4(1). 
5. Ibid., S. 6(1) 
6. Ibid. 
7. Yash Ghai (ed. ) op. cit., p. 247. 
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Chief among the methods of control of N. I. C. and other parastatals by 
the Tanzanian state is the planning machinery. It is no longer possible, 
as it appears, for parastatals to resist interference by the Planning 
Ministry, and their relative autonomy in the sphere of planning, a phenomenon 
of the late 60s and early 70s1 Out see below) has been eroded a great deal. 
The significance of the plan for the parastatal sector centres around the 
existence, in the plan, of strategies and programmes which have a direct 
bearing on the business of enterprises such as investment, output, 
productivity targets and broad national objectives2 etc. The Minister of 
Finance and Planning regularly issues planning guide-lines which are 
discussedand approved by the Economic Committee of the Cabinet. These are 
then distributed to parastatals - N. I. C. included - which prepare their plans, 
discuss them with the Ministry of Finance and Planning, and subsequently 
submit final drafts to the Ministry. 
3. And to secure maximum adherence to 
the planning machinery, the Finance Act, 1974 required all parastatals which 
are also companies such as N. I. C., to submit annually to the Treasury 
Registrar their projected production and investment levels. 
4 
The proposed 
financial operations of an enterprise are subject to review by the Treasury 
Registrar in consultation with Sectoral Ministers. This review must consider 
(a) the adequacy, feasibility and realism of the proposed financial and physical 
results, (b) the standard of the past and proposed financial management and 
1. In the Economic Survey of 1970/71 (Tanzania), the Planning Ministry 
admitted that parastatals were : 'largely outside attempts at socialist 
planning of the economy; investment decisions are made essentially the 
same way as in the private sector of an unplanned economy', p. 90, 
quoted by John Loxley and John Saul, 'The Political Economy of the 
Parastatals', E. A. L. R. Vol. 5, No. 1&2,1972. p. 18. 
2. M. S. S. El-Namaki, Problems of Management in a Developing Environment, 
(ELsevier: North Holland Publishing Co., 1979)-, - p. 104. 
3. Ibid., pp. 108-110, see Fig. VI at p. 110. 





budgetary control and (c), the consistency or otherwise of the proposed 
operations with the national planning and policy objectives, with particular 
reference to fiscal, credit, surplus generation and output expansion 
objectives. 
I However, it should not be understood from this brief account 
that the immense problems of planning in Tanzania have been done away with. 
2 
There are still major problems such as poor level implementation resulting 
from the weakness, or lack of, the implementation strategy in the plan 
itself. 3 But undoubtedly, unlike the Sudanese insurance industry which 
as discussed in Chapter Three, is virtually free from planning regulations, 
N. I. C. appears to be well integrated into the economic plan of Tanzania, 
just as other enterprises are. 
There are, yet, other forms of control and supervision over public 
enterprises. One such control is exercised by the Party. As early as 1971 
Mwongozo (the Party guide-line) had provided the party with a role, though 
not sufficiently well-defined, in the control of public enterprises. This 
role was confined to ensuring that ' parastatal s do not spend money extravagantly 
on items which do not contribute to the development of the economy as a whole. '4 
The case of the Kharada (mentioned in the last chapter) substantiates the sort 
of action which the party in Tanzania could take in influencing decisions taken 
by public enterprises. The Kharada announced a scheme to provide finance for the 
purchases of private vehicles by the party and government leaders and senior 
civil servants. The National Executive Council of the party criticized the 
1. S. 30(3) of the Finance Act 1974. 
2. See G. F. Mbowe, 'Project Implementation and Control: A Critical Problem in 
Public Enterprises in Tanzania', Public Enterprise, Vol. 1, No. 1,1980, 
pp. 57-65. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Para. 33. 
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scheme as being utterly inconsistent with Tanzania's declared policies of 
socialism and self-reliance. The Kharada had no option but to cancel 
the scheme. 
' In 1975, Tanzania's Interim Constitution of 1965 was amended2 
to provide that 'all political activity in Tanzania shall be conducted by 
or under the auspices of the Party [and] the functions of all organs of the 
state..... shall be performed under the auspices of the Party. '3 At the 
present control by the Party over public enterprises centres around: (a) 
control over the entire range of operational activities undertaken by a 
public enterprise, (_b) representation of the Party in intra-company debates 
by Party commissars (. 
-there 
is a high-ranking Party official in every 
public enterprise), (_c) participation in decision-making regarding the 
employment of foreigners, (d) settling of industrial disputes, and (e) 
reviewing the financial conditions of an enterprise as reflected in its 
financial statements. The Party representatives in N. I. C., and other 
4 
officials with close links with the Party, have recently criticized a call 
by some bureaucrats to move the corporation's headquarters to the more 
grandiose 'investment house' (see below), and it is unlikely that the 
corporation will move head offices. 
5 
1. Yash Ghai (ed. ) op. cit., p. 232 
2. An Act to amend the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965, 
No. 8 1975. 
3. Ibid., S. 3. 
4. M. S. El-Namaki, Problems of Management in a Developing Environment, 
Supra., pp. 43-4. 
5. Interview with Mr. D. S. Mashiku of N. I. C., Dar es Salaam, August, 1979. 
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The amendment to the Constitution which made the Party supreme was 
not to affect the legal status of the National Assembly (the Tanzanian 
parliament) which shares with the President the power to legislate. 1 In 
practice, however, the Tanzanian Parliament does not appear to have an 
effective or systematic role in the regulation or control of public 
enterprises. And whatever role it plays is not a direct regulatory one 
upon enterprises, but upon the Ministers under whose responsibilities 
the parastatals function. It is a 'control over controllers'. 
2 One of 
the few incidents in which Parliament intervened directly in the affairs 
of an enterprise concerned the State Trading Corporation (S. T. C. ) which 
in the early 1970s was the subject of a public outcry caused by shortages 
of consumer goods. In 1972, Parliament formed a committee to investigate 
the affairs of the corporation. The committee was very critical of the 
corporation which was subsequently abolished al together. As far as N. I. C. 
3 
is concerned Parliament has not been a source of control so far. 
1. As Nyrere himself observed 'The ... constitutional changes have not taken away a single power conferred by the Constitution on either the 
National Assembly or the President. The Laws of this country are 
still made by the Parliament i. e. the National Assembly and the 
President'. A speech in Parliament on 18th July, 1975, quoted by 
EL-Namaki, op. cit., p. 245. 
2. Yash Ghai (ed. ) op. cit, p. 253 
3. Ibid., p. 254. 
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To conclude this part although Tanzania lacks an insurance regulation code, 
there are many, albeit not unlimited, avenues for state control of N. I. C. The 
most important aspects of control centre around the appointment of N. I. C's 
top management, the issue of directives, and the incorporation into the 
development plan of the corporation's investment and projected level of 
capital formation. Not only is state control of N. I. C. sufficiently 
far-reaching, but the corporation, together with the National Bank of 
Commerce (N. B. C. ), are important institutions in the hands of the state 
through which the most effective method of control upon other enterprises 
i. e. the allocation of funds, is exercised. 
' 
In the remaining parts of this chapter we shall see how this comprehensive 
control of insurance (, in comparison with the Sudan) has influenced the 
chances of Tanzania in utilizing its insurance industry for the purposes of 
economic and social development. Other forms of control under the Companies 
Ordinance, by the Central Bank of Tanzania and the Ministry of Finance will 
be discussed in the appropriate places. 
V. The Effects of Insurance Nationalization on Tanzania's Economy: 1970-1977. 
(A) Insurance and Capital Formation 
(1) Non-Life Insurance 
When N. I. C. transacted business for the first time its portfolio consisted 
of the usual risks covered under familiar policies such as fire, marine cargo, 
personal accident, public liability, etc. Complicated business transactions 
such as marine hull, professional indemnity, custom and excise bonds, contract 
1. Ibid., pp. 239-40, see also Yash Ghai, 'Fishery Parastatals in Developing 
Countries', Supra., p. 103. 
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bonds and engineering risks were introduced gradually at varying periods. 
l 
After nationalization the corporation was required to handle the entire 
nation's business, but its underwriting capacity could only accommodate 
the country's business at great costs. In its first 3 months of business 
the corporation's managemnt expenses amounted to over 54 per cent of its 
gross premiums compared with 25-30 per cent level of expenses in other 
parts of East Africa. 
2 Nevertheless, the corporation's contribution to 
capital formation was spectacular. In the first three years following 
nationalization, a surplus of Shs. 82 m. was made despite the initial 
administrative and technical problems such as the lack of manpower (there 
were only 60 employees in the service of the corporation in 1967), lack of 
experience in new branches and the problems of dealing with unfamiliar 
agents. 
3 One of the serious problems encountered was the problem of 
premium rationalization. 
4 We have seen earlier, that foreign insurers 
cancelled most of their policies without allowing for a proportionate refund. 
Some policyholders chose to continue their covers with the corporation but 
the latter had a hard time trying to fix adequate premiums. The corporation 
could have charged each policyholder the same rate for fire premiums or 
liability premiums, etc previously charged by his foreign insurer. But the 
corporation would have rendered itself open to criticism for charging 
dissimilar rates for similar risks as foreign insurers had not adhered to any 
tariff in respect of any branch of business. 
5 
1. Lecture given by Mr. R. Vaidya (then General Manager of N. I. C. ) on, 'Insurance 
in Tanzania', quoted by E. M. Tango, 'Effects of Nationalization on Insurance 
Business i. n Tanzania: Law and Practice', a paper submitted to the Faculty of 
Law, University of Dar es Salaam, (undated), p. 4. 
2. John Loxley, 'Structural Change in the Monetary System of Tanzania', 
o . cit., pp. 107-8. 
3. The Review, No. 15,1 March, 1975, p. 13, also Mr. Vaidya 'Insurance in 
Tanzania' quoted by Tango, 'Effects of Nationalization on Insurance Business 
in Tap - 4. Ibid. 
5.1 bd. 
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A remarkable rate of progress has been recorded by the miscellaneous 
insurance department since 1967. Between 1970-1977, its general fund, 
including technical reserves, has increased from Shs. 2.6 m. to Shs. 11 m. 
in 19771, and the premium income has increased sixfold from Shs. 5.4 m. in 
1970 to Shs. 29.6 m. in 1977 (_see Table 9 below). The motor insurance 
branch has not been a successful one for N. I. C. While all claims of all 
non-life branches stood at Shs. 200 m. between 1967-1974, a sum of nearly 
Shs. 150m. was paid in respect of motor vehicle accidents alone. 
2 This 
branch has also been the least important of the non-life departments in 
terms of reinsurance earnings or commissions as these have not exceeded Shs. 
828.000 in any one year, indeed, that was the highest sum earned during 
the whole period of 1970-1977 (see Table 10 below). Fire insurance has 
developed, perhaps, more than any other branch of non-life business. Fire 
premiums stood at Shs. 11.3m in 1970, but rose .. to over Shs. 41m. by 1977, 
while fire reinsurance commissions amounted to Shs. 27.5m. during 1970-77 
(See Table 11 below). Finally, the marine insurance branch has also recorded 
an extremely high rate of growth. Its premium income has increased from 
Shs. 2.9m. in 1970 to Shs. 33.4m. in 1977, and its total premiums during the 
period 1970-1977, amounted to Shs. 66m. (see Table 12 below). The dramatic 
increase in the premium income of this department during 1973/74 and afterwards 
was due to the fact that the drought of 1973/74 and the adverse cl imatic condi tions 
in Tanzania have resulted in higher food imports which were insured by the 
corporation. 3 
1. Annual Reports of N. I. C. 1972-1977. 
2. The Daily News (Tanzania) 23, July, 1976. 
3. Annual Report for 1974, p. 13. 
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TABLE NO. 9 
The Growth of Miscelleneous Insurance Business in Tanzania 
1970-1977 
(T. Shs. 000) 
Year Premiums Reinsurance Commissions Surplus 
1970/71 5,419 3,094 
1971/72 5,513 3,397 
1973 11,067 3,450 
1974 12,954 4,340 
1975 15,807 5,354 
1976 18,828 4,791 








Source: N. I. C. 's Annual Reports, 1972-1977. 
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TABLE NO.. 10 
The Growth of Motor Insurance Business in Tanzania (1970 - 1977) 
(T. Shs. 000) 
Year Premiums Reinsurance Commissions Surplus or 
profit 
1970/71 30,955 516 997 
1971/72 35,935 201 -1,641 
1973 26,514 621 - 638 
1974 31,009 559 176 
1975 37,144 828 1,766 
1976 49,661 658 1,417 
1977 70,228 625 3,804 
Source: Annual Reports of N. I. C. 1972-1977. 
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TABLE NO. 11 
The Growth of Fine Insurance Business in Tanzania (1970-1977) 
(T. Shs. 000) 
Year Premiums Reinsurance Commissions Surplus 
1970/71 11,325 2,518 5,544 
1971/72 12,700 3,583 5,015 
1973 14,314 2,388 7,940 
1974 16,406 3,162 7,013 
1975 22,100 3.925 8,799 
1976 30,816 5.992 10,605 
1977 41,529 : 7,080 
15,931 
Source: Annual Reports of N. I. C. 197 2-1977 . 
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TABLE NO. 12 
The Growth of Marine Business in Tanzania (1970 - 1977) 
(T. Shs. 000) 
Year Premiums Reinsurance Commissions Surplus 
1970/71 2,996 1,551 1,594 
1971/72 3,793 2,600 1,948 
1973 3,687 2,720 1,020 
1974 12,007 4,041 - 904 
1975 16,669 6,604 2,903 
1976 17,097 5,791 6,538 
1977 33,412 5,080 1,034 
Source: Annual Reports of N. I. C., 1970-1977. 
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2. Life Insurance Business 
The number of life insurance policies issued by the corporation 
increased dramatically after the exclusive franchise of life business was 
granted to the corporation in 1967. These rose from only 2526 in 1966/67 
to 6764 immediately after nationalization although, as mentioned earlier, 
the life portfolios of foreign agencies were not transferred to the 
corporation and as a result a number of policies issued by foreign insurers 
are still held by Tanzanians. At the end of 1976, N. I. C. had a life 
portfolio of 59,516 policies in force. 
1 The type of life policies issued 
by the corporation are similar to those issued by any life insurer anywhere 
in East Africa. The corporation provides whole life policies, temporary 
assurance, family protection policies, endowment assurance, anticipated 
endowment assurance, and annuities or fixed term policies. The business of 
group life and pension schemes (which are included in the life portfolio) 
have also increased in volume. The schemes comprise: group term assurance, 
group endowment assurance, deferred annuities, and self-employed annuities. 
2 
Net life insurance premiums have also increased substantially as they rose 
from Shs. 13.1 m. in 1970 to Shs. 71.4 m. in 1977 ( See Table 13 below). 
Recently, however, life insurance business has responded unfavourably (from 
the point of view of the corporation) to Tanzania's inflationary conditions. 
The volume of total surrenders increased from Shs. 0.9m in 1973 to Shs. 1.5m. 
in 1974, and at the end of 1977, it stood at Shs. 5.4m. 
3 Adverse economic 
conditions have also resulted in an increase of life insurance purchases as 
many a policyholder has taken out his policy in the hope of obtaining a future 
loan. 4 
1. Annual Report for 1976, p. 14, see also the Insurance Industry in Tanzania: 
10th Year Independence Anniversary, Sura , p. 23. 2. Interview with Mr. Radman Mongi of N. I. C. July, 1979, also annual reports 
of ^Tr -- --ý 
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TABLE NO. 13 
The Growth of Life Assurance Business in Tanzania (1970-1977) 
(Figures in T. shs. 000) 
Year Net Premiums Claims Surplus 
1970/71 13,126 623 471 
1971/72 19,095 971 1,288 
1973 18,326 1,300 999 
1974 23,501 946 1,533 
1975 35,969 3,306 2,659 
1976 48,753 4,428 3,851 
1977 71,407 5,184 5,400 
Source: Annual Reports of N. I. C. 1972-1977. 
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Thus as in non-lifeinsurance so in life insurance, there were 
windfall gains from the nationalization of insurance in Tanzania. Total 
net premiums earned by the corporation in respect of all branches stood 
at nearly Shs. 250m. by 1977. And as will appear later from the examination 
of the corporation's investment policy, the lion's share of the income is 
made available to the government either directly or indirectly. But the 
accumulation of capital by the corporation is not without its own problems. 
Two major points may be considered here. Firstly, the reason for the 
enormous growth of the insurance premium income in Tanzania, especially of 
the non-life business, is to be found in the vast expansion of the public 
sector in terms of output and investment. The magnitude of exposure to 
risk by the parastatals is well substantiated by the economic weight given 
the parastatal sector in the country's development plans. In the second 
Five Year Plan issued in 1969, for example, the parastatal sector was 
planned to contribute 84 per cent of total investment and 79 per cent of total 
output; and in the Third Five Year Plan 1976-1981 (which ceased to be a 
guide to action) estimates for parastatal revenue indicated that a leading 
role was assigned for parastatals upon which the task of the socio-economic 
transformation is no doubt dependent. 
) In practice parastatals seek the 
protection of N. I. C. through their parent- Ministries which arrange cover for 
them, and it appears that a large part of N. I. C's non-life portfolio consists 
of parastatal risks. 
2 In effect, premiums paid by parastatals are no more 
than transfers of cash made from one parastatal to the other. Insurance of 
parastatals, therefore, involves unnecessarily prolonged procedures and 
1. W. Edmund Clark, op cit., ssim. 
2. John Loxley, "The Monetary System of Tanzania since 1967: Progress, 
Problems and Prospects', in Kim et al. op. cit., p. 129. 
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enormous administrative costs. 
' Loxley has recently argued that an alternative 
method of cover for parastatal risks is called for. By simply 'making their 
own provision for an insurance reserve (i. nvested in Government paper) and 
by adding to this annually to offset losses or to allow for a growth in the 
stock of physical assets, parastatals would be saved much of the huge 
volume of administrative work involved in taking out insurance cover for their 
multitudinous risks and in making claims for losses. '2 Loxley's argument 
essentially questions the relevance of the existence of a state-owned insurer 
to which government or other public sector risks are transferred. This 
argument is examined thoroughly in the concluding chapter of this thesis, 
suffice it to say here that, apparently, a large part (not known precisely) 
of the capital accumulated by N. I. C. is actually contributed by other 
parastatals. The second major problem concerning the accumulation of capital 
by the corporation is the high cost of management and the high commissions 
which, particularly in non-life business, eat up a large portion of the 
accumulated fund (see Table 14 below). We have seen earlier that in the 
first 8 months after nationalization management expenses ate over half of the 
corporation's income. The life branch contributed a lot to high costs in the 
early 70s. In 1969/70, for example, the expenses of 'first year covers' stood 
at 60 per cent of the premium income with a renewal cost of 14 per cent, but 
in 1971/72 the same increased to 67 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. 
3 
Many avenues are open for the upper-rank bureaucrats to spend part of the 
accumulated surplus; and the business profits are, sometimes, directly 
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corporation and the general manager have full financial powers to spend 
any amount of money for entertainment, and the same privileges, albeit 
to varying degrees, are also open for managers, chief accountants, and 
senior officials. 
' 
Thus N. I. C. does not appear to be different from other 
parastatals in the Tanzania the resources of which 'have been diverted and 
continue to be diverted toward not only fringe benefits for individuals 
but toward headquarters' expenditures as symbols of status and prestige'. 
2 
The erosive impact of salary increases upon the accumulated fund was well 
illuminated by a decline of profits of the fire business in 1974 despite 
an increase of 15 per cent in the premium income. This was due I an all 
round increase in the administrative expenses as a result of large increases 
of wage and salaries! 
3 
B. Insurance Investment 
Of all business practices presently adhered to by N. I. C. none bears 
a stronger affinity to the pre-Arusha period than the corporation's investment 
practices. All that has changed over the years was the volume of investment 
and, hence the amount of funds channelled into each area of investment. 
The amount of money invested by the corporation increased from only 
Shs. 2.9m. 
in June 1966, to Shs. 122.7 m. by June 19774 a remarkable increase, no doubt. 
1. N. I. C. Schedule of Financial Powers, 19781, p. 12. 
2. Philip C. Packard, 'Management and Control of Parastatal Organizations', 
Development and Change, Vol. III, 1971/72, p. 69. 
3. Annual Report of N. I. C. for 1974, p. 13. 
4. Annual Reports of N. I. C. for 1977, p. 16. 
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By 1977, the corporation had invested a total of nearly Shs. 530m. 1 Funds 
are invested in government stocks, short-term deposits in banks, building 
projects, equities in other-parastatals, loans on mortgages, loans on 
policies and letters of credit, in this order of importance (see Table 15 
below). Investment income or returns from investment increased with a rate 
fairly parallel to the increase of the volume of investments. These rose 
from nearly Shs. 2m. to Shs. 19m. between 1968/69 and1977 (see Table 16). 
The most basic characteristic of N. I. C. is that it is a finance 
institution to the Tanzanian Treasury. A close look at the corporation's 
investment policy leads to no other conclusion. About 80 per cent of the 
corporation's investment fund in any one year is directly or indirectly 
made available to the Treasury, and consequently, to other enterprises. In 
June 1977, about 57.8 per cent of insurance investment went into government 
stocks (a total of Shs. 230m. was invested by N. I. C. in government stocks 
by that date, see Table 15 below), and 32.9 per cent went into the banking 
system as short term deposits. Bank deposits are made available to the govern- 
ment which owns all the banks and is, no doubt, the principal borrower from 
the banking system. Direct taxes upon the corporation also increased from 
Shs. 5m. in 1970/71 to Shs. 20m. by 1977; and dividends to shareholders (the 
Treasury Registrar) stood at Shs. 2m. in 1977 alone. 
2 The corporation rates 
high among non-bank domestic finance institutions. The most important of these 
is the Provident Fund which contributed 68 per cent of total non-bank funds in 
1973/74; this was followed by government sinking funds which put another 18 
per cent, and N. I. C. which contributed 10 per cent. 
3 
1. Ibid. 
2. Annual Reports of N. I. C., 1972-77. 
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TABLE NO. 16 
Investment income of N. I. C. (1968-1977) 





















Source: Annual Reports of N. I. C. (1972-1977) 
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The utilization of N. I. C. by the state as a tool for fiscalcontrol 
over other enterprises was discussed earlier. The Minister of Finance 
has wide powers to direct the manner in which the accumulated capital 
could be disposed of, whether in the interest of other enterprises 
through allocation of funds by the Treasury or through other means. He 
may direct the corporation to pay to the government as dividend or con- 
tribution such portion of its net profits or surplus in any one year as 
he may direct. 
l He may, in consultation with the corporation, make 
financial regulations in relation to the management of the corporation's 
funds. 2 He may also specify the areas in which funds should be invested 
and the portion to be invested. 
3 
Thus the extent to which the corporation 
could be utilized as a capital accumulation agency is largely controlled 
by the state. And apart from the differences in the juridical ownership 
of the insurance institution this constitutes the second most essential 
difference between the Tanzanian insurance industry and its Sudanese 
counterpart. But this power to direct the investment of the corporation 
is not used to prevent investment in real estate which no doubt, yields fat 
returns. Indeed, of late (in 1980) the corporation has set aside a sum of 
Shs. 78.4m. for giant building projects in urban areas in the country4 
(these will be discussed later) - obviously with the consent of the upper 
ranks of the Ministry of Finance. Nor has state power been used to compel 
the corporation to invest in rural areas or i: n ujamaa villages which do not 
yield comparable yields. 
5 Indeed, as will appear from the discussion below, 
1. The Parastatal Organization (Fi. nancial Control and Supervision) Act, 1975, 
S. 5(1). 
2. Ibid. 
3. The Companies (Regulation of Dividends, and Surpluses and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1972, S. 3(1)_ and S. 11(_2). 
4. Ngao (N. I. C's Quarterly Magazine), No. 12, March, 1980, p. 1. 
5. Issa G. Shivji, "Insurance and Development , Supra , p. 168. 
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despite the government's actual and potential powers to control the corpor- 
ation an attempt to relate the corporation's investment. policy to Tanzania's 
goals of achieving socialism is like the attempt to marry a square peg to 
a round hole - the two cannot maintain a happy union. 
C. Insurance in the Balance of Payments of Tanzania 
Undoubtedly, the nationalization of insurance has had a positive effect 
on Tanzania's balance of payments as the transfer of premiums by the foreign 
agencies abroad was almost brought to an end. It was not brought to a complete 
end once and for all because, as we have seen earlier, the take over of N. I. C. 
by the state was not accompanied by a compulsory transfer of the foreign 
insurers life portfolios to the corporation. As a result, some policies 
(their number is not known to the writer) are still held by Tanzanians and 
premiums are still collected by the agents and brokers who had solicited 
business for the agencies. Apparently, the agencies are still represented 
in Nairobi which is. the destination of premiums paid by Tanzanian policy- 
holders. In 1974, however, the Minister of Finance made a Notice1 to 
the effect that 96 per cent of the net premium income of the agencies2 which 
have subsisting obligations in the country should be invested as deposits in 
NBC or in approved securities as the Minister may require. 
3 Premiums so 
deposited may not be released, pledged, mortgaged or otherwise used as a 
security, sold transferred or disposed of. 
4 The income deriving from such 
1. Insurance (Investment of Premiums) Notice, 1975. This was passed 
under S. 20 of the Insurance Act. 
2. The schedule to the Notice Lists 11 foreign (mostly British) companies. 
3. Insurance Notice, S. 3. 
4. S. 10(3)(a) of the Insurance Act.. 
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investment or deposit shall be, and remain invested or deposited as if 
it were premium income required to be deposited or invested 
1 
under the 
Notice referred to above. 
2 But when the assets of an insurer who has 
subsisting obligations in Tanzania exceed 110 per cent of such insurer's 
obligations, in the judgement of an actuary approved by the Minister, 
the above obligations do not apply3 and the accumulated premiums could be 
transferred abroad. Unfortunately, the volume of these premiums is unknown 
and, accordingly, the impact of the portion of life policies subsisting 
from the pre-Arusha period in the country's balance of payments (a negative 
one) is difficult to estimate. 
It was discussed earlier that some of the non-life business branches 
are sources of enormous commissions to N. I. C. The corporation, in fact, 
reinsures its own business until its capacity is exhausted and retrocedes 
the surplus abroad. These commissions are, therefore, retrocession commissions. 
4 
It follows that the greater the commissions earned the greater the sums remitted 
abroad. These commissions are the only guide to the volume of reinsurance 
leaving the country as the corporation's annual reports only mention incoming 
reinsurance and ignore the quota ceded abroad. The subject is surrounded 
by secrecy and all attempts to obtain even a rough estimate of the outgoing 
business have failed. 
5 
So far, however, reinsurance remittances seem to be 
increasing annually with respect to marine, fire and miscellaneous insurance, 
1. S. 10(3)(a) of the Insurance Act. 
2.5.10(3)(b) ibid. 
3" S. 10(4) ibid. 
Reinsurance and retrocession are used interchangeably and in the rest of 
this chapter 'reinsurance' is used to refer to both categories of trans- 
actions. 
5. I'm indebted to many friends in Tanzania who attempted to obtain the 
figures for me. 
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but not motor or life insurance businesses as the reinsurance earnings 
of N. I. C. indicate (see Table 17 below). The only information available 
about the corporation's outgoing business suggests that this was rather 
substantial in the immediate post-nationalization period. In 1968, for 
example, reinsurance transfers stood at 78 per cent of the premium income, 
but the figure was brought down to 67 per cent by 1972, and until 1974 
the average sum leaving Tanzania was between Shs. 16m. and Shs. 20m. 
1 
Comparing 1968 figures with 1972, it appears that fire insurance has 
reflected better results as the total ceded abroad was brought down from 81 
per cent of all earnings to 65.4 per cent (. see Table 18 below); marine re- 
insurance decreased from 88 per cent of gross premium to 74.4 per cent 
(Table 19); and miscellaneous reinsurance remained almost the same - around 
66 per cent of premium income (see Table 20). 
Apparently, outgoing reinsurance by N. I. C. _ 
is still large in volume. 
2 
The fact that the corporation's share capital has increased fivefold between 
1967 to 1977, from Shs. 2m. to Shs. 10m., or that the corporation is wholly 
owned by the government and is remarkably solvent as we will see later, 
do not seem to have quenched the corporation's thirst for reinsurance 
protection. The Central Bank of Tanzania which controls the allocation of 
foreign reserves to parastatals (with the Treasury), and the transfers of 
funds abroad does not appear to have been influential in reducing outgoing 
quotas. It was not until 1975, for example, that the Bank called upon 
importing agencies to import their goods on C&F basis; and its 'call' was 
more of a request than a binding order. 
3 And apparently, the Ministry of 
1. John Loxley, "Some Reflections on the Role and Effectiveness of N. I. C. ". 
Supra. 
2. Ibid., also Loxley, "The Monetary System of Tanzania Since 1967", Supra. 
3. Annual Report of N. I. C. for 1975, p. 13. 
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TABLE NO. 17 
Reinsurance earnings of N. I. C. (1970 - 1977) 
(T. Shs. 0001 
Year Life Motor 
. Insurance. 
Fire Marine Miscell. 
1970/71 055 515 2,518 1,552 3,094 
1971/72 029 201 3,583 2,600 3,397 
1973 336 621 2,387 2,721 3,451 
1974 124 559 3,163 4,042 4,341 
1975 087 828 3,925 6,604 5,354 
1976 003 658 5,992 5,791 4,791 
1977 006 625 7,080 7,080 8,656 
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Finance has no objection to the corporation's reinsurance practice which 
is seen as a way of keeping in business one of the 'main investors in the 
country. '1 In other words, the desire to reduce potential losses and 
to increase returns is readily reflected in the reliance upon western 
reinsurers, the object being to secure the involvement of reinsurers in 
underwriting the success of business. It is then possible for the 
corporation to remain in business as an insurer and a giant investor 
in the country. 
Speculation about an adverse reinsurance situation in Tanzania is 
inevitable. The omission, in the corporation's annual reports of out- 
going reinsurance and the emphasis on incoming cessions create the 
suspicion that the role of insurance in Tanzania's balance of payments 
is a negative one; but the extent of. this role must remain unearthed. The 
corporation, however, has earned considerable sums of money from abroad 
from companies which cede part of their portfolios to Tanzania. The inward 
portfolio has actually increased from nearly shs. 9m. in 1974 to over 
shs. 14m. by 1977 (see Table 21 below).. On the other hand, the retention 
capacity of the corporation has increased enormously and this is likely 
to result in much smaller outgoing cessions. Indeed, the capacity to 
1. J. Shenyangwa, "The Responsibility of the Reinsurance Directorate", 
Ngao, No. 6, September, 1977, p. 20. 
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TABLE NO. 21 
Reinsurance inflow to Tanzania 1974-1977 (T. shs. m. ) 











retain business has nearly doubled during the three year period ending 
in 1977 (See Table 22). Equally significant was the increase of the 
corporation's share capital five-fold between 1967-1977, an increase which 
was paralleled by the growth of the corporation's reserve fund from shs. 
2.3m. in 1970 to shs. 74.3m. by June, 1977.1 If claims by foreign cedants 
could be maintained at a level far below the volume ceded to Tanzania, 
and if the retention capacity could maintain its present rate of growth 
then, undoubtedly, the extraction of reinsurance surplus from Tanzania 
by western reinsurers could be diminished a great deal. The two way 
flow of reinsurance in and out of Tanzania constitutes the third most 
remarkable difference between Sudan and Tanzania. 
1. The Insurance Industry in Tanzania: 10th Year Independence 
Anniversary op. cit. p. 22, also Annual Report of N. I. C. for 
1977, pp. 9,10. 
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Year 
TABLE NO. 22 
The retention capacity of N. I. C. 
(T. Shs. m) 
Premiums booked in respect 









Source: Annual Reports of N. I. C. (1974-1977). 
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VI. The objectives of Insurance Nationalization : What Has Been Achieved? 
As we have seen earlier, no specific task was assigned to N. I. C. in 
order to contribute to the goals of socialism and self-reliance. The 
Insurance Act has simply assumed the existence, in Tanzania, of an 
established 'normal and proper' insurance practice in the light of which 
the corporation was to continue to function. In 1971, the management of 
the corporation sought to achieve a set of objectives which may be briefly 
reproduced in the following points: (a) to make available quick and 
efficient insurance service, (b) to enable the public to obtain a good 
deal and fair value for premiums paid, (c) to finance economic development 
through accumulated reserves and premiums, and (d) to carry out business 
with the ideal of service first. 
In the pages following these objectives are examined with reference 
to current conditions in the insurance market in Tanzania and with reference 
to some obstacles which make their achievement a particularly difficult 
task. 
A. Insurance Law and Practice in Tanzania 
1. Insurance Law 
Upon the attainment of independence in 1961, the colonial legal 
system was preserved in the country, and despite the enormous legislative 
activity of recent years, much of the old English Common Law had remained in 
force, for example, the criminal code, the law of tort and almost all 
commercial laws. 
1 Tanzanian insurance law is no exception. The Insurance 
1. Yash Ghai, "Notes Towards A Theory of Law and Ideology", Supra, p. 47. 
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Act, which was a milestone in Tanzanian insurance history, made no 
attempt to balance the inequality in the bargaining power of the parties 
to the insurance contract before a single insurer was charged with an 
exclusive franchise to transact all sorts of insurance business. In 
East Africa, as elsewhere in the capitalist world, 
I 
the inequality of 
the parties is a predominant feature of the insurance contract. 
2 In 
line with English Common Law principles of insurance, agents in East 
Africa are deemed to be the agents of the public3 and not of the company 
for which they solicit business, even if they err or deliberately conceal 
material facts. 
4 But actual or prospective policyholders are required to 
display nothing but the 'utmost good faith' when insurance cover is 
purchased although, in practice, the same does not appear to be equally 
g 
required from the insurer or its agent.. In compulsory third party 
insurance tortious liability remained the basis on which motor insurance 
1. See e. g. Gordon Borrie and Aubrey L. Diamond, The Consumer, Society 
and the Law, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 4th ed. , pp. -64; 
also Friedrick Kessler, "Contracts and Power in America", in David Black 
and Maureen Mileski (eds. ), The Social Organization of Law, (New York: 
Seminar Press, 1973), pp. 167-79; also R. A. Hasson, "The Doctrine of 
'Uberri. ma Fides in Insurance Law -a Critical Evaluation", 32, M. L. R. 
1969, P. 615. 
2. See generally, J. B. Byamugisha, Insurance Law in East Africa, (Nairobi: 
East African Literature Bureau, 1973). 
3. See e. g. Motor Union Insurance Co. V. Odamba, [1963], E. A. L. R. 271. 
4. In the above case Jones J. stated that 'I have decided that Kanya (agent) 
had no information other than that disclosed, but even if he had the 
insurers would not be liable on the authority of Newsholme v. Road Transport 
and General Insurance Co., " Ibid. 
5. Having decided that agents need not communicate information to their 
principals Jones J. insisted that the 'contract of insurance requires 
the 'utmost good faith' ' and therefore the assured 'must disclose to 
the insurer every material fact.... ', Ibid., p. 275. 
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is administered, the law focuses on the driver rather than his vehicle, a 
number of persons are excluded from compulsory motor insurance cover, and 
the scheme itself was said to be run by the wrong machinery and under wrong 
principles and provides no adequate protection to the public. 
1 At a more 
fundamental level, the lingering pre-Arusha ethos of capitalist insurance 
techniques readily find expression in the principal legal instruments 
issued by the corporation i. e. insurance policies, which are characterized 
by incredibly small print conditions and warranties all of which are written 
in English. Recently, a Swahili version has been added but an explanatory 
note attached to the policy reads: 
2 
The Swahili version is for explanatory purposes 
only and does not form part of the policy. The 
authentic text will be the text printed in English 
on the policy document. 
Proposal forms for life insurance are incorporated into the policy with 
the usual basis of the contract clause and the declaration attached to life 
policies contains an undertaking by the prospective assured to forfeit all 
sums paid by him to the corporation in cases of fraud. 
3 But the same does 
not apply to the corporation which had taken advantage (or so it appears) 
of the rule that insurance agents are agents of the public for the purposes 
of the formation of the contract. For when premiums paid to an agent are 
1. J. L. Kanywanyi, "Compulsory Motor Insurance Scheme in Tanzania: The Need 
for Change", E. A. L. R. Vol. 4, No. 1&2,1971, p. 35 and p. 91. 
2. "Explanation of Important Policy Conditions: Life Assurance Prospectus in 
use by N. I. C. 
3. Ibid. 
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subsequently misappropriated by such agent, the corporation will be 
protected by a clause which provides that 'under no circumstances should 
premiums be paid in cash to any of our agents', 
I but it is the duty of the 
agent to explain this to the public! And should the situation arise the 
applicant will only have himself to blame. 
2 Thus if anything, insurance 
law in Tanzania does lend itself to be used by the corporation to enhance 
its position vis-a-vis the public. 
2. Business Practices : Service or Profitability? 
N. I. C. is still a company. It is empowered by its memorandum of 
association (drawn at the time when foreign insurers had a stake in the 
share capital), which has remained substantially unaltered, to carry on 
business of insurance of all forms and in all branches, just as any other 
insurance company elsewhere, to borrow or raise or secure payment of money 
in connection with its business, to purchase, hold, sell or dispose of any 
real property, and to perform any of these functions as principal agents, 
trustee or otherwise. 
3_ The bureaucrats who continued to discharge their 
normal duties after 1967, often assert that the corporation was not intended 
to function on any special basis or in any different style from that of any 
insurance company anywhere. 
4 In fact N. I. C. is a leading member' of OEAI, 
1. Ibid., p. 14. 
2. Interview with Mr. Ramadan Mongi of N. I. C., July 1979. 
3. Article 3 of the memorandum of association of N. I. C. 
4. This was repeated by more than one official interviewed by the writer. 
5. The General Manager of N. I. C. is in fact the Chairman of the Organization 
of East African Insurers, see Ngao, No. 12, March, 1980. 
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the Organization of East African Insurers, which provides a common platform 
for member companies from Uganda, Kenya, Swaziland, Zambia etc., to discuss 
insurance problems common to these countries - none of which proclaims to 
be building a socialist society like Tanzania. Instead of innovating goals 
and strategies which would distinguish it as an insurer of a society 
aspiring to socialism, N. I. C. is, evidently, content with, and was said to 
be proud of, its heritage of the experiences of former foreign partners - 
a heritage which enabled it 'to conduct its business in line with the true 
honoured systems of underwriting and professional standards governing this 
complex industry all over the world. 'l Given these conditions it is difficult 
to see how the corporation could possibly provide its services to 'each and 
every person who is in need of insurance' without sacrificing the goals of 
profitability which, undoubtedly, have been inherited, among other things, 
from the pre-Arusha period. The notion of profitability, reflected as it 
is in the corporation's choice of investment, for exampi-e, (see below) 
certainly stands in the way of any attempt to extend insurance services to 
the less privileged. As an official of N. I. C. has put it: 
' 
Let there be no mistakes about the role of 
N. I. C. .... . N. I. C. 
is not like the Ministry 
of Health, which is required to build a hospital 
where there is none, we .... are not expected to go to villages in the countryside to transact business. 
What is the purpose of doing that? Who is going to 
purchase our services? If we are not within the 
reach of the majority ...... it 
is bahati mbaya 
[bad luck]. Insurance services are for those who 
1. Interview with Mr. K. Makari, op. cit. 
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can afford to pay for them; when they 
need us they seek for us, we don't have 
to travel a long distance. 
The corporation's investment in real estate (which yields fat returns) 
is evidence of the persistence of profitability as a guiding principle; 
indeed profitability is seen as a means of 'ultimate survival'. 
1 In 1980, 
as mentioned earlier, a sum of shs. 78.4m. was reserved for building projects. 
These consisted of a garage, a life insurance building, a block of offices 
in Mbeya, resident flats in Moshi and Arusha, senior staff houses in Dar es 
Salaam and a hospital to service only 100 employees. 
2 And to maintain a 
high level of profits 'tightening measures' are introduced whenever a 
branch proves less profitable. The motor insurance branch offers a good 
example. When, in 1972, it incurred great losses because of the government's 
decision to increase the time bar in third party claims from one to three 
years, the general manager retorted: 
3 
I may caution you that we may have to 
further tighten the controls in underwriting 
if the current trend of rising prices of spare 
parts and high labour costs .... lead to deterioration in the general level of 
maintenance of motor vehicles in the country. 
Tightening controls of the branch in that context simply meant doing 
selective business i. e. accepting good risks only, with the result that 
1. Per A. Maalim, Executive Chairman of N. I. C. at the OEAI Conference at 
Arusha (February 1980), quoted by Ngao, No. 12, March 1980, p. 2. 
2. Ibid., p- l 
3. Annual Report for 1972, p. 14. 
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less vehicles will be insured, or tightening the claims policy by paying 
less for motor accidents. In practice both policies are adhered to. 
Recently, however, there has been some concern about 'country-side 
business' and attempts are being made to increase the scope of insurance 
consumption. Life insurance for a minimum sum insured of. shs. 2500/= was 
made possible for peasants for annual premiums not exceeding shs. 146/= 
i. e. 40 cents a day1 (one shs. = 100c. ). But not many peasants have taken 
out life policies and, indeed, even among urban workers life insurance holds 
little attraction for the majority, essentially in view of meagre wage incomes. 
2 
And although the average sum insured has come down from shs. 16,655/= in 1967 
to shs. 9,436/= in 1976, it is still three times higher than the target 
minimum of shs. 2500/= (see Table 23 below). And of course, not all those 
who can afford life insurance do get it, because some lives are better risks 
than others according to 'normal and proper' insurance practices. In 1977, 
for example, 33,276 new proposals for life insurance were made, but only 
21,838 policies were issued. 3 The rest were rejected and it is unlikely that 
a rejected proposer could obtain a life cover in Tanzania again. Proposals 
for life insurance in use by the corporation contain questions about previous 
rejections, and answers are warranted to be true. 
4 And in most cases second 
1.10th Year Independence Anniversary, op. cit. p. 27. 
2. John Loxley, "Some Reflections on the Role and Effectiveness of 
N. I. C. " op. cit. 
3. Annual Report for 1977, pp. 13-14. 
4. If an answer which is not true or precise is warranted to be true the 
corporation will be entitled to repudiate liability or avoid the policy 
altogether and keep the premiums, see Thomson v. Weems (1884) App. -.,. Case. 671, and Kumar v. Life Insurance Corporation of India [1974] I. Lloyds 
L. Reports, 147, see also R. A. Hasson, "The 'Basis of the Contract Clause' 
In Insurance Law", 34, M. L. R., 1971, pp. 29-41. 
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TABLE NO. 23. 
Average Sum Assured in Tanzania (1967-1977) 
(T. Shs. ) 


















81,154 N. A. 
Source: Ngao 
, 
No. 6, Sept. 1977 and Annual Report of N. I. C. 1977, pp. 13-14. 
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proposals are rejected straight away. 
' 
In the summer of 1979, the corporation was considering a plan to 
introduce 'deferred premiums life insurance' for the Tanzanian peasantry. 
2 
Under the plan life insurance cover will be extended to peasants in 
consideration for premiums payable after the end of each harvest. So 
far the plan has not been put in practice, and it is notknown whether it 
will be implemented at all. Another plan aims at introducing crop insurance 
in Ujamaa villages and co-operatives. 
3 Insurable crops cover produce goods 
viz: maize, beans, rice, onions, groundnuts etc., and cash crops such as 
cotton, coffee, simsim (sesame) and wheat. 
4 The problem facing the latter 
plan is the difficulty of fixing an adequate premium rate although crop 
insurance research is in full swing in Tanzania now. 
5 As with deferred 
life insurance premiums it is not known whether- crop insurance will be 
carried out although public pressure upon the corporation to introduce it 
has been sounded. 
6 If these plans are implemented the categories of insurance 
to be transacted under them will constitute the most radical departure from 
conventional insurance practices. As we have seen in Chapter Three no such 
departure could possibly take place in the Sudan given the conditions under 
which the industry operates. 
1. Interview with Mr. Ramadan Mongi of N. I. C., July 1979. 
2. I am indebted to Professor Vaidswaran of the Institute of Finance 
Management, Dar es Salaam for explaining to me some of the corporation's 
future plans. 
3. N. I. C. 's Marine Insurance Book, p. 41, also 10th Year Independence 
Anniversary, op. cit., p. 27. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ngao, No. 8, March 1978, p. 15. 
6. Ibid. 
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Solvency and Policyholders Protection 
1. The Corporation's Solvency 
As we have seen earlier, the ultimate protection to policyholders 
is the solvency of the insurance carrier and its ability to meet a claim 
any time a policy matures. In Tanzania, as in other countries where 
insurance is carried out by a state-owned enterprise, the solvency of the 
insurer is automatically guaranteed by the state `whose financial solidity 
is not to be doubted'. 
I There is no defined margin of solvency in the 
sense in which the term is understood in the Sudan. On the other hand, 
the immense problems of assessing technical reserves and of ensuring their 
proper investment which greatly endanger the solvency of Sudanese insurers 
as we have seen, are entirely unknown to Tanzania where the share capital 
is wholly owned by the state. The state could, therefore, intervene at any 
time to rescue its corporation and ensure its solvency. At any rate, the 
power to wind up certain companies2 - including N. I. C. - could no longer 
be exercised by courts3 in Tanzania. The Companies Ordinance was amended4 
to give such powers to the Minister of Finance. The amendment did not 
specify the grounds upon which these companies could be wound up, but in 
the case of N. I. C. and in view of its significance to the Treasury as a 
1. S. A. Fonkam, 'State Supervision of Insurance Companies in Cameroun', 
Supra , p. 344. 
2. These are listed in the Schedule to the Companies (Regulation of Dividends 
and Surpluses and Miscell. Provisions) Act, 1972. 
3. S. 163 of the Companies Ordinance had given the High Court power to wind 
up any company registered in Tanganyika. 
4. S. 6 of the Companies (Regulation of Dividends and Surpluses and Miscell. 
Provisions), Act, 1972, provides that 'Notwithstanding the provisions of 
any written law - (a) no court shall make an order for the winding up of 
any specified company, (b) no specified company shall resolve to be wound 
up, save with the consent in writing of the Minister'. 
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finance institution an order by the Minister to wind it up is a very remote 
possibility. This conclusion is also confirmed by t'ie enormous excess of 
the corporation's assets over its liabilities which make the subject a 
purely academic one with no practical relevance. By June 1977, this 
excess amounted to shs. 421,5m. (see Table 24) or approximately $42m. 
Also, the financial position of the corporation is kept under close 
security, and any financial difficulty would be detected at an early stage. 
Under the Companies Ordinance the corporation is under a duty to make a 
statement specifying its share capital and its assets and liabilities1 
on the first Monday in February and the first Tuesday in August. 
2 Also a 
profit and loss account and a balance sheet must be kept. 
3 In practice, 
and instead of the half yearly statement, an annual report which specifies 
the corporation's volume of business, its profit and loss account, balance 
sheet, share capital etc., is issued by the head office. And adequate 
measures to avoid a financial crisis could be taken one year in advance. 
For before the commencement of any financial year the corporation must submit 
to the Minister of Finance a cash flow budget setting out: (a) the sums of 
money which the corporation estimates to receive during the ensuing financial 
year, (b) the sources from which such sums are expected and (c) particulars 
of the estimated expenditures of the company during the ensuing financial year. 
4 
1. The Sixth Schedule to the Companies Ordinance. 
2. S. 131 of the Companies Ordinance. 
3. S. 123 (1), (2) of the Companies Ordinance. 
4. S. 11(l) of the Companies (Regulation of Dividends and Surpluses and 
Miscell. Provisions) Act, 1972. 
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TABLE 24. 
Excess of the Assets of N. I. C. Over Its Liabilities (1971-1977) 
(Fig. in shs. m. ) 















Source: Annual Reports of N. I. C. 1972-1977. 
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If the corporation's annual reports for the previous year had disclosed 
an actual or potential state of insolvency the Minister could make the 
necessary recommendations before a crisis materializes. And at the end 
of each financial year the accounts of the corporation are audited by the 
Tanzania Audit Corporation, ) and the Minister may also issue any regulations 
he deems fit for the submission of audited balance sheets and other records, 
returns and particulars, and for the maintenance and auditing of such 
returns. 
2 And if a person who is a director or officer of the Corporation 
commits a breach of such regulations he will be guilty of an offence punishable 
by a fine not exceeding 5 years. 
The integrity of the insurance fund and its proper management (which 
are inseparable from the question of solvency) are also matters of concern 
for the Tanzanian government. An amendment to-the Criminal Code in 1970 
provided for the offence of causing economic loss to the government or a 
parastatal. Under S. 284A of the code, an employee of an authority 
(including a parastatal organization) is guilty of an offence for which he 
can be imprisoned for up to two years if 'by wilful act or omission, or by 
his negligence or misconduct, or by any reason of his failure to take care 
or to discharge his duties in a reasonable manner, causes his employer to 
suffer any pecuniary loss or causes any damage to any property owned by or 
in possession of his employer'. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 
4 1971, 
1. S. 21(3) of the Tanzania Audit Corporation Act, 1968. 
2. The Companies (Regulation and Dividends etc.. ), Act, 1972, S. 13(1). 
3. Ibid., SS. 13(2), 14 and S. 15. 
4. No. 16 of 1971. 
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applies to public officers -a term widely defined to include employees 
of parastatals. The Act creates three basic offences of corruption: 
(a) the giving or receiving, soliciting or offering of a benefit or 
advantage to an agent (which includes a public officer) for doing or 
forbearing, or having done or forborne to do anything in relation to his 
principal's affairs or business, 
' (b) the use of documents by an agent 
or other person, relating to the business of the agent's principal when the 
document is false, erroneous or defective in any material particular, and 
which is intended to mislead the principal, 
2 
and (c) the obtaining or 
attempting to obtain by a public officer an advantage without a lawful or 
an inadequate consideration from a person whom he has reason to believe has 
been, or is likely to be concerned in any matter or transaction with him in 
his capacity as a public officer. 
2 
The proper management of the insurance fund is also governed by 
regulations. The Minister of Finance has powers 'to make financial 
regulations in relation to the management of the funds'3 of a parastatal. 
Such regulations need not be published in the Gazette, but the parastatal 
organization to which they are issued must 'ensure that the regulations are 
1. S. 5. 
2. S. 6. 
3. The Parastatal Organization Act, 1975, S. 4(1). 
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brought to the notice of all its employees who are likely to be affected 
thereby'. 1 And one of the most direct advantages of insurance nationalization 
in Tanzania was the emergence of a well trained management in virtually all 
branches of business. Most senior bureaucrats, however, had some training 
in western insurance institutions, notably London, Zurich and Bonn. The 
Institute of Finance Management also offers courses in insurance management; 
and in early 1980 N. I. C. 's Training Centre was opened to offer practical 
training for the corporation's employees. 
2 Thus unlike the case of Sudanese 
insurance carriers, N. I. C. 's solidity and its proper management do not appear 
to be in doubt. But are these by themselves sufficient to protect the public? 
2. A Fair Value for Insurance Premiums? 
One of the objectives of N. I. C. was said to be the desire to ensure 
that 'every person in Tanzania who insures should get a fair deal and a fair 
value for his money'. Unfortunately, this has not been the case on many 
occasions. To begin with, rates of premiums charged by the corporation 
are not, in practice, subject to any regulations. As things in action, 
policies of insurance, 
3 
and consequently insurance premiums, do not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Price Commissioner who has powers to regulate 
1. Ibid., S. 4(2). 
2. Ngao, No. 12, March 1980, p. l. 
3. Raoul Colinvaux, The Law of Insurance, (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 
[3rd ed. 1970]), p. 247. 
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the price of goods and services. 
1 
But, undoubtedly, if the Minister of 
Finance is of the opinion that rates of premiums are excessive he would 
issue regulations to the board of directors of the corporation to reduce 
premium levels. It appears, however, that premiums charged by the 
corporation, especially with regard to life insurance, are rather inflated 
because the 'actual experience of the corporation is better than that 
assumed in premium calculation'. 
2 
Higher premiums have lately been 
mitigated by the repayment of bonuses which have actually increased by a 
100 per cent, from shs. l0/= per shs. 1000/= in 1969 to shs. 20/= by 1978.3 
But this only goes to prove that the experience of the company bore no 
relation to its premium calculations. In relation to non-life business 
the fact that a substantial part of the premium income is drawn from other 
parastatals is likely to frustrate an attempt by N. I. C. to increase its rates 
excessively. This is also one of the most fundamental differences between 
government insurances in Tanzania and those in the Sudan. We have seen 
earlier that the co-insurance scheme in the Sudan was primarily devised as a 
means of ending competition between the companies so that public sector risks 
could be charged higher rates. We have also seen how the distribution between 
the companies of public sector risks under the co-insurance scheme operates to 
prevent the controller from using pressures against companies which do not 
1. Under the Regulation of Prices Act, 1973, the Price Commissioner has no 
power to regulate rates of premium although he has powers to regulate the 
prices of goods and services. Goods are defined under S. 2 of the Act as 
'all chattels (other than things in action and money), growing crops and 
things attached to or forming part of the land, which are agreed to be 
served before such sale or under a contract of sale. ' Services are 
defined by S. 2 of the Act as 'the sale or hire of goods, where sold or 
hired in connection with the rendering of service. ' 
2. Ngao, No. 12, March 1980, p. 19. 
3. Ibid. 
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meet their claims to government units. No such thing exists in Tanzania. 
But as we will see shortly when the question of claims in in issue in 
Tanzania, a distinction must be drawn between ordinary policyholders and 
parastatal policyholders in respect of non-life insurance claims. Parastatal 
policyholders stand a good chance of having their claims met relatively 
easily (compared to ordinary policyholders) especially if they share the 
same parent Ministry with the corporation i. e. the Ministry of Fiance. 
In this case the payment of claims is automatic. 
I Parastatals under Ministries 
other than the Ministry of Finance also have nothing to fear from the 
corporation's claims policy because the decision to settle a claim, 
especially a sizeable one, is often a political decision. 
2 
It is the ordinary policyholder who has no political backing and who 
faces the corporation unaided that receives the blow. As in Sudan, so in 
Tanzania, once a claim is denied a policyholder could only resort to court 
if he wishes to pursue a claim against the corporation. The Permanent 
Commission of Enquiry (the Tanzanian Ombudsman) is not a possible remedy to 
be exhausted by such a claimant because of the Commission's lack of jurisdiction 
to deal with complaints against N. I. C. 
3 There is no complaint machinery in 
1. Interview with Mrs. Mshuza, Supra., July, 1979. 
2. Ibid. 
3. The Commission has jurisdiction to investigate complaints against 
'persons in the service of the United Republic of Tanzania , persons holding office in the Party, the members and persons in the service 
of local government authority,....., corporate bodies established by 
statute and public authorities and boards, as may be specifie by Act 
of Parliament ...... ', article 67(4) of the 
Interim Constitution of 
Tanzania 1965. The first Schedule to the Permanent Commission of 
Enquiry Act, 1967 (Act No. 25 of 1966) lists a number of boards and 
public corporations which do not include N. I. C. as it is a company 
registered under the Companies Ordinance 1931. 
-316- 
the Ministry of Finance and no administrative authority appears to have 
power to investigate a complaint against the corporation. The Minister 
of Finance who has vast powers in connection with the corporation could 
pass directives or regulations to govern the manner in which claims could 
be considered. Unfortunately, this has not been the subject of regulations 
so far - thus giving the corporation all the freedom it needs to formulate 
its own claims policy. In practice strict adherence to policyterms and 
small-print conditions by the corporation has rendered a large number of 
individual claims either voidable at the option of N. I. C. or has enabled it 
to settle or pay ex gratia, a fraction only of what claimants should, in 
fairness, have obtained. Some cases on workmen's compensation claims upon 
the corporation substantiate these propositions. In Kibasa v. Stone Valley 
Tan Co. Ltd., 1 the claimant's hand was trapped_between a roller and a 
conveyor belt of a machine, but subsequent deterioration necessitated its 
amputation altogether. Compensation was assessed at shs. 7,545/= and was 
immediately met by the employer. When N. I. C. (which provides Employers' 
liability insurance) was informed of the accident it repudiated its liability 
on the basis that the claim had been settled before notice was given, in 
breach of a policy condition to that effect. Also, in Musa Omari V. 
Tanganyika Farmers' Association Ltd., 
2 
the claimant's finger was chopped 
while he was off-loading plough-discs. The injury was assessed for compen- 
sation at shs. 1801= ($18), but the claim was repudiated by N. I. C. because of 
1. Workmen's Compensation, 2948/1970, cited by Octavian W. S. Temu, 
"Workmen's Compensation : Law and Practice in Tanzania", research 
paper, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 
1974/75, p-28- 
2. Workmen's Compensation, 3952/1972, Ibid., p. 29. 
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late notice. A final authority in this line is Dependants of Tarawia V. 
Tinga Tinga Estate Ltd., l where the deceased workman was thrown off a lorry 
which overturned and caused his death. When the corporation was notified, 
it required a death certificate in proof of death. No such certificate 
was issued at the time and, instead, the employer furnished the corporation 
with a burial permit. This was later rejected by the corporation as 
insufficient proof of death. It was not until the Tanzania Legal Corporation 
had furnished N. I. C. with a photocopy of the death certificate that the 
claim was met, exactly seven years after the accident. 
2 
As the sole insurer in Tanzania N. I. C. is entrusted with a significant 
role in workmen's compensation as employers are required to obtain covers 
with it. 
3 Even before the amendment to the Act (which provided for wider 
coverages) became effective in June 1967, workmen's compensation premiums 
have accounted for an average of 9.4 per cent of the corporation's premium 
income between 1963-1965.4 Apparently, this contribution has not been 
appreciated by N. I. C. Indeed, the corporation's role in workmen's compensation 
'has only contributed to the problems of the scheme which was, itself, born 
I. Workmen's Compensation, 457/1971, Ibid., p. 35- 
2. Ibid. 
3. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1967, Cap. 263, S. 25. 
4.10th Year Independence Anniversay, op. cit., p. 17. 
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disfigured with many flaws and gaps. 
1 
The corporation uses a clause, in 
workmen's compensation, of the kind mentioned in Kibasa case above. To 
the extent that a clause of this nature is treated as a warranty the breach 
of which entitles the corporation to repudiate its liability or avoid it, 
the corporation has actually inhibited prompt settlement by employees of 
injured workmen. When this is not possible the corporation could delay, 
unnecessarily, the payment of compensation as in the case of Dependants 
of Tarawia discussed above. It may be added here that the demand in that 
case of a death certificate and the rejection of the burial permit conform 
neither to law nor to public policy a good practice. But good practice and 
public policy apart, in insurance law the burden of proof is upon the assured 
or his dependants only to show that the loss was proximately caused by a 
peril insured against. 
2 To prove a prima facia case the assured need not 
prove how the casualty occurred or what particular peril caused it, and 
once a prima facie case is proved, the burden of proof shifts to the insurer 
if he wishes to challenge the assured. 
3 
When it was not possible for the corporation to take advantage of the 
situation by relying on the letter of the law, other practices were adhered 
to with the result that the public also failed to get a fair deal for their 
premiums. In recent years the corporation has adopted the practice of making 
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act applies to workmen under a contract of 
service which provides for them a stipulated wage or salary. As such 
the Act is limited in scope to a fraction only of Tanzania's workforce. 
Another problem with the Act is its scale of compensation which is 
related to workers' earnings, see M. C. Othman, "Social Security in 
Tanzania", research paper, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 
1974, also Y. M. K. Rashid, "the Role of the National Provident Fund as a 
Social Security Institution in Tanzania", Faculty of Law, University of 
Dar es Salaam, 1974. 
2. See e. g. London Plate Glass v. Heath [1913]3K. B. 411. 
3. Greaves v. Drysdale (1935)53 LI. L. R. 16. 
-319- 
several deductions on the sums payable to policyholders when payment is 
due. This takes place in motor insurance claims, but it is not known if 
it is also followed in other branches. In one such incident, a vehicle 
which was insured comprehensively for shs. 35,000/= was seriously damaged 
in a road accident and was considered a total loss by an assessor who 
estimated its pre-accident value at shs. 28,000/=. N. I. C. obtained salvage 
of the wreck, as it was entitled to, but only offered the assured shs. 25,000/= 
which he had no choice but to accept. But before the sum was handed to him 
another deduction of shs. 1,150/= was made, apparently, for no good reason 
and, certainly, no legal basis.. 
1 The corporation also uses an excess cause 
by which the sum payable is reduced, sometimes, by nearly one-third, while 
'labour charges' deductions are made even if payment is made 'cash in lieu of 
repairs' and salvage is claimed. 
2 To the knowledge of the writer no such 
practice exists in the Sudan. We have seen that a certain company (Khartoum 
Insurance Company) openly refuses to pay third party claims although these 
are rarely made upon the company. We have also said that marine insurance 
has been quite problematic and that covers are cancelled before the delivery 
of the insured goods to their final destination. But the motor insurance 
market appears to be fairly competitive and a good standard of service exists. 
VII. Insurance Business and the Transition to Socialism 
The objectives of the post-Arusha insurance industry which the 
1. M. J. A. Mwaipela, "the Meaning of the Principal of Indemnity in the Context 
of Historical Development and Function of Insurance", research paper, 
Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam (undated). 
2. Ibid. 
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management of the corporation has outlined, have only appeared in the 
records of the corporation in 1971 when the country was celebrating its 
first decade of uhuru. They, therefore, seem to have been a brain-child 
of the occasion -a sort of momentary enthusiasm, rather than a challenge 
to the Insurance Act's exhortations to conduct 'normal and proper' insurance 
business just as before. They were contadictory to each other, and almost 
impossible to put in practice given the circumstances under which the 
corporation operates. To the head office bureaucracy, trained as it was in 
western institutions, and having internalized western values, the 
essence of insurance business will remain the same, perhaps for many years 
to come. The corporation will continue to swallow other parastatals' 
risks for premiums which will partly be transferred abroad in order to 
purchase reinsurance protection - never mind the goals of self-sufficiency. 
Part of the fund retained in the country will be invested in fabulous 
building projects, with little benefit to, the mass of Tanzanians. The spirit 
of the capitalist initiative techniques which remained to plague Tanzania's 
transition to socialism has also afflicted its insurance industry and 
inhibited the release of novel socialist insurance strategies. 
But at the centre of power the danger has not been realized. In fact no 
danger is felt at all. The official message for Tanzania's parastatals was 
to invest 'additional wealth' to attain the goals of socialist construction. 
' 
1. Defining the goals of public corporations in Tanzania the Minister of 
Finance stated that "they are required to play their full role with 
great task of socialist construction of our economy i. e. to attain 
planned economy, additional wealth must [therefore] be invested to 
attain this goal", Ngao, No. 1,1971. 
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No matter how a parastatal operates, its primary task must be to yield 
more and more revenue to the state. The rank and file of the bureaucracy 
have learnt the message and are determined to carry on with their policies 
to the end. 'Our duty' said an official of N. I. C. 
I 'is to accumulate 
wealth, but building socialism is the responsibility of the state'. Any 
deviation from the goal of accumulation might bring about an undesirable 
discontent at the centre. An official of N. I. C. has succintly summarized 
the situation in these words: 
2 
N. I. C. is a commercial business institution 
and has to make a profit. If losses are so 
exhorbitant as to make us unable to meet our 
liabilities, the whole nation will condemn us 
as a failure just as in the case of some of 
our public corporations currently ... 
It was imperative then, to set aside those carefully written objectives 
and opt for more pragmatic ones consonant with the corporation's legal duty 
and more capable of conforming to its image at the centre. In practice the 
'real'objectives are set annually by the board of directors in the form of 
target underwriting results, investment returns, reinsurance commissions 
and the like. In the words of an official: 
3 
We have an annual target set for us by 
the board [of directors] each year and 
1. Per ...., of N. I. C. Agent, 
1979. 
2. An official quoted by F. A. R. Jundu, "Insurance: A commercial venture", 
research paper, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 1976/77, p. 57. 
3. Interview with Mr. K. Makani, op. cit. 
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we attempt to reach the targets set.... 
so far we have been successful. 
Recently, the general manager of the corporation happily claimed 
that: 1 
Management-workers relationship for the 
year under review has been positive and 
this is one of the factors that has enabled 
the corporation to achieve its goals. This 
year the workers' council through which 
workers participate in setting the corporation's 
goals, met twice to debate on the budget and 
other important policy issues. Thanks to the 
diligence of the workers in this regard - the 
targets set were not only achieved but surpassed. 
[emphasis added]. 
In the eyes of many bureaucrats in Tanzania N. I. C. is a successful 
corporation. Its investments in real estate in Dar es Salaam - the 
Investment House (perhaps the highest building in Tanzania), the 
corporation's grandiose head office, and an emerging giant building 
are seen as evidence of this success. The more the corporation could 
show off by investing in fabulous buildings in urban areas (thus moving 
further from rural areas) the more it could conform to the image of a 
successful enterprise at the centre. In other words the more it is anti- 
1. Annual Report for 1977, p. 17. 
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socialist in its investment and business principles the more it is 
blessed! More importantly, and as the primary objective of the Arusha 
Declaration was to release the accumulative energies of the state, the 
nationalization of insurance - even though unaccompanied by a redefinition 
of the goals of the institution - has undoubtedly, resulted in windfall 
gains. To the Treasury, N. I. C. is an institution which pours over 80 
per cent of its accumulated capital (this amounted to shs. 111,4m. in 1977), 
either directly into the government coffers or indirectly through the banking 
system. It appears, therefore, that a redefinition of the goals of insurance 
which attempts to divert the institution from conventional underwriting 
practices - by making it function in the interests of the majority - is 
undesirable, either to the centre or to the corporation. Such 
redefinition would make the corporation less successful. 
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CHAPTER SIX : CONCLUSION 
Insurance and Development : Statutory Regulation or Nationalization? 
Like the rest of the countries which now form what is known as the 
Third World, the Sudan and Tanzania owe their underdevelopment to their 
incorporation into the world capitalist system. The theories of 'modernization' 
which propogated other explanations for underdevelopment are unlikely to be 
taken seriously by students of political economy nowadays. Under colonialism 
'development' in both countries was a 'development of underdevelopment' in 
which economic structures and institutions were set up, but only to function 
'properly' by being dependent upon the imperialist centre. The expansion of 
capitalism under colonial hegemony in both countries had thus introduced the 
laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production. The manner of utilization 
and distribution of economic surplus, while adhering to a capitalist order, 
was to be dictated by the needs of the centre even when colonial rule was 
over. That system of underdevelopment involved a vast array of institutions. 
Insurance companies and banks featured prominently. They had financed the 
railways, harbour construction, imperialist expeditions and invested enormous 
funds, not only in the two countries, but in the rest of the Third World. 
The role of insurance companies was to ensure the safety of capital thus 
invested and to secure its repatriation to the metropolitan-based investors. 
Insurance protected primary goods and raw materials against weather conditions, 
-325- 
labour riots and allied perils until the goods were safely unloaded at 
the metropoles. At that end they were manufactured into processed goods 
and food stuffs and again insured and shipped for marketing in the periphery, 
and so on. The role of insurance was to underwrite the success of colonialism 
as an economic venture. But the expansion of metropolitan insurers in the 
two countries and elsewhere was also indispensable to successful insurance 
underwriting for it allowed a world-wide geographical spread of the insured 
portfolios. It, therefore, reduced losses and increased profits. The 
success of insurance business was - is - synonymous with its geographical 
spread. And in carrying out their task under colonial rule metropolitan 
insurers had performed a category of services alien to peripheral economic 
structures such as handcrafts and household industries. Also, as the 
extraction of capital from the periphery was the primary factor which 
prevented its economic progress, insurance companies had contributed to 
this extraction and hence, the underdevelopment of the periphery. 
But neither in Sudan nor in Tanzania did the formal termination of 
colonial rule bring about any fundamental economic or social change. On the 
contrary, as we have seen earlier, development along the capitalist path, 
which colonialism had bequeathed, only fostered and maintained under- 
development under the neo-colonial state. The Sudan, in particular, did 
not seem to have challenged the capitalist trajectory for more than a short 
while. Following the political upheaval of the late 60s the state lent its 
power and coercion to the expectations of Sudanese capitalists by liberating 
the economy from foreign control on the home front. As a result, a Sudanese 
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bourgeoisie - much weaker in earlier times - was advanced to the top. 
It soon controlled state power and with it some major means of production 
and exchange. In Tanzania, on the other hand, capitalism was accepted as 
an article of faith until 1967 when the Arusha Declaration advocated an 
alternative socialist path for development. The state advanced itself to 
control the commanding heights of the economy and no bourgeoisie was allowed 
to exist as in the Sudan. 
In both countries, however, the fortunes of metropolitan insurers were 
affected in form rather than in substance. Foreign insurers no longer exist 
in Tanzania, and they no longer dominate the Sudanese market as only one 
foreign insurer operates there now. The liberation of the insurance 
industry from direct foreign dominance was a positive development which 
could have paved the way for a better utilization of insurance for economic 
development in the two countries. But both markets soon became good hunting 
grounds for professional reinsurers. We have seen earlier that insurance 
imperialism is now more dependent upon the extraction of reinsurance premiums 
rather than upon direct insurance premiums. In both markets the dialectical 
relationship with the centre regarding insurance assumed a new dimension but 
remained essentially unchanged. For the expansion of international insurers 
and reinsurers no longer required their physical existence in the periphery 
because in the periphery economic development necessitated an automatic 
insurance and reinsurance dependency on the centre. This dependency is 
exploitative in nature. The periphery transfers away reinsurance premiums 
but only claims a portion of them. At the centre, the asymmetry between the 
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volume of reinsurance coming from the periphery and the portion going back 
keeps professional reinsurers in business and subsidizes the services 
rendered to the buyers of insurance and reinsurance in the metropoles. 
We need not discuss again the impact of the extraction of reinsurance 
capital upon the development of the country whence this capital is extracted. 
But although both markets are free of foreign hegemony the differences 
between them are many. The differences in the socio-political conditions 
in the two countries have produced dissimilar conditions under which their 
respective industries now operate. In the Sudan the state refrained from 
entering the insurance field. All insurance companies are privately owned, 
and the role of the state in their regulation is confined to the provisions 
of the Insurers (Control) Act, 1960. This model we called 'the regulatory 
model'. In Tanzania the political developments of 1967 necessitated that 
all the major means of production and exchange - including insurance - be 
under state control. Tanzania thus adopted nationalization as the ultimate 
form of control. This model we called 'the direct model'. It is time now 
to ask how did the differences between the two models affect the chances of 
each country in utilizing the insurance institution for economic development? 
How did the institution respond to the problems of underdevelopment common to 
both countries? How did the different characteristics of the institution in 
the two countries (in terms of the juridical ownership of the institution 
and the structure of the regulation machineries) aid or otherwise frustrate 
the attempt to redefine the function of the institution? Which model is 
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more capable of resisting reinsurance imperialism of the centre? And 
which model is more suitable to the needs of underdeveloped countries? 
Possible answers to these questions will emerge from the discussion below. 
In so far as the flow of reinsurance abroad directly affects the 
accumulated insurance fund in each of the two countries and hence the 
volume retained inside for economic development it deserves prior 
consideration. The question which arises here is which market is more 
resistant to the expansion of professional reinsurers, a market which is 
dominated by several insurers or a market which is monopolized by a single 
insurer? Undoubtedly, a fragmented national portfolio like that of the 
Sudan offers the least resistance. This conclusion derives from insurance 
theory itself. Insurance, as we have noted in the opening chapter, is a 
device for balancing the effects of chance according to the law of large 
numbers, and is based on the notion that the combination of uncertainties 
produces greater certainty. It follow that in Tanzania where a single 
insurer operates under a state monopoly of insurance services, a better 
medium exists for the law of large numbers to operate. This explains the 
enormous increase in the retention capacity of N. I. C. The relationship 
between the retention capacity and the need for reinsurance is an inverse 
one: the greater the capacity the less reinsurance will be needed. In the 
Sudan with the national portfolio being divided among several insurers there 
is a greater need for reinsurance to augment underwriting capacities, and 
greater likelihood for the small portfolios to be made uneven by the 
acceptance of big or disproportionate risks which again encourage the taking 
out of reinsurance. We have noted earlier that in view of the services which 
-329- 
reinsurance renders to small companies and in view of the methods and 
techniques which underlie the trade, smaller companies have no alternative 
but to rely heavily upon reinsurers every time their portfolios are made 
uneven. Indeed, this is the case in the Sudan now especially as public 
sector risks (some really big in size) are transferred to the companies 
which have failed to increase their capacities proportionate to the size 
of risks transferred to them. The companies became effectively reinsurance 
brokers ceding away most of their income abroad. And although a giant and 
partly state-owned reinsurer now exists in the country, the companies are 
neither bound to cede their business to it nor willing to do so in view of 
their preferences to international reinsurers. In Tanzania, due to the 
high retention capacity and the enormous assets owned by the corporation, 
the insurance portfolio has attracted business from abroad and this went 
some length toward counteracting the flow of reinsurance to the rest of the 
world. In the Sudan the divided portfolio has not allowed for such a 
development. The operation of a single insurer in Tanzania also enhanced 
the bargaining power of the country vis-a-vis international reinsurers, and 
justified the training of staff in reinsurance techniques. Reinsurance 
planning has, therefore, developed more in Tanzania than in the Sudan where 
the small portfolios did not create a need for training until recently. 
Reliance is, therefore, readily made on reinsurers; but undoubtedly, 
Sudanese insurers are not in the same position vis-a-vis international 
reinsurers as an insurer like N. I. C. is. In Tanzania, moreover, 
the 
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concentration of insurance services has enhanced the solvency of N. I. C. 
and (in theory) minimized its need for reinsurance. In the Sudan, on the 
other hand, the need to earn commissions (in view of the low standards of 
solvency) and to enhance capacity maximized reliance on reinsurers. 
Tanzania which keeps more insurance funds within its borders than the 
Sudan does, also utilizes the portion. retained better than Sudan as we 
have seen earlier. The capital formed directly pours into the coffers of 
the Government (up to 80 per cent of it) and is not accumulated by individuals 
as in the Sudan. This by itself reinforces a tendency towards a more even 
distribution of wealth within society. Insurance investments in the two 
countries are compared later; but it may be recalled that in both countries 
the non-life portfolios consist largely of public sector risks, and that 
in the case of Tanzania premiums paid by public-corporations are in essence 
transfers of money from one corporation to the other which involves prolonged 
procedures and complications. In other words the creation of a state-owned 
insurer was more or less a futile excercise. Let us take the case of the 
Sudan first in order to bring out the merits of the Tanzanian case. In the 
Sudan as we have seen above, insurance companies do provide the government 
with the economic security it desires in the field of insurance. But the 
co-insurance scheme under which the government is insured holds little 
benefit for the government as it is devised in the interest of the companies 
first and foremost. To start with, these insurances do not correspond to 
any genuine need for protection supposedly deriving from random contingencies 
because the disparity between the premiums charged for risks and the claims 
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paid is enormous. Secondly, as risks are distributed by the companies 
according to their own plan no competition exists and the premiums have 
increased because of that. Thirdly, government insurances have increased 
the problems encountered by the controller in enforcing investment 
regulations with the result that companies are much freer now than before 
with respect to their investment priorities. Fourthly, the scheme has 
virtually incapacitated the controller from using government insurances 
as a means of pressure against companies with particularly bad records as 
far as claims are concerned. 
In the case of Tanzania one critic of the corporation has argued that 
there is no need for parastatals to insure themselves. This was LoxleyI 
who suggested alternatively that parastatals be saved the administrative 
cost of seeking insurance simply by making 'their own provision for an 
insurance reserve (invested in Government paper) and by adding to this 
annually to offset losses or to allow for a growth in the stock of physical 
assets. '2 He seemed unimpressed by the argument that N. I. C. could provide 
a good medium for the assessment of loss in cases involving destruction of 
physical assets. His objections to this were that: 
3 (a) the insurance 
market in Tanzania is relatively small and lacking in past experiences on 
which proper assessments could be made. In practice reliance is made upon 
1. John Loxley, "The Monetary System of Tanzania Since 1967", op. cit. 
pp. 128-9. 
2. Ibid., p. 129. 
3. Ibid. 
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London where evaluation or assessment is made on the basis of the British 
insurers' experiences and losses all over the world in addition to their 
profits. It is, therefore, difficult to see how these assessments could 
be relevant to Tanzania, (b) Since assessment by N. I. C. is extremely 
difficult, the return to the corporation from attempting proper estimates 
may not be worth the bother. Loxley's proposal for the establishment of 
a reserve fund essentially questions the existence of a state-owned insurer 
to which public sector risks are transferred. The proposal draws heavily 
on the experiences of some socialist countries and, indeed, Loxley cites 
the Polish experience to support his argument. In Poland, and perhaps in 
other socialist countries, insurance is seen as a regulator of the national 
economy and not merely as an institution which distributes the effect of 
losses between risk-averse enterprises as in capitalist countries. 
1 It 
is argued there that 'if the development process of the National Economy has 
to attain the pursued end ......, there has to be a regulatory institution 
which would be able to eliminate disturbing occurences or to compensate 
(equalize) unfavourable directions of the effects caused by these 
occurences. '2 One such regulator is insurance. Its regulatory function 
is, no doubt, enhanced by the massive public ownership of the means of 
production. This theory which advocates a regulatory role for insurance 
over and above the socialization of risk, is known as the 'cybernetic 
insurance theory. '3 According to the theory there need not be a state-owned 
1. Antoni Banasinski, "Insurance AsA C yberne tic Institution of Self- 
Regulation of the National Economy. " Astin Bulletin. Vol. 5, part 
3, February 1971, pp. 393-401. 
2. Ibid., p. 394. 
3. Ibid., p. 393. 
-333- 
insurer to which public sector risks are transferred as it could be 
substituted by a reserve fund. The premiums which form the fund need 
not even be paid by the economic units which need protection, as Loxley 
has suggested in the case of Tanzania, but should be drawn from state 
funds. I In Poland, the capital equipment of the public sector, in 
particular, is not covered by insurance. The reason for this is that 
'the reconstruction of reduced economic capacities should not be decided 
automatically, as the reconstruction of just the same plant in just the same 
place because in many cases a more efficient way of recovering damaged 
capacities is either the construction of a new plant elsewhere or 
supplementary investments in existing plants. '2 For this reason 'reserves 
are held centrally in the state budget to meet claims for repair or recon- 
struction of reduced capacities'. '3 It is submitted that the Polish 
experience has no relevance to the Tanzanian situation; and Loxley's 
proposal is not without its own problems. Firstly, and unlike in Poland, 
the scope of public ownership of the means of production in Tanzania is not 
so great as to require the transformation of the function of insurance from 
that of being a distributor of the effect of losses to being a regulator of 
the national economy. Private sector risks are also insured with the 
corporation and their pooling with public sector risks is the reason behind 
1. Ibid., p. 395- 




the enlarged insurance portfolio in Tanzania. If parastatals are to cease 
to insure their risks a reduction will occur in the size of the portfolio 
and the law of large numbers will not operate sufficiently well in favour 
of the corporation. Being run essentially as a capitalist institution as 
we have noted, such reduction will automatically result in increased 
reinsurance cessions by the corporation, consequent upon the reduced 
portfolio, and will also minimize the business ceded from abroad consequent 
upon its reduced capacity. True the overall drain may be reduced significantly 
if corporations were to cease insuring their risks with N. I. C., but whatever 
drain that might continue through the reinsurance of private sector risks 
will be very difficult to stop. We have noted earlier that even within the 
present framework in which the corporation operates there appears to be some 
hope that insurance could play a positive role . in Tanzania's balance of 
payment if the retention capacity maintains its present level of growth 
and if the incoming portfolio continues to be fed from abroad. At some 
point sometime in the future incoming business might exceed the cessions 
transferred abroad and Tanzania would earn foreign exchange through its 
insurance institution. This will not be possible if the domestic portfolio 
shrinks through lack of public sector insurances. Secondly, the argument 
that insurance of capital equipment often results in automatic replacement 
of destroyed assets need not be a serious objection to insurance by 
parastatals. What insurance is all about is to ensure that a certain sum 
of money is payable on the happening of an event against which insurance is 
taken out. Where the planning authority or the Ministry which owns a plant 
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is of opinion that such sum be invested elsewhere the sum insured could 
be paid to such authority or Ministry and then applied to the appropriate 
alternative project. If insurance had not been taken out then the 
construction of a new plant or the improvement of existing plants, as the 
case may be, would still have necessitated drawing funds from some source 
for the purpose. In Tanzania and in view of the lack of capital the 
replacement of destroyed assets may not take place at all or may be delayed 
for some time pending the arrangement of the required funds. The existence 
of an insurance cover undoubtedly facilitates the carrying out of whatever 
remedial action is thought necessary. On the other hand and due to its 
experience in risk management N. I. C. could now provide the necessary 
information pertaining to the nature of losses which afflict the public 
sector, their frequency, their causes and perhaps even the kind of remedial 
action to be taken after a loss occurs. And the establishment of an 
alternative reserve fund by the parastatals is not without its own problems 
A corporation wishing to establish a reserve fund might find itself obliged 
to keep aside all the sums needed to provide an adequate security in the 
case of loss or destruction of capital equipment, and would certainly have 
to reduce its capital investment to meet this requirement. Undoubtedly, 
this will have a direct effect on emplyment, investment and output. 
' And 
even if the fund is to be established by the payment of small premiums, as 
Loxley suggests, the contributions will, in effect, be premiums and these 
1. Robert L. Carter & G. M. Dickinson, Barriers To Trade injnsurance, 
(London : Trade Policy Research Centre, Thames Essay No. 19,1979), p. 47. 
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are better quantified and measured in Tanzania (even on rough estimates) 
by N. I. C. than by any other parastatal. And, undoubtedly, the establishment 
of a reserve fund invested in government paper is tantamount to creating 
a quasi-insurance concern at the Treasury if records are to be kept of 
corporations' contribution to government stocks, and if other administrative 
tasks consequential upon the establishment of the fund are to be discharged. 
The work load may be eased at the corporation but only to be exported to the 
Treasury which might even seek the assistance of the corporation in view 
of its experience in risk management. And, of course, the fund itself 
would also involve the transfer of liquid assets from one public corporation 
to the other with the result that a premium paid by N. D. C., for example, 
might well be used to pay for a claim by Tanzania Tourist Corporation since 
the premiums of each corporation will not be earmarked to cover its own 
losses. There does not appear to be a good reason for the public sector not 
to insure itself with a state-owned insurer even in a socialist country. The 
juridical nature of the ownership of the means of production appears to have 
little to do with the degree of risk to which the means of production are 
exposed. At any rate, not all socialist countries have followed the Polish 
example. In Czechoslavakia, for example, a law categorically prohibited the 
insuring of state property in 1952, but in reforms introduced in 1966 that 
prohibition was lifted and the value of insurance services, even to state 
enterprises, was again recognized. 
) Thus what appears to be the most serious 
1. Karl Urban, The Economic Role of Insurance", Inter-regional Seminar 
on Insurance and Reinsurance, UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/B/C3/83, (Geneva, 
1970), pp. 4-22, at p. 8. 
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objection to the existence of N. I. C. as an insurer for state enterprises 
is not in fact as serious as it sounds. 
Indeed the existence of a state-owned insurer appears to be a better 
solution for the problems which afflict government insurance under a 
regulatory model. None of the problems of public sector insurances in the 
Sudan (which we have examined above) apply to any degree to parastatal's 
insurance in Tanzania. We have seen that the corporation cannot increase 
its premiums at will like Sudanese insurers. The payment of a claim to a 
parastatal in Tanzania is almost automatic especially if a claim is a 
sizeable one. And there is no question of parastatal insurances being 
an obstacle to investment priorities of N. I. C., while the very high 
standard of solvency it maintains provides the utmost security for the 
public sector. 
In utilizing insurance investment for economic development Tanzania 
has also succeeded where the Sudan has failed. In Tanzania the Minister of 
Finance could, in theory, direct the corporation to pour all its premium 
income into the Treasury, and in practice about 80 per cent of the income 
is made available for government borrowing in one way or another. Thus 
the problem of parastatal insurances being exaggerated in relation to the 
actual amount and cost of claims is softened by the flow back of insurance 
premiums into the Treasury and therefrom to the same premium-paying 
parastatals through financial support of the Treasury. In the 
Sudan 
government insurances are essentially losses to the public sector which 
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claims a fraction of its premiums. And although a certain proportion 
of premiums is deposited in banks and is available for government 
borrowing, ultimately this will have to be repaid to the banks and taken 
back, not by a state-owned insurer as in Tanzania, but by the few individuals 
who own the companies. And, of course, the investment of premium income 
primarily benefits those individuals, not the state, which appeared to have 
prejudiced its own chances for using insurance investments by its own 
decision to insure its property. Thus in Tanznaia N. I. C. permits private 
(as well as government) funds to be chanelled into the government coffers; 
in the Sudan government funds are chanelled into private investment. The 
gross premium income in Tanzania amounted to $30m. at the end of 1977,1 
most of which was used by the government; in the Sudan the same amounted 
to $24m. 2 most of which was used in the companies' own interest. 
Our discussion so far is leading towards one obvious conclusion: the 
failure of the regulatory model to allow for a proper utilization of the 
insurance institution for economic development. A regulation code, by 
itself, does not appear to be an adequate intermediary to depend upon in 
I a soft state'3 characterized by weaknesses such as 'deficiencies in ..... 
legislation and, in particular, in low observance and enforcement; lack 
of obedience to rules and directives handed down to public officials......; 
frequent collusion of those officials with powerful persons or groups of 
1. UNCTAD Secretariat, "Third World Insurance at the End of the 1970's, " 
TD/B/C. 3/169/Add. l , 31 , July, 1980. 
(UNCTAD, Geneva, 1980). p. 7 and p. 13. 
2. See generally, Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Supra. 
3. Gunnar Myrdal, "The Soft State in Underdeveloped Countries, " U. C. L. A. Law 
Review, Vol. 15,1968, p. 1120. 
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persons whose conduct they should regulate.., '. The case of the Sudan 
studied in this thesis confirms the existence of virtually all these 
conditions. As we have seen, foreign insurers themselves drafted the Act 
in their best interest and by so doing pre-empted the field of insurance 
regulation before Parliament could pass a much tougher piece of legislation. 
Reinsurance is not subject to control under the Act, rates of premiums 
and policy terms are left to the companies to decide upon according to 
their practice, investment regulations are openly disregarded and the 
con4roller has no adequate capacity to enforce the minimal regulations in 
the Act. Information as to solvency of the companies comes from the 
companies themselves and the manner in which assets and liabilities are 
assessed are determined by them alone. But even when insolvency is 
disclosed it is not likely that the appropriate legal measures will be 
invoked against them. The weakness of the insurance section vis-a-vis 
the market which we have mentioned above, finds expression in the lack of 
a legal department at the section to monitor violations of the Act, the 
lack of an actuary to investigate insurers' solvency, and the lack of a 
qualified accountant to verify annual documents. The crossing of boundaries 
between the section and the industry by the regulation bureaucracy (in the 
direction of the industry) has become an important mechanism by which the 
regulator is co-opted by the regulated and has weakened the section a great 
deal. But any improvement in the capacity of the section to regulate the 
market must first be sanctioned by the industry. Thus the section was 
destined to remain a mere depository of annual documents primarily engaged 
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in the peripheral issues of regulation rather than a watch dog on the 
industry. With little effort the industry could keep the controller 
engaged with the rituals of regulation so as to make his behaviour 
predictable and to keep him a captive of a certain level of movement at 
which his activities are tolerable. To the politically powerful industry 
the controller is essentially a broker who procures the bulk of business 
(free of commission) rather than an enforcer of rules. And from the 
observation of the writer during the time of research at Khartoum, the 
controllers' office is, in the eyes of the industry, really no more than a 
convenient seasonal meeting place from which government insurances are 
obtained every summer. It is situated in the middle of Khartoum (in a 
building owned by the General) and within walking distances from all 
head offices. And for company representatives the controller is one of 
their social milieu whose primary task is to preside over the distribution 
of gains between the companies - not to object to, or vary, terms; but 
to see which government risk is obtained by which company and how best the 
premiums could be paid to it. 
Undoubtedly, the risks are much greater when the task of social and 
economic transformation in an underdeveloped country is entrusted to pieces 
of legislation like the Sudanese Act. Indeed the entire legal order 
(including regulation laws) in many a country in black Africa has not been 
an effective vehicle for bringing about economic change. To Seidman1 this 
was due to the authoritarian nature of the legal order itself. 
2 He defines 
1. Robert B. Seidman, The State, Law and Development, (London: Groom Helm, 
1978). 
2. Ibid., pp. 462-72. 
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law in terms of being 'a process by which government structures choice'. 
' 
To him the legal order 'structures society simultaneously with society's 
structuring of the legal order'2 and the constraints 'that limit choice 
represent the influence of society on the legal order; the fact of choice 
represents the legal order's potential for influencing society'. 
3 African 
'role-occupants' or addressees of law had their choices structured for them 
by an authoritarian colonial order. That authoritarianism was a necessary 
condition for the success of colonial rule and, in turn, reflected the 
nature of colonial hegemony. At independence the economic and social 
structures remained intact to serve the interests of a 'political elite' 
and the ruling class which emerged as beneficiaries of the inherited 
structures. The legal order thus retained its authoritarianism and its 
irrelevance to the needs of genuine socio-economic transformation. The 
failure of development thus 'result[ed] ........... from the contradiction 
between an authoritarian legal order and the participatory imperatives of 
development. '4 And as long as role-occupants remain isolated from the 
democratic process of law-making the legal order will not induce changed 
behaviour and will not bring about economic development. This is, undoubtedly, 
true of many a situation in Africa as Seidman's study has shown. But in the 
context of regulation statutes like The Insurers (Control) Act here, one 
cannot speak of 'authoritarianism' or lack of participation in law-making 
1. Ibid., p. 77. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 468. 
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by role-occupants. The irrelevance of statutes of this sort to the needs 
of development was actually due to participation, in their making, by their 
addressees i. e. insurance companies, rather than to their exclusion from 
the process. When they made the law they did not 'structure' their choices 
or impose upon themselves the constraints which the needs of development 
should have necessitated. And if such a law were to serve the goals of 
real change its powerful role-occupants should, as far as possible, be 
excluded from the process of its promulgation. 
Seidman's analysis appear to have much in common with t1illiam 
Harvey's studyl of the role which law and legal institutions could play in 
the preservation of 'democratic values' while 'stimulating and guiding the 
modernization of economies'. 
2 After a short stay in Nkrumah's Ghana (2 years) 
Harvey suggested that an authoritarian African legal order was unlikely to 
bring about 'modernization' (he rejects the concept of development because 
it implied to him a teleogical view of social movement). According to Harvey, 
only the support of democratic consent could be a vehicle 'for the achievement 
of law and effective legal action'3 which would ultimately bring about 




[T]he modernizing activities of the various 
institutions created by law would be the 
means to move the general population towards 
levels of understanding and value agreements 
that would permit greater reliance on modernizing 
activity guided and regulated by general norms. 
1. William B. Harvey, "Democratic Values, Social Change, and Legal 
Institutions in the Development Process". In Arnold Rivkin (ed. ), Nations 
By Design (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1968), pp-62-82- 
2. I bid., p. 62. 
3. Ibid., p. 81. 
4. Ibid. , p. 79. 
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Myrdal's analysis of the 'soft state' and the problems which afflict the 
regulatory model (discussed so far) reveal Harvey's hopes as too unrealistic. 
The Sudanese model provides sufficient evidence that private activity could 
not be effectively 'guided and regulated by general norms. ' Indeed greater 
reliance on private activity directly contradicts the goals of equal 
distribution of wealth in society and creates a situation in which public 
interest and rapid development are sacrificed to entrepreneurial promotion. 
This in turn perpetuates underdevelopment rather than achieves development 
as Harvey has suggested. And the existence of a law - an exercise in 
democracy as it might appear to some - of the Sudanese type, actually worsens 
the chances of a state in making use of its industry in any effective manner, 
as we have seen, in contrast to systems in which law is subordinated to 
state ownership of the institution. For it gives the state a false sense of 
security i. e. that the industry is regulated, while the publicity given to 
its existence wards off the industry's potential critics. The mere existence 
of the Act in the Sudan's statute book performs a function in Sudanese society 
closely related to a function for law which Thurman Arnold formulated thus: 
l 
It is part of the function of law to give 
recognition to ideals representing the exact 
opposite of established conduct. Most of its 
complications arise from the necessity of 
pretending to do one thing, while actually 
doing another. 
1. Thurman Arnold, "Law as Symbolism", in Vilhem Aubert (ed. ), 
Sociology of Law, (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 47. 
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What is pretended is that insurance is being regulated in the interest of 
development; what the legislature is actually doing is to allow entrepreneurs 
all the freedom of action they need. It is part of the symbolism of the law 
which maintains the status quo in the interest of the powerful. But contrary 
to Harvey's hopes for a 'modernization', or rather development, being 
achieved through legal action our discussion so far favours the direct 
model in which all defects of a regulatory code are taken care of by state 
ownership of the institution, and under which the role of law in development 
is subordinated to that of the wider state intervention in the running of the 
institution. And what justifies state intervention is the fact that the 
market mechanism in most underdeveloped countries is little developed and 
the state is often unable to exert control through market institutions to 
augment regulation statutes. Public enterprises therefore 'offer the 
prospect of a more direct form of control .'1 
The superiority of the direct model to the regulatory model does not 
appear to be in doubt and its suitability to the needs of underdeveloped 
countries is, to a large extent, substantiated by the Tanzanian experience. 
The ownership of the institution by the Tanzanian state has not only 
facilitated proper utilization of the institution but has actually enabled 
the state to exercise the most effective form of control over other enter- 
prises through the allocation of funds. And as we have seen in Chapter Five, 
by virtue of its ownership of N. I. C. the state has successfully integrated 
the corporation into the economic plans of the country. In contrast to 
1. Yash Ghai, "Fishery Parastatal in Developing Countries", Supra., p. 83. 
-345- 
Tanzania, the government in the Sudan has failed to exercise any form of 
negative operational controls upon the insurance sector. And in the absence 
of coherent national strategies and objectives, insurance regulation was 
bound to belittle more than a futile exercise, its objectives never 
articulated with precision, and its effectiveness more dependent on the 
personal qualities of the bureaucracy than on scientific principles of 
regulation. Tanzania has a lot to offer to other Third World countries 
wishing to use their insurance industries properly; the Sudan has nothing 
to offer. 
And in the literature there is hardly any argument against the nationalizatior 
of insurance in underdeveloped countries which could be taken seriously. One 
argument put forward by Irukwu1 is that nationalization of the industry is 
bound to deprive a government of the taxes payable by insurance companies'. This 
argument necessarily assumes that companies pay more money by way of taxes than 
they actually earn, and does not call for further comment. He also argued2 
that nationalization would deprive citizens from having access to the controller 
of insurance who could act as an independent arbitor when a complaint is lodged 
against a company. We have seen that the controller of insurance in the Sudan 
has absolutely no powers to deal with public complaints and that when a 
complaint is made to him (on the basis of his status vis-a-vis the industry) 
he could only intervene to the extent desired by the parties (which effectively 
means by the company against which the complaint is made) and his decisions 
would not have the force of law. Indeed, nationalization - in theory - offers 
1. J. O. Irukwu, op. cit., p. 177. 
2. Ibid. 
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a better chance for the public to have their disputes settled before legal 
channels are attempted, that is, of course, where the appropriate machinery 
for dispute settlement exists which is not the case in Tanzania. Another 
argument against nationalization is that a state-owned insurer is likely 'to 
receive little support from citizens or commercial organizations of other 
countries'1 as these are alleged to prefer having contacts with private 
capital than with publically owned institutions. This assumption is simply 
not true in the case of N. I. C. which has received a lot of business from 
abroad while the Sudan, in contrast, is merely an exporter of reinsurance to 
other countries including Tanzania itself: It. is also assumed that the 
problems of management of the insurance fund would multiply once a government 
takes over an insurance industry since there hardly exists a high quality 
management ready to run the enormous portfolio. 
2 There is some truth in 
this argument, indeed, as we have seen earlier, in the case of N. I. C. in 
the immediate post-nationalization period the lack of expertise was readily 
reflected in enormous administrative costs which amounted to over half the 
accumulated premiums. But undoubtedly a great portfolio is more likely to 
justify the training of personnel than in the case of a small portfolio as 
we have mentioned earlier. And in Tanzania today there is a high standard 
of management and more than one institution in the country offer training 
facilities for insurance personnel. The Sudan certainly lags behind in this 
respect. Indeed nationalization appears to be the best remedy for improving 
the standard of management and expertise in any market in underdeveloped 
1. Ibid., p. 178. 
2. Ibid. 
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countries. Being a service, the production of insurance is a labour- 
intensive activity, demanding a well-educated labour-force, including a 
wide range of professional expertise in financial, legal and technical 
subjects. 
l It is unlikely that each company would have its own lawyer, 
actuary, reinsurance expert, underwriting expert etc., in a market where 
several insurers operate. And in so far as nationalization involves the 
unification of portfolios there will be a concentration of skilled manpower 
and expertise in one concern. 
Carter and Dickinson2 have also warned against restrictions on foreign 
supply of insurance often imposed by countries which 'have adopted socialist 
policies of taking into state ownership all ......... their domestic 
insurance market. '3 The consequences of such restrictions are that: 
4 
[T]he lack of insurance cover [which might 
follow from restricting foreign supply of 
insurance] could result in a reduction in 
the risk-taking propensity of enterprises 
so reducing output and employment. Even if 
more risky investment decisions are not 
deferred, output and employment could still 
suffer if firms decide to carry a higher level 
1. An outline of the educational and training needs of the industry can 
be found in the UNCTAD Study Report, "Insurance Education for Developing 
countries, " TD/B/C. 3/121/ Suppl. l (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1975). 
2. R. L. Carter & G. M. Dickinson, Barriers To Trade in Insurance, Supra. 
3. R. L. Carter & G. M. Dickinson, "Economic Effects of Restrictions on 
International Trade in Reinsurance", a paper presented at the Third 
International Reinsurance Seminar at Cambridge, 4th-6th April, 1977. 
4. Barriers To Trade in Insurance, op. cit. p. 47. 
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of working capital to cover the extra 
operating risks. Moreover, the absence 
of an adequate supply of property and liability insurance for new, technologically- 
advanced products and processes may adversely 
affect the growth of a particular economy. 
There is no disagreement about the need for foreign supply of 
reinsurance for risks which have a high foreign exchange content such as 
refineries, aircrafts, and the like. These could be, indeed, need be, 
ceded to more able reinsurers in whose favour the law of large numbers 
operates on a world level. But Carter and Dickinson seemed to have over- 
looked the fact that the restriction of foreign supply of insurance is 
naturally accompanied by the establishment of national insurance firms to 
fill the gaps in the insurance market. The risk-taking propensity will 
obviously increase rather than decrease if the national firm or firms were 
to replace foreign ones and take responsibility for the entire nation's 
insurance. In the case of N. I. C., for example, the issued and paid up 
capital has increased from shs. 2m. in 1967 to shs. lOm. by 1977 and, accordingly, 
the potential for risk-taking has increased a great deal. And asparastatals' 
risks are insured by the corporation there is no question of excessive 
capital retention by a parastatal so as to be its own insurer. Thus neither 
output nor employment have suffered through attempts to keep aside large 
liquid reserves to cater for contingencies that might arise. The responsibility 
is directly shifted or transferred to N. I. C. On the other hand and although 
ultimately the solvency of the corporation is ensured by the Treasury the 
corporation's own reserve fund i. e. the general reserve fund, has increased 
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from only shs. 2.3m. in 1970 to shs. 74.3m. by the end of 1977.1 To the 
extent that risk-taking capacity increases with the volume of capital and 
reserves, the present insurance industry in Tanzania is more competent than 
ever to provide a very wide range of covers. 
We may safely argue now that though nationalization by itself is not 
a panacea for all the ills of the industry if offers the most adequate 
framework within which the industry could be made to operate in the interest 
of a particular society. The Sudan which refrained from nationalizing 
insurance has also failed to make use of it in any meaningful sense; 
Tanzania which nationalized insurance has made several breakthroughts hardly 
achieved alsewhere in black Africa. Even Loxley - N. I. C. 's most articulate 
critic - admits that 'the direct financial gains from nationalizing insurance 
[in Tanzania] undoubtedly outweigh those from nationalizing any other sector. '2 
But, unfortunately, features common to the industries in the two countries do 
exist. In both countries the industry still bears all the hallmarks of its 
metropolitan model with little chance of adapting to local needs, although 
in Tanzania there has been an attempt to involve a larger segment of the 
population through cheap life insurance and crop insurance. In both 
countries the public is still at the mercy of insurers when a claim is made, 
although in Tanzania regulations could be made to govern the settlement of 
disputes. And although the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to deal with 
individual claims against the corporation, the Party and Parliament could 
intervene if the corporation becomes a source of a public outcry. Even 
Mwongozo could be invoked against the corporation since it provides that 
1. The Insurance Industry in Tanz ania: 10th Year Independence Anniversary, 
91, cit. p. 22, also the Annual Report for 1977, pp-9-10- 
2. John Loxley, "The Monetary System of Tanzania Since 1967... ', op. cit. p. 128. 
-350- 
'the activities of parastatals should be a source of satisfaction and not 
discontent'. ) But these are theoretical possibilities only; in practice 
it is hard to distinguish between the institution in the two countries as 
each appears to be worse than the other. Nevertheless any argument against 
nationalization of insurance which invokes the possible advantages of 
competition2 must weigh such advantages against others which nationalization 
might bring in its train. At any rate, as the case of the Sudan indicates 
competition could be eliminated by a device such as a co-insurance scheme. 
Also, in the two countries a large portion of the insurance fund is invested 
in real estate with little benefit to the common man, although in Tanzania 
the larger portion of insurance funds pours into the Treasury. And the 
markets of both countries are still open to professional reinsurers and 
direct insurers, although Tanzania is more resistant to their expansion. 
Nationalization of insurance in Tanzania was not a futile exercise, 
but it was not accompanied by a redefinition of the goals and functions of 
the institution in the post-Arusha period. This in turn has allowed the 
head office bureaucracy to pursue policies and goals identical to those of 
a capitalist insurance company anywhere in the world, but in so doing it 
only increased the vulnerability of the clients of the industry. That is 
why the differences between the insurance institution in Tanzania and in the 
Sudan appear more like differences of degree than of kind. 
1. Para. 33. 
2. This is the classic argument against insurance nationalization, see 
Irukwu, op. cit., p. 177, also J. C. Keir, "Nationalization of Insurance 
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